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Introduction
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• . • . • , - / / * •
Ever since Thorstein Veblen (1898:374) proposed his famous question "Why is
Economics not an Evolutionary Science" theorists have been trying to incorporate
biological concepts into economics. The introduction of evolutionary analogies into
economics by early work of influential scholars such as Marshall (1890),
Schumpeter (1942) and Alchian (1950) however did not lead to a fundamental
change in economic thinking. Evolutionary ideas turned out to have only a modest
impact on mainstream economic theory and did not challenge the position of the
traditional neo-classical school of thought as the dominant paradigm in economic
theory. Clark and Juma (1991) put forward three main factors which accounted for
the observation that economic theory tends to neglect evolutionary concepts. "....
first, the limited knowledge on evolutionary and human behaviour opened the
way to arguments by analogy; such arguments are often fallacious. Second, social
change was not obviously gradual, and therefore the theory was not particularly
consistent with the observations of social historians (especially of the Marxists).
Third, the rules of the hard sciences (especially Newtonian physics) combined with
the Cartesian philosophy of nature as automata and the Baconian appeal to
empirical rigour, had become the legitimate view of reality. And economics readily
adopted this mechanical world-view" (Clark and Juma, 1991:45). In spite of this
widespread aversion against evolutionary ideas in mainstream economic theory,
the 1970s showed a steady growing interest in evolutionary perspectives. This was
particularly due to the difficulties of the dominant neo-classical paradigm to deal
with the growing complexity and radical changing nature of our society. Especially
the growing impact of technology was difficult to grasp in the traditional
frameworks. This led a number of economists to search for alternative approaches
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that were better equipped to deal with patterns of change and instability. Their
search soon turned to the biological sciences which featured a promising and
already well developed framework for the analysis of dynamic change. Since
Darwin published his Origin of the Species' biological theorists have been involved
in the study of longitudinal time-bound phenomena. The long tradition of
evolutionary thought in biological sciences paved the way for economists to go
beyond the static notions of neo-classical theories and enabled them to construct an
inherent dynamic framework. The search for alternative scientific paradigms in
biology led to two distinct but closely related new frameworks. The first frame-
work was sparked by seminal work of Winter (1964, 1971, 1975), Nelson and
Winter (1982) and Dosi (1984,1988) and would eventually lead to the creation of a
school of thought based on evolutionary economic theories. The second framework
thriving on work by Stinchcombe (1965), Hannan and Freeman (1977,1984,1989),
Aldrich (1979) and Carroll (1987,1988) constituted another school of thought which
would soon be known as the organizational ecology school. As in biological theory,
evolutionary and ecological approaches address different questions. Evolutionary
theories are primarily concerned with the ability of species (or economic actors) to
adapt to changing environments, whereas ecological theories tend to focus on the
relative importance of specific species (or organizational forms) under different
environmental conditions. We might therefore say that evolutionary and ecological
theories study the same process from a complementary point of view. Although
many theorists would argue that these theoretical perspectives are still in their
infancy, the growing number of publications, the establishment of a journal
dedicated to evolutionary economics (Journal of Evolutionary Economics) and the
publication of seminal books on evolutionary economics by Nelson and Winter
(1982) and on organizational ecology by Hannan and Freeman (1989) can be seen as
indicators of a rapid maturation of biology inspired approaches to economics and
organizational theory. '
In this thesis we will demonstrate that the use of dynamic insights which were
originally developed in biology can improve our current understanding of the
evolution of complex industrial systems over time. Our commitment to non-
conventional biology inspired approaches does not imply that we completely
ignore the important theoretical contributions made by neo-classical theorists. We,
however think that although the neo-classical framework can be extremely well
suited to deal with complex theoretical problems, it is often less well suited to deal
with dynamic patterns of change and instability. Although more recent neo-
classical models incorporate imperfect information and uncertainty and are much
more dynamic than the earlier models, Krepps (1990) has argued that incorpo-
rating all kinds of costs such as adjustment costs, search costs
 etc. in a neo-classical
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framework seems to be an awesome undertaking and is likely to be impossible.
Instead of rewriting traditional economic theory we will therefore follow the lead
of more dynamic heterodox theories that are particularly developed to study
longitudinal time bound phenomena.
This study departs from a long tradition in economic theory which studied the
development of market structures, technological development and company
strategies as separate entities. It tries to provide an alternative to the traditional
Structure - Conduct - Performance (SCP) approach which, for a long time, has
dominated industrial organisation theory and industrial economies'. In our
contribution technological development is not regarded as an exogenous variable,
but is seen as an endogenous factor that is not only influenced by the existing
market structure but also by the innovative actions of particular categories of
companies. Following Schumpeter's notion of 'creative destruction' we will argue
that technological changes are able to destroy existing industry structures and
create new ones. Our main argument is that the evolution of complex industrial
systems is shaped by the interplay of industrial structures, company strategies and
technological developments. Therefore, in order to understand the complex
dynamics of industrial systems it is compulsory to analyze not only the develop-
ment of market structures, but we also need a thorough understanding of the
nature of technological change and the role that is played by various organizational
forms over time. Central to our approach is the model of natural selection. The
natural selection model was addressed by Darwin and Wallace in 1858 and is
based on the principle of the 'survival of the fittest' (Winter, 1964). The model
argues that species which are best adapted to a specific environment survive, while
other less adapted species die. In this study we will argue that firms better
equipped to meet environmental changes than others, may grow successfully,
while other less successful firms decline. However, unlike orthodox theories,
competitive forces are not supposed to establish a static equilibrium in which
successful firms achieve their optimal size, and unsuccessful firms disappear
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hagedoorn, 1984). Our contribution proposes a more
dynamic analysis in which technological changes, market structures and firm
strategies constitute a dynamic interactive system.
;» Our adherence to biology inspired theories does not imply that we accept the
complete models presented in these theories. Neither do we plead for the
gratuitous reproduction of biological models into economics and business studies.
' The first to propose the Structure - Conduct - Performance (SCP) approach was Edward Mason in
the 1930s (see e.g. Mason, 1939). His work described a one-directional relationship between structure,
conduct and performance. **•»'•'* *»-"' ** ^
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As in biology, ecological and evolutionary models can be used to describe different
phenomena. Evolutionary economic theories concentrate on incremental changes
over time whereas ecological theorists tend to focus on the evolution of
organizations of a particular type: i.e. take a population level view. Although both
frameworks generate an adequate description of the dynamics at each level, they
do not provide us with a method for integrating the distinct levels analytically
(Levinthal, 1990). In this thesis we will argue that if we want to describe the full
dynamics of organizations and market structures, it is necessary to integrate the
two distinct levels of analysis into one all encompassing framework. Describing the
dynamics of industrial systems itself is however not sufficient. In order to
understand these dynamics we need a thorough understanding of the underlying
mechanisms which induce these systems to change. We will argue that in high
technology industries the main engine for change is technological progress. We
therefore need a thorough understanding of the nature of these technological
changes. As suggested by Rosenberg (1982), opening up the 'black box' of
technology is considered to be the first step in a process which leads to a better
understanding of the complex dynamics of industrial systems. For a detailed
understanding of the nature of technological change we will build on the
elaborated framework developed by evolutionary economists. For the study of the
evolution of market structures and the importance of particular organizational
types under various environmental circumstances we will take on a more
ecological inspired perspective. The integration of both theoretical perspectives
enables us to cope with the interaction between the previously separate entities.
Our approach is however not only biologically inspired. Although ecological and
evolutionary approaches form the basis of our framework we take on a more
eclectic approach, combining evolutionary concepts with ideas from strategic
management, organization theory, industrial economics, new institutionalism and
international business studies.
From an empirical perspective it is necessary to create a better understanding
of the evolution of industry structures, the strategies undertaken by various
categories of companies, the broad patterns of technological evolution, the
intemationalisation tendencies that characterize today's markets and the networks
of cooperating companies. The core of our empirical study will focus on the
historical development of three major sectors of the information technology
industry: i.e. computers, telecommunications and semiconductors. We decided to
study the information technology industry because this industry can be referred to
as one of the most dynamic industry of all times. Both market and technological
evolution have been very rapid and competition has always been very intense. The
second reason to study IT sectors is that the underlying technology bases of these
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present the industry is undergoing a period of major consolidation and
reorganization. We will end the chapter with a critical evaluation of the hypotheses
that are put forward in the second chapter. We will then consider how well the
assumed pattern of evolution of industrial systems fits the evolution of the
computer industry.
C/iapter /bur deals with the development of a previously strongly regulated
sector: the telecommunications industry. This sector is particulary interesting
because it has been traditionally dominated by so-called 'national champions' but is
now challenged by new firms that are eager to grasp the opportunities that emerge
as a result of both technological as well as institutional changes. After we describe
the historical evolution of the telecommunications industry we will evaluate the
predictions of our integrated framework under the specific conditions of the
(regulated) telecommunications industry.
C/iapfer /iue describes the evolution of the semiconductor industry. This
industry is especially important as a generator of technological progress in other IT
fields. In contrast to other IT sectors, competition in the semiconductor industry has
been dominated by relatively small, technology oriented companies. Technological
progress in this sector has always been extremely fast and forces of 'creative
destruction' have brought about significant market structural changes.
Because the three IT sectors are marked by structural, institutional and
technological differences it is very interesting to examine the effectiveness of our
integrated framework under such very diverse industrial settings. Although there
are major differences between these sectors they share one very important feature:
i.e. technological progress in each sector is increasingly dependent on progress in
the other sectors. It will be argued that the basic design parameters that form the
core of the relevant technological regimes have become increasingly similar and
that the underlying technology bases are likely to converge in the near future.
C/iopfer six is therefore concerned with an analysis of the effects of this process of
technological convergence. The basic argument is that the convergence of
technological paradigms of the three previously separate markets may lead to a
significant shift in the boundaries of the markets and technologies involved. The
major aim of the chapter is to examine whether the so-called convergence of
information and communications technologies has led to a growing similarity of
the firms that are active in the different industry sectors. Empirical testing of the
convergence hypothesis will be based on patent data and on patterns of inter-
company strategic alliance behaviour.
C/iapter seuen is concerned with a detailed empirical analysis of cooperative
behaviour within the IT industry. In this chapter we will argue that the strategic
value of alliances can only be assessed if one pays attention to the structure of the
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total network in which a firm is embedded. We will show that with few exceptions
agreements are generally studied from a dyadic or firm level perspective. Such a
perspective seems however simply inadequate to study industry sectors where
virtually all companies are linked to each other. The chapter will start with a
general theoretical introduction on the use of strategic alliances and proceeds with
the identification of historical trends in strategic technology alliances and the
analysis of the developments of the basic networks over time. The structure of the
networks in each IT sector and the positions of the major actors in these networks
are analyzed by means of a statistical technique which is known as network
analysis. Network analysis enables us to examine the overall network and at the
same time provides us with an examination of the role and importance of the
individual players in the network.
In C/iapfer eig/if we discuss one of the most noticeable phenomena that
characterizes the present day information technology industry, namely
internationalization. We will make use of recent data in order to asses the
importance of the internationalization of innovative activities during the 1980s. In
this chapter we will also pay attention to the importance of national backgrounds
of companies in relation to their corporate strategies. We address the question of
whether large firms are gradually losing their national characteristics and become
truly globalized companies. An empirical analysis is performed in order to
understand whether firms, operating in such dynamic and globalized sector as the
international information technology industry, can still be identified in terms of
their country of origin, given their structural, technological and strategic
characteristics.
Owpter nine is concerned with an evaluation of the results of our empirical
studies and with an appraisal of the usefulness of our integrated biology inspired
approach. We will start with a summary of the findings of the first five chapters.
We will consider how the predictions of our integrated framework have been
evaluated under the diverse conditions that characterize the various industry
sectors. The second part of the chapter is concerned with the results of our
empirical analyses of the three major forces that have marked the development of
the IT sector over the past decade: i.e. technological convergence, cooperation and
globalization. Finally we will present some suggestions for future research.
• ' . ? . . . . . • •
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Theoretical Framework
E "JX
- v f .r;;: .K)r *•;; ' • ; ; . * . . •;.-
In order to obtain a better understanding of evolutionary economics and
organizational ecology we will start with a brief introduction to these theories. We
then proceed with a critical evaluation of both theories and an explanation of how
they fit into our integrated framework. This is followed by the discussion of a
number of hypotheses that are to be tested in the next three chapters.
2.1. Evolutionary Economics '
2.2.2. Euo/wtionary Economic Tteory
Evolutionary economic theory emerged as a reaction to orthodox theories that were
being criticized as lacking ".... descriptive realism in the characterization of
behaviour and events", and which were not equipped to deal with uncertainty and
change in advanced theoretical work and many applied contexts (Nelson and
Winter, 1982:33). Textbook neo-classical theories have been widely heralded for
their mathematical and logical structure. These features provided textbook neo-
classical theory with an inherent logical structure, but at the same time removed it
far from reality. Textbook neo-classical theories have been criticized on many
different grounds but the larger part of these criticisms are related to three major
issues, i.e. the simplistic characterization of the firm and the use of information, the
static underpinnings of these theories and the awkward treatment of technological
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change*. These 'weaknesses' of so-called 'orthodox' theories led Nelson and Winter
(1982:33) to use an analogy stating that ".... orthodoxy builds a rococo logical palace
on loose empirical sand". Others used the term 'economics of Nirvana' to refer to
the, in their perception, unrealistic notions of the orthodox neo-classical economists
(Kay, 1986)'.
In textbook neo-classical theory firms are seen as homogenous units which act
completely rationally. All information which is necessary to maximize profits is
readily and freely available, i.e. there is perfect information. Evolutionary theorists
try to create more realistic models of the role and behaviour of firms in their
economic environment. Largely influenced by Herbert Simon's (1955,1959) concept
of bounded rationality, they argue that economic actors cannot conceive all the
possible alternatives in our complex and continuous changing world (Winter, 1964,
1971, 1975; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Incomplete information ensures that firms
are merely satisficing rather than maximizing profits. The concept of profit
satisficing or 'striving for profit' implies that if existing strategies work well firms
do not feel the need to change their strategy. Our preoccupation with the
uncertainty and dynamics of turbulent high technology industries makes the
distinction between profit maximizing and profit satisficing very important.
According to Nelson and Winter (1982:31) ".... in a sufficient calm and repetitive
decision context, the distinction between striving for profit and profit maximization
may be of little moment, but in a context of substantial change it matters a great
deal".
In the textbook neo-classical framework profit maximizing behaviour of firms
was assumed to establish a static equilibrium*. Evolutionary theorists try to replace
these static notions by an inherently dynamic framework. In such a framework the
analysis of static states is replaced by the analysis of change over a long period of
time. In analogy to biological evolutionary theories the evolutionary economic
model is based on the assumption that change is gradual and cumulative. In an
evolutionary framework economic and organizational changes are primarily due to
the interaction of three fundamental forces: variation, selection and retention
(Campbell, 1969; Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; Aldrich, 1979). Van'fltion refers to the
differences among organizations with respect to their organizational structures and
* For a critical assessment of neo-classical theories we refer to e.g. Winter, 1964, 1971; Nelson and
Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1984,1988; Hagedoom, 1989; Clark and Juma, 1991.
*These criticisms amount to the claim that in textbook neo-classical economics the relationships are so
idealized that they are unlikely to exist in reality.
•* A static equilibrium can be seen as a state of the world in which feedback mechanisms do not induce
changes in a firm's behaviour.
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strategies. Deliberate strategic choices account for most of the planned variation
whereas unplanned variation occurs through strategic mistakes or as a result of
incomplete information. A-symmetry between organizations is subsequently
reinforced by the cumulativeness, tacitness, and partial appropriability of
knowledge (Dosi, 1988). In contrast to the textbook neo-classical notion of
knowledge as a public good, evolutionary theorists argue that knowledge is often
very difficult to transfer (See Nelson and Winter, 1982; Freeman, 1982; Dosi and
Orsenigo, 1988). Such is especially the case for what Polanyi (1958) called 'tacit
knowledge'. Tacit knowledge refers to knowledge which cannot be transferred in
codified form. Firm specific tacit knowledge is often accumulated within a firm by
processes of learning-by-doing and learning-by-using (Arrow, 1962b; Rosenberg,
1982). The accumulated tacit knowledge in combination with the more general
available public knowledge comprises the knowledge base of a company and
determines the a-symmetric character of organizations. Variation among
organizations is essential for the successful operation of selection mechanisms. In
an evolutionary economic framework the term se/ecfi'on is used to describe the
economic equivalent of the natural selection process as put forward by Darwin and
Wallace. The concept of natural selection is based on the principle of the survival
of the fittest' (Winter, 1964) and argues that species that are best adapted to a
specific environment survive, while other less adapted species die. Inspired by this
conception of 'natural selection', Alchian (1950) stressed the importance of selection
among firms on the basis of their ability to make profits. He asserted that "... those
who realize positive profits are the survivors; those who suffer losses disappear"
(Alchian, 1950:213). This idea is in accordance with the notion of Schumpeterian
competition, in which a-symmetries between organizations may lead to a process
of 'creative destruction'. Firms better equipped to meet environmental changes than
others, may grow, while other less successful firms decline. However, unlike in
orthodox theories, competitive forces do not establish a static equilibrium in which
successful firms achieve their optimal size, and unsuccessful firms disappear
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hagedoorn, 1984). Instead the industry is in a constant
disequilibrium moving from one state to the other. Variation and selection are
however not sufficient to bring about changes in the economic system. Selection
takes place only if there are firms that are not able to achieve an optimal 'fit' with
their environment. Thus, in order to make selection effective there have to be some
sort of retention mechanisms in the system. The main sources of retention in an
evolutionary framework are brought about by so-called organizational routines.
Evolutionary theorists have argued that apart from a stochastic element in the
choice of decisions and their outcomes, most of the behaviour of firms is relatively
predictable and repetitive. Nelson and Winter (1982) described such patterns of
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behaviour as routines. Routines can be compared to biological genes because they
govern a firm's behaviour and are inheritable in the sense that future behaviour is
largely based on today's characteristics (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Evolutionary
theorists assert that firms grow by the replication of successful routines'. The
continued reliance on basic routines however severely reduces the speed of
adaptation of organizations. Because adaptation to new environments is generally
low in relation to the speed of change adaptation is often not possible and selection
is likely to take place*. Dosi (1983, 1984) enriched Nelson and Winter's model by
introducing the Lamarckian-inspired concept of 'mutation generating mechanisms'.
In a Lamarckian approach not only Darwinian ex-post selection takes place, but
also feedback effects are taken into account.
2. L2. Tec/zno/o^ icaZOjflwge as aw Epo/whonary Process
One of the areas in which the evolutionary approach has been rather successful is
the study of technological change. From a textbook neo-classical point of view
technological progress is often described as merely a shift along the production
function. Technological change is often considered to be an exogenous variable and
the nature of technological change remains a 'black box' (Rosenberg, 1982)^ . In an
attempt to open up this 'black box', evolutionary economic theory studies
technological change as an endogenous time-bound process. Evolutionary
economic theorists believe that technological innovations are the outcome of
deliberately planned research and that technological progress is considered to be
an incremental cumulative process that follows consistent technological paths and
that is evaluated by its 'selection' environment*. Technological paths or trajectories
are often shaped by selection or focusing mechanisms which guide technological
progress into certain directions. In evolutionary theory these focusing mechanisms
are often referred to as technological paradigms. In analogy with Kuhn's definition
This process of replication can be compared to the genetic inheritence process in biology (Winter,
1971; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Winter, 1990). •
* As Freeman (1991) has pointed out, the natural selection model should not be seen as a one-
directional process, but should be seen as a process in which all three stages interact simultaneously.
These criticisms refer to the strong assumptions often embedded in economic models that
technological change is exogenous. We must however not neglect the efforts of neo-classical theorists
to endogenize technological change into their models.
*The selection environment consists of market and non-market forces which feed back the likelihood
of success and profitability of certain technological innovations.
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of a scientific paradigm and inspired by Rosenberg's (1976) 'focusing devices', Dosi
(1988) has defined a technological paradigm as " a 'pattern' of solution of
selected techno-economic problems based on highly selected principles derived
from the natural sciences, jointly with specific rules aimed to acquire new
knowledge and safeguarding it, whenever possible against rapid diffusion to the
competitors" (Dosi, 1988:1127). The establishment of a new paradigm entails a
'communis opinio' about the nature of the solutions of 'selected techno-economic
problems' (Dosi, 1988). In such framework the direction of technological progress is
more or less irreversible. Although irreversibility is generally associated with
acquired system-scale economies or prior investments in education and equipment
(David, 1985) often the focusing capabilities of the prevailing technological
paradigm are much more important, in the sense that while technological progress
is locked-in a specific path, previous technologies are disregarded and eventually
'forgotten' (Cantwell, 1990). However, unlike biological evolution, technical
evolution can in some instances be characterized by partial reversibility to previous
technologies (De Bresson, 1987). Nonetheless, reverting to previously abandoned
technologies is often very difficult and seems to be very rare in practice.
Technological paradigms often evolve from a conception of vague ideas into very
strong paradigms which blindfold technicians from pursuing other more uncertain
directions. Within those technological paradigms progress develops along
relatively straight paths which are referred to as technological trajectories (Dosi,
1983). Although this may seem to be a handicap for rapid technological progress it
turns out to be an essential condition for the development of a certain technology.
Path dependency makes the research process cumulative and facilitates the rapid
expansion of the boundaries of a technology. .• -.,.•. -.»_. r.
The emergence of a new paradigm gives way to series of technological
innovations and experiments. If specific experiments accumulate a critical mass of
consensus then a technological regime may be constituted (Nelson and Winter,
1982). A technological regime can be seen as a specific technical system which
operates within the boundaries of a paradigm. Technological regimes are often
physically embodied in so called basic designs' which arise if there is consensus
about a specific product or process which stands out above other products or
processes. A basic design establishes a foundation on which other developments
can be based and often serves as a kind of 'technological guidepost' (Sahal, 1981),
which steers the direction of future improvements in technology.
Some authors have used the term dominant design to refer to the same concept (Abernathy and
Utterback, 1978) •• • . - - • - • = < ••--,-.- • « . - . . •, •;--,. > . ; . U - * : - , •- • • : ^ « . - . • ; . : •
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Although technological paradigms and technological regimes may be very
strong for a considerable period of time, technologies do not follow the same
technological path forever. Kuhn (1970:64) argued that ".... novelty emerges only
with difficulty, manifested by resistance, against a background provided by
expectation." Thus, a change of regime may arise whenever there are diminishing
returns in improving the basic characteristics over time or when other technological
developments give way to a change of the basic characteristics of a design. Change
can however also been induced when there are significant changes in the nature of
the selection environment which favour other technological alternatives. <.' • v T
2 . 2 . O r g a n i z a t i o n a l E c o l o g y •••' •>•'•• = ••-'S.'f:; ..i= r- :,.;;.";-<«:
Originating from a different discipline (sociology), but also inspired by theories of
biological evolution, a new approach to organizational theory was introduced in
the mid 1970s: the organizational ecology approach. Whereas evolutionary
theorists oppose primarily to the assumptions of orthodox neo-classical theorists,
ecological organizational theories can be seen as a reaction to contemporary
organizational theories which stress the flexibility and adaptability of organizations
in response to their changing environments. Whereas a large part of the
organizational and strategic management literature views organizations as rapid
flexible adapters, organizational ecologists argue that most of the variation in
organizations comes about by the creation of new organizational types and the
demise of old ones and is only for a small part influenced by adaptive behaviour of
organizations. Whereas organizational and strategic management theory has
focused on adaptive change within organizations, organizational ecologists
emphasize the importance of inertial forces that prevent organizations from
achieving the required adaption. It is claimed that in a rapid changing environment
it is doubtful whether firms are capable of changing their forms fast enough to deal
effectively with a new environmental state. Ecologists refer to this relatively slow
process of adaption as 'relative inertia': i.e. relative in comparison to environmental
changes. Sometimes changes in the environment are so radical that adaption to
these changes is not possible. Hannan and Freeman (1977:957) have used the
analogy ".... failing churches do not become retail stores nor do firms transform
themselves into churches" to characterize the difficulties that organizations face
when they try to adapt to radical changes. From an ecological perspective inertia
arises from both internal as well as from external pressures (Hannan and Freeman,
1977). Internal pressures comprise; (1) sunk costs in plants, equipment, and
specialized personnel; (2) the bounded rationality of firms and imperfect
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information; (3) resistance to change from organizational members; (4) the presence
of normative rules and standard procedures. External pressures include; (1) legal
and fiscal entry and exit barriers; (2) difficulties in acquiring information about the
environment; (3) a decrease of the legitimacy of organizations, due to selection
forces which favour reliable and accountable organizations.
In order to grasp the complex dynamics of our present-day society the
organizational ecology school tries to explain how different types of organizations
survive or fail under different environmental settings. Ecological theorists are
therefore primarily concerned with vital rates: i.e. foundings and disbandings of
organizations. Although ecological dynamics take place at three different levels:
community, population and organization, most analyses have dealt with the
population level (Carroll, 1984; Astley, 1985). Populations consist of organizations
that share a specific organizational form. The populational dynamics in an
ecological framework are generally based on two central concepts: competition and
legitimation (Schreuder and van Witteloostuijn, 1990). Competition can be seen as
the rivalry between populations for a limited amount of resources, whereas
legitimacy can be described as the amount of social acceptance of a specific type of
organization. The strength of competitive forces is largely determined by the so-
called carrying capacity of an environment. Carrying capacity is referred to as the
maximum ability of a niche'" to support certain types of organizations, given the
prevailing social, political and economic circumstances. That means that there is a
restriction in the total number of organizations that can be supported by a specific
resource environment (Lambkin, 1988). Based on the two central concepts:
competition and legitimation, ecological theorists have build a framework for the
evolution of populations over long periods of
 time. In order to model the effects of
carrying capacity on growth rates, a logistic growth equation is used which was
originally developed by population biologists (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). This
so-called Verhulst-Pearl equation can be described as:
This equation shows that the growth rate of a population with size N is dependent
on two fundamental factors. The first factor (r) represents the intrinsic growth rate.
The intrinsic growth rate determines the growth rate in absence of resource
" The niche of a population can be denned as the ".... combination of resource abundancies and
constraints in which members arise and persist" (Hannan and Freeman, 1989:50). .tr,;/* • : •
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constrains (Carroll, 1988). The second factor (K) represents the carrying capacity of
a certain niche". Because the number of organizations during the first stage of a
populations development is low resources are abundant and K (carrying capacity)
is not considered to be very important. At that time the number of organizations is
likely to be small: i.e. there is low density (Period O-A, figure 1). Over time
however a population experiences growth and density increases. A larger number
of similar types considerably improves the legitimacy of all the organizations in a
specific population and therefore enhances the survival chances of similar
organizations. Increased legitimacy therefore induces death rates to fall until
carrying capacity is approached (figure 1, period A-B). R is therefore the only
meaningful factor that influences the growth rate of a population at that stage. In a
later stage, when the number of organizations increases and carrying capacity is
approached, the factor K is becoming increasingly important. When carrying
capacity is approached competitive forces among the organizations in a population
intensify and this may well lead to a lower number of entrants and to a shake-out
in the market" (figure 1, period B-).
"". : ' S i . • A - ^ ' • • • • • . ' , - • •
• •• ' • - • • • ' ^ - - v ' ' ' ' : • • • ! . . : - . . - i . • ' . . ; • • . - :
:•• • -> • Carrying Cqpacrty ,
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FIGURE 1 Stages o/aPoputef ion 'sGrotwt/i.
For a more extensive review, see Hannan and Carroll (1992).
" The relationship between density and founding and mortality rates is elaboratedly discussed in
terms of density dependence selection (Brittain and Freeman, 1988; Hannan and Freeman, 1988,1989;
Bamett and Amburgey, 1990; Hannan and Carroll, 1992).
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Organizational ecology's primary focus is on organizational diversity. In analogue
to the biological question of "Why are there so many kinds of animals ?"
(Hutchinson, 1959:145) organizational ecologists have been concerned with the
question of "Why are there so many kinds of organizations ?" (Hannan and
Freeman, 1977:929). Organizational ecologists have tried to answer this question by
linking specific organizational types to different environmental conditions.
Ecological organizational theorists have argued that some organizational forms do
better under specific environmental conditions than other organizations (Hannan
and Freeman, 1977,1989; Brittain and Freeman, 1980; Lambkin, 1988; Lambkin and
Day, 1989). Hannan and Freeman (1977) distinguish among five strategy types: r-
types, k-types, generalists, specialists, and polymorphists. Consistant with the
importance of the specific factors r and K under different stages of a population's
development, ecologists have referred to organizations as r-types if they can be
described as first movers. These firms are generally characterized by simple and
fast to build organizational structures and tend to move quickly into a newly
established niche. K-type organizations on the other hand are relatively slow
movers which tend to rely heavily on efficient but capital-intensive and rigid
organizational structures. Another closely related distinction between types of
organizations is concerned with the differences between generalists and specialists
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Tucker, Singh & Meinhard, 1990). Generalists differ
from specialists in terms of the scope of the environment that is claimed by these
organizations. Whereas generalists tend to occupy a large part of the environment,
specialists are concerned with a more narrowly defined part of the environment.
The last strategy type (Polymorphists) can be seen as organizations that combine
generalist and specialist strategies in order to deal with a wide range of fitness
contingencies (Brittain and Freeman, 1980; Aldrich and Wiedenmayer, 1990).
Polymorphists are generally characterized by a largely diversified organizational
structure in combination with a holding form (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). In an
attempt to generate a more detailed representation of strategy types, Brittain and
Freeman (1980) combined the different strategy types into k-generalists, r-
generalists, k-specialists, r-specialists and polymorphists".
The division of organizations into different strategy types is not a goal on itself.
It is only important if the effectiveness of these strategy types can be related to
different environmental conditions. Hannan and Freeman (1977) have classified
environments in terms of three features; variability, grain and uncertainty. The
variability of an environment depends on the degree of change in the environment.
Radical changing environments are referred to as concave, whereas incremental
For a description of these strategy types see also Lambkin, 1988 and Lambkin and Day, 1989.
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environments can be regarded as convex. The grain of an environment is associated
with the frequency of changes. Constant changing environments are denoted as
fine-grained, whereas sporadic changing environments are referred to as coarse-
grained. The third feature characterizing environments is the degree of uncertainty.
Uncertainty can be seen as a deriviate condition of the two other conditions
(Lambkin 1988). Frequent, radically changing environments are characterized by
high uncertainty, whereas sporadic, incremental changing environments are
generally characterized by a relatively low level of uncertainty. rj-.»c« -Mh.irr .••ygrfv;
Table 1 describes the fundamental ecological propositions with respect to the fit
of the organizational form under various environmental conditions (see e.g.
Brittain and Freeman, 1980, Lambkin, 1988; Lambkin and Day, 1989). We refer to
section 2.4 for a more elaborated discussion of the fitness of specific organizational
forms under different environmental conditions. > <-««?i »3#;.m<r • -*;T Divwjojscs >•;:
- - • , . . . , . , „ . . . . . . . ,^ , . , , , •..,,,- , •*•«/; 1' >?*••• y:'-.7]/s ^ F t ^ S t ' b o f f W i ^ t
Fine-grained
~ Uncertain
r-generalists
r-specialists
polymorphists
Environment
• Fine-coarse
, re/atiae/y
uncertain
K-generalists
K-generalists
i >• . - • • •
TABLE 1 Fitness o/organizahona/ybrms under different enpironmentaZ circumstances
fSource; Lambfcin, 2988).
Coarse-grained
re/afii)e/y
certain
._, . K-generalists
Concoue   ' K-specialists:
.;••; -independent
,r . -captives
-subordinates
2.3. An Integrated Approach: Combining Evolutionary and Ecological Theories
In the literature we find two fundamental drivers that bring about change in
organizational fields: adaption and selection. Whereas most of the organizational
and strategic management literature has traditionally been dominated by the
adaption perspective we take on a selection approach. Although the intellectual
heritage of both evolutionary and ecological organization theories is found in
biology, they differ significantly in the way selection is treated. Ecologists argue
that ".... most of the variability in the core structure of organizations comes about
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through the creation of new organizations and the demise of old ones" (Hannan
and Freeman, 1989:11-12). This view is consistent with the traditional neo-classical
view of Darwinian selection and is concerned with a rather deterministic
relationship between firms and the environment in the sense that the 'fit' of
organizations is strictly dependent on the environment. Such an approach is clearly
Darwinian because organizations are stuck with their organizational characteristics
and are not able to adapt to changing environmental circumstances. Recent
contributions by evolutionary economists have taken on a more Lamarckian point
of view". Evolutionary theories have argued that if pressures are hard enough
firms can be engaged in a search process in order to increase their fit with the
environment. A firm's emphasis on profit satisficing implies that firms which
achieve above average profits are not likely to be engaged in search processes,
whereas firms that are deprived of satisfactory profits pursue search processes in
order to increase their fit with the environment. If routines can be compared to
genes in biological evolution, then the search process may well be regarded as the
generator of mutations in biological evolutionary theory (Nelson and Winter, 1982).
Evolutionary theorists argue that firms that are engaged in a search process do not
explore all the possible directions but confine their search to the most promising
ones. Nelson and Winter modelled this process using so-called Markov chains. The
concept of a Markov chain is based on the assumption that ".... the condition of the
industry in each time period bears the seeds of its condition in the following
period" (Nelson and Winter, 1982:19). Under these conditions a probability
distribution of the state at time t+1 can be constructed from the state of a firm's
competencies and routines at time t. In general, firms are engaged in 'local search'
only, which means that search is often limited to related areas. Local search and a
continued reliance on their basic routines implies that firms are much better at
doing more of the same than they are at adapting to change. In evolutionary
economic theory the continuous changing technological environment provides a
moving target. Firms with specific competencies and routines that are appropriate
in one period are often not as successful in other periods. All the competencies and
build-up of knowledge may be rendered useless in situations of change. However,
as long as the combination of selection processes and competition provides a firm
with signals regarding future directions of change, it might be very rewarding to
pursue such a moving target (Gomulka, 1990). Recent contributions have
emphasized adaptive change through learning or imitation. Dosi (1983,1984) for
example enriched Nelson and Winter's model by introducing the Lamarckian-
Lamarck was the first biologist who described a process of adaption in which a specie survives by
learning from and adapting itself to the environment.
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inspired concept of 'mutation generating mechanisms'. In Dosi's approach not only
Darwinian ex post selection takes place, but also the feedback effects on the
selection of the technological paradigm are considered to be important. We contend
that describing the feedback effects of the selection environment on the behaviour
of firms, i.e. taking a Lamarckian point of view, is essential for describing the
strategic behaviour of organizations". We think however that in order to describe
the full dynamics of industrial systems both Darwinian as well as Lamarckian
selection should be taken into account (see also Aldrich and Auster, 1986). Inertia is
an essential characteristic of organizations but by studying vital rates only we
would downplay the role of changes that are due to transformation processes
within organizations. Although some ecological theorists have studied the change
of organizational forms over time (Aldrich, 1979; McKelvey & Aldrich, 1983;
Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Baum and Singh, 1994) this change is considered to be of
minor importance in ecological theories and empirical studies. It would however
be a caricature to refer to firms as static organizations that are unable to change.
Organizational ecologist's emphasis on the inertia of firms at first sight seems
convincing, but lacks an explanation of the observed ability of firms to make large
profits over long periods of time (even in rapid changing environments). This
makes us sceptic about the inability of firms to adapt. We contend that firms can
learn from their environment and when pressures are hard enough, they try to
modify their forms. Therefore, following Freeman (1991:211) we suggest that ".... at
the very least any good biological model would have to be Lamarckian and not
neo-Darwinian". In general organizations are not supposed to react very quickly to
new developments. However, if organizations are confronted with persistently
lower revenues they are induced to change (Singh
 1986). Therefore adaption to the
environment is considered to be an essential aspect of every dynamic theory.
Another, related point we have to make is concerned with the analysis of vital
rates. In line with Winter (1990:289) we will argue that ".... it would be surprising,
therefore, if a mere count of the number of firms proved to be a good indicator of
the degree of pressure on the carrying capacity of the environment or other
consequences of population size". In contrast to arguments expressed by Hannan
and Freeman (1977, 1989) the total size of the population seems to be a more
important determinant of niche-density than the absolute number of firms". An
" There is a strong debate in organizational ecology literature about the question of whether the
incorporation of organizational change in an ecological framework is appropriate (see Perrow, 1986;
Young, 1988; Singh, 1990; Baum and House, 1994).
" Bamett and Amburgey (1990) have tried to operationalise this perspective by measuring population
mass instead of a mere count of numbers (see also Singh and Lumsden, 1990; Hannan and Carroll,
1992; Boone and van Witteloostuijn, 1995). • ." •• / • :>. ..-..••. ;>,,•>,,,
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approach based on the number of firms may only be important in situations in
which the growth of firms is restricted by institutional or other factors or in
situations in which the population consists of small organizations (Aldrich, 1979;
Bedian, 1984; Perrow, 1986; Scott, 1987). Hannan and Freeman (1977) refute this by
arguing that this problem might be overcome by studying a longer time span. On
such a long time scale even the largest companies can be dissolved. However, in
our opinion some cause factors which are important for analyzing organizational
change cannot be studied on such a large time scale. For example the implications
of a specific technological innovation cannot be effectively measured on a time
scale of say 100 years. Another argument against the study of 'vital rates' per s6 is
that the selection process is often retarded by governmental influences. Social costs
of liquidation of large organizations often motivates government agencies to
provide firms with a substantial amount of financial aid in order to protect them
from liquidation. We will argue that often exit cannot be equalled with low
performance levels. Although exit is often referred to as the ultimate manifestation
of organizational failure (Bedian, 1984) successful small firms can be taken over or
merge with other firms. In a pure selection model these firms would be referred to
as 'failures'. Therefore Winter (1990:280) proposes to take routines as the unit of
analysis. ".... to distinguish survival from non-survival in a way that is not
influenced by superficial institutional distinction, and to sort out the complex
intermediate cases, it is necessary to identify the key routines and ask what
happened to them". It must however be noted that it is often very difficult to
discern the key routines of an organization (Meyer, 1990). Following Hannan et al.
(1990:246) we will argue that".... The full dynamics of populations of organizations
involve vital rates (of founding and mortality) as well as growth and decline of
individual populations over long periods". We propose an approach that combines
both rates of founding and mortality with the growth rates of populations as well
as individual organizations^.
Because our main concern is the evolution of high technology industries we
should also decide upon a framework for the analysis of technological change. In
organizational ecology, technological change is considered to be one of several
environmental factors that affect organizations. Although technological change
may spur new entries in the market, the inability to adapt to changing technologies
can be a major source of organizational exit. Technological change is therefore
primarily viewed as a factor which creates turmoil in the economic environment
(Brittain and Freeman, 1980). Whereas ecological theorists can be denoted as
" One of the few evolutionary economic theorists that proposes a population perspective into
evolutionary economic theory is Andersen (1994).
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technological determinists, evolutionary economic theories have stressed the
interaction between forces of technological change, market structures and
organizational strategies. For a detailed understanding of technological change we
will therefore build on the elaborated framework developed by evolutionary
economists. For the study of market structures and the importance of particular
organizational types under various environmental circumstances we will take on
an ecological perspective albeit interpreted from a more Lamarckian point of view.
In our approach attention will therefore be paid to both the dynamics of
populations as well as to the dynamics of individual organizations. From a
population point of view we can study the performance of organizational forms
under a diverse set of environmental circumstances, whereas the analysis of the
behaviour of individual organizations generates a number of interesting
propositions about firm strategies and the effects of different strategies on market
structures and on technological developments. Our combined approach allows us
to come up with a number of propositions about the likely success of different
generic strategies over time. With these considerations in mind we put forward a
number of hypotheses that can be derived from our integrated framework.
2.4. The Evolution of Industrial Systems: Some Hypotheses
In contrast to the general conception of new life cycles born out of market needs
(Sherwin and Isenson, 1967; Utterback, 1974) high technology industries are typical
examples of markets created by radical technological innovations (Mueller and
Tilton, 1969; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). At the time of founding there is often
substantial uncertainty about the technological feasibility of an innovation and its
potential market size. Because both market and technological uncertainties are high
most commercial firms are very reluctant to support research in this stage.
Moreover, social acceptance (legitimation) of potential entrants is very low which
makes it very difficult to persuade investors and financial institutions to finance
these potential entrants (Bedian, 1984; Aldrich and Auster, 1986). Because markets
are non-existent and technological development is to a great extent dependent on
the underlying scientific knowledge base we expect that the larger part of
technological efforts are carried out by academic or other institutions under state
supervision and support. These institutions are therefore expected to act as
incubators' of radical new technological developments (Roman and Puett, 1983;
Martin, 1984; Stankiewicz, 1990). Thus:
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Hypothesis 2: L/wrfer cond/flows o//iigft marfcef and tec/ino/ogica/ uncerfainh/, universities
anrf government institutions are fhe^ irsf important incubators o/radica/ new tecnno/ogies.
After a short 'incubator period' the first commercial companies are likely to enter
the newly born market. Because technological change is frequent and radical the
market can be characterized as fine grained and concave (Hannan and Freeman,
1977). Under these conditions the ecological model predicts that the market will be
explored by small specialized fast to build organizations (Hannan and Freeman,
1977, 1989; Brittain and Freeman, 1988; Lambkin, 1988). The classic argument for
the importance of these small firms in the introduction of new technologies was
given by Arrow (1962a). Arrow showed that a new entrant will benefit more from
adopting a new innovation than incumbent firms. For the incumbent organization
a new innovation may cannibalize profits from its other products. The new entrant,
however does not experience any loss of profit as a result of the new technology or
the new product. Therefore, the impetus to move into the new technology or
product segment is correspondingly higher for these firms. Their flexible
organizational structures and short communication lines enable these so-called r-
specialist firms to respond rapidly to new opportunities in the market. At that stage
of development customers focus on product performance rather than on costs
(Mueller and Tilton, 1969; Parker, 1978; Dosi, 1984; Freeman, 1990). Companies can
therefore expect high rewards for bringing a technologically dominant product to
the market. This induces firms to follow an offensive innovation strategy in which
they try to be the first on the market with new products and aim at market and
technological leadership. Thus we might argue that:
Hypothesis 2: A new/y emerging hign fecnno/ogy marfcef is/Irst exp/ored by r-specia/isf
organizations pursuing an ojffensive innovation strategy. , , . : , . , -
In spite of the high profits and temporary monopoly gains which could be realised
by offering a high performance product, the high risks involved in pursuing such
strategy brings about bankruptcy for a large number of unsuccessful firms.
According to Baum and House (1990:130-131) ".... their dependence on first mover
advantages makes them high-risk and, potentially, high-payoff organizations that
thrive in temporarily rich and dispersed resource environments in which no firm
or small group of firms dominates competition." The combination of high risks and
possible high payoffs generates a state of constant flux in which high founding
rates of small firms are just enough to offset their death rates (Hannan and
Freeman, 1989). The creation of new firms which try to imitate the technologies of
the most successful firms is responsible for high birth rates, whereas so-called
"- - • • • • : . ' - I
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'liabilities to newness' (Stinchcombe, 1965) are responsible for the high dissolution
rates of r-specialists. Liabilities to newness" refer to the observation that small new
firms are characterized by higher death rates than their larger counterparts because
such firms, unlike their larger competitors, are often not equipped with
considerable buffers against temporary setbacks. That means that they are often not
capable of dealing with temporary failures or cutbacks in sales. Moreover, social
acceptance (legitimation) of the firms exploiting a new technology is often not very
high in the initial stages of the life cycle (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1989)". As a
result, life expectancies of these firms are generally low. Because awareness of new
high technology products is low and experience is nil only a few consumers are
willing to adopt the often high-priced products. High prices and limited usability
of the new high technology products induces most potential customers to take a
'wait and see' approach rather than buying such a radical new product directly.
New-product diffusion research has shown that at this stage only about 16 percent
of the eventual adopters is likely to acquire new products (Figure 2). The first
adopters, which make up about 2.5 % of eventual adopters, are (in the IT industry)
often governmental institutions which buy new innovative high performance
products regardless of their prices for use in military or space applications. When
the technology is sufficiently developed to be introduced in the commercial
market-place another group of potential users, so-called 'early adopters' is likely to
adopt the technologies or products. Early adopters fulfil the role of 'opinion
leaders' and therefore have an enormous impact on the success or failure of a new
product. Whereas technical and market uncertainties are very high in the initial
stage of the life cycle, during time uncertainty reduces. Technological problems are
often solved and institutions that are able to provide the best' technologies or
solutions to their customers are rewarded by rapid growth. Due to the selection
mechanism it gradually becomes clear which technologies will be most successful
both in technological terms and in meeting customer demand. The technology
which accumulates a critical mass of consensus may trigger off a new technological
regime. Such a technological regime is often physically embodied in a product or
process which stands out above others. These so-called 'basic-designs' may then
serve as 'technological guideposts' (Sahal, 1981) and steer the direction of future
improvements in technology. The search for radical new technological changes can
now be substituted by 'normal' technological progress that is represented by
'* Sometimes it is better to speak of liabilities to smallness because small size is often a more important
determinant of failure than age (Aldrich and Auster, 1986).
" Empirical support for this assumption can be found in Freeman, Carroll and Hannan (1983) and
Singh, House and Tucker (1986).
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incremental cumulative improvements along a specific technological path or
trajectory (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1984,1988). We therefore hypothesize:
Ht/pof/iesis 3: 77ie emergence <?/ a 'basic design' teads to a subsMwhcm o/ radica/
fecrtno/ogica/ deue/opwienf by more/ocused increment/ CHmu/ah'i>e improuemewfs a/ong a
speci/ic fec/mo/ogica/ paf/i or fra/'ecfory.
FIGURE 2 Non-cumu/atipepflHemo/ajfoption (Wind, 1982).
The establishment of a technological regime does not only lower technological
uncertainty. Due to the adaption of the basic design as the standard market
uncertainty is also considerably reduced. Moreover, awareness of and experience
with the product increases rapidly. The overall reduction in uncertainty makes the
environment less fine grained and less concave. At this stage it is feasible for firms
to enter the market on a larger scale. The outlook of a considerable market warrants
large scale advertising campaigns in order to attract the awareness of potential
clients. Moreover, costs decrease due to experience curve effects. Founding rates
take off as a result of the growing legitimacy of organizations and the spread of
know-how about the dominant product technology. The standardized direction of
technological progress shifts competition away from performance and design
towards price. From now on, cost factors are driving the industry. The cumulative
character of technological changes rapidly expands the technological frontiers and
".... research becomes increasingly specialized and sophisticated and the
technology is broken down into its component parts with individual investigations
focusing on improvements in small elements of the technology" (Mueller and
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Tilton, 1969:576). The complex character of technological change at this stage
clearly favours formal organizations (Dosi, 1988; Hagedoorn, 1989). Their
additional advantages in terms of economies of scale and scope enable large firms
to set prices below those of their smaller competitors. In such an environment
which is characterized by complex technologies and cost-based competition, large
firms are clearly better off than their smaller counterparts. The emergence of a
mass-market and an ongoing reduction in technological uncertainty attracts a large
number of so-called 'early-follower' firms into the new market. These followers are
typically subsidiaries or divisions of large established firms which operate in
adjacent markets. In comparison to r-specialist firms, these so-called K-generalists
rely heavily on their efficient but capital-intensive and rigid organizational
structures and tend to focus on a broad number of market segments. However, not
all of these generalist firms enter from neighbouring markets. Some very large
polymorphist firms, for which an unsuccessful entry into the new market does not
threaten their survival, enter the industry at this point in time (Lambkin, 1988).
These polymorphists combine their overall generalist strategy with a specialised
unit approach in the new market. This enables them to deal with a wide range of
fitness contingencies (Brittain and Freeman, 1980)*°. Polymorphists as well as K-
generalists tend to use their efficiency advantages to leapfrog the positions of their
smaller competitors (Lambkin, 1988). This leads us to the following hypothesis:
Hyporfiesjs 4: /4/rer the esfab/is/imewf o/o new fec/ino/og/caJ regime, K-fype organizations
fend (o outcompefe r-fype organizations. 77iis is iZZusfrated by fne sfarf o/ an r- to K
transition in t/ie marJfcet.
' • • ' . • • • ' , - V - . ? - . : • • > • ' • • • : - ^ £ i - . , : > . - " / J 7 : 5 . • : • - - . • •
At this stage the diffusion of technology is accelerated due to an increase in
awareness and experience with the new technology. A positive evaluation of the
early users may provoke another (larger) part of the potential customers to adopt
the new technology or product. These adopters which in first instance waited for
an evaluation of the early users are referred to as the 'early majority' (Wind, 1982).
These adopters are found to account for about one third of all eventual adopters
(see figure 2). The adoption of the new technology or product by such a large
number of adopters can be seen as the confirmation of a successful establishment of
the technological regime. Apart from awareness and experience factors, more
dynamic diffusion research (e.g. Hagedoorn, 1989) has stressed the importance of
cumulative improvements in the new technology. Moreover learning effects allow
20 Polymorphists are generally characterized by a large diversification pattern in combination with a
holding form (Hannan and Freeman, 1989).
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prices to decline as a function of time and market growth (Dosi, 1984). The rapid
increasing functionality and the improved price/performance of new technologies
broadens the application fields of these technologies and gives way to a rapid
increase in the number of potential users. Cost declines of 15-30% per doubling of
output in high technology industries (Day, 1981) enables price decreases of the
same amount. These price decreases accelerate the rate of adoption of the new
product or technology.
However, after a period of seemingly infinite technological progress and
considerable market growth most industries undergo a phase of more moderate
technological and market development. Saturation of demand is levelling sales
growth towards zero, whereas technological progress seems to approach its natural
limits. At the same time users become increasingly sophisticated and tend to
demand standardization of products. The standardization of products increasingly
turns products into technological commodities. Almost identical technological
products are now supplied by many different competitors. As the standardization
process makes it possible for users to choose between a number of competitors with
virtually the same products, an increase of competition is expected. Under
conditions of fierce price-based competition in which prices reflect a firm's
marginal costs an erosion of profits is likely to occur. Under these conditions firms
are induced to expand their market share in order to maintain their profits. As
technological change within a specific technological regime approaches its natural
limits, R&D expenditure's payoff decreases rapidly. Since no satisfactory gains can
be reaped by the improvement of technology, competitive strategies are to shift
towards marketing, distribution and production efficiency.
A firm's competitive position in the first stage of the life cycle is largely
determined by its innovative capabilities. As carrying capacity is increasingly
approached and technological change becomes infrequent and incremental (convex
and coarse grained), efficiency replaces innovativeness as the strongest competitive
weapon (Brittain and Freeman, 1988). Competition for scarce resources then
replaces the importance of legitimation as the limiting factor on the growth rate of
the population. Increasing competition in a situation in which carrying capacity of
the niche is gradually approached will lead to a state in which only the most
efficient producers are able to survive (Carroll, 1984,1985; Baum and House, 1990).
Because of the price-sensitive character of competition there will be a shift of focus
away from product improvements towards cost-reducing process innovations (see
Figure3). •/ .• ' ';. " . " , - - - , • -
" K i t . . Yr
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FIGURE 3 Pa»enis o/ Product and Process /nfiot>afions.
Source: i 4 i m u i % and Utterbacit, 1978.
It is dear that in such an environment it is very difficult for small firms to compete
effectively against more scale-efficient larger firms. Carroll and Hannan (1990:109)
for example argued that ".... when density is high, resources are subject to intense
exploitation and few resources go unexploited. Since newly founded organizations
can seldom compete head to head with established organizations the new entrants
tend to be pushed to the margins of resource distribution". By driving down costs
and prices, large K-strategists are likely to outcompete the small r-strategists. This
process, where small r-type firms are replaced by efficient large-scale firms is often
referred to in the ecological literature as the r- to K transition (Brittain and
Freeman, 1980). Whereas small flexible first-mover firms were well equipped to
take advantage of the high market and technological opportunities in the
introductory stage of the life cycle, these same firms often fail to deal with the
consolidating forces of a mature environment. The standardization of products and
processes and the subsequent reduction in market and technological uncertainty
induces firms to compete on a low-cost, low margin basis. Overall, static market
entry barriers such as economies of scale and scope replace 'dynamic' entry barriers
such as learning economies and pre-emption economies (Dosi, 1984). K-type firms
which are characterized by their rigid, efficient organizational structures seem to be
much better suited to compete in such environment than r-type organizations. K-
generalists with their rigid organization structures and efficient production
apparatus move slowly into new niches, but once they are established they tend to
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out-compete r-strategists. Thus, as the carrying capacity is approached and
competitive forces intensify, r-types will be replaced by K-type firms*'. Therefore
we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 5: y4s carrying capacity is increasingly approacned and tecnno/ogica/ c/iange
becomes in/reawenf and incremental, efficiency rep/aces innouafiueness as tne sfrongesf
competitive weapon. T/iis increases t/ie rate o/r- to X transition in f/ie marfcet.
At the same time, the sophistication of users and the preoccupation of large firms
with serving the overall market opens up a number of niches in which specialized,
smaller, firms can gain high rewards by serving the specific needs of a
sophisticated customer group. This process of 'niche-elaboration' (Pianka, 1978)
opens up a number of opportunities for specialist organizations. K-specialists are
usually of the following types; captive producers, independent producers and
subordinate producers (Brittain and Freeman, 1988). Captive producers tend to
produce solely for their parent company, whereas independent specialist producers
try to outcompete generalists in stable niches. Because they have little excess
capacity specialists are often more efficient than their generalist competitors, at
least under stable market conditions. Subordinate producers are firms that occupy
a niche previously abandoned by K-generalists because the technology became
outdated and the market declined. Whereas initially the market was not large
enough to support multiple niches, the gradual emergence of a massymarket makes
a strategy of segmentation viable (Popper and Buskirk, 1992). Specialists try to
bypass entry barriers and head-on
competition with large K-generalists by entering market niches that are not
occupied by these same firms, or which cannot be served as efficiently by
generalists. Therefore we hypothesize: :
Hypothesis 6: 77ie emergence o/a mass martef creates mflrfef nicnes, u;/iicn u;i// soon be
occupied by speciaZist organizations. .•=
i
Eventually not only does market growth slow down but there can even be a
general decline in sales. This decline can often be attributed to decreasing
technological opportunities in the current paradigm (see figure 4).
' Some of the most successful r-strategists may succeed in transforming themselves into K-strategists.
• - : . . - i - , J . - - " -
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FIGURE 4 A S/ii/i o/f/ie tec/mo/ogica/ paradigm.
In this stage of development carrying capacity is reached and resources become
exhausted. The lower margins that result from larger competitive pressures
decrease the founding rate of new organizations and increase the dissolution rate
of incumbent organizations. Therefore, the total number of organizations is likely
to decrease (figure 5). Whereas the first stage of the life cycle can be described as a
phase where Schumpeterian enterprises play a fundamental role in the creation of
new combinations, now the industry is dominated by large firms which turn
innovation into routine". Only the most efficient K-type producers are able to
survive in such declining market. Due to the success of the new competitive
technological paradigm, the carrying capacity for the 'old' paradigm is likely to
decrease (figure 3). Decreasing carrying capacity implies that the environment is
capable of supporting only a limited number of organizations. A further
concentration of the industry seems therefore inevitable and a shake-out is likely to
occur (Carroll, 1984,1985; Pianka, 1978).
This view is consistent with Schumpeter's conception of the large firm as ".... the most powerful
engine of progress" (Schumpeter, 1942:106).
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FIGURE 5 The t5(fec/s ic s/ii/i on currying capflcily.
Although technological paradigms may be very strong for a considerable period of
time, it is obvious that technologies do not follow the same technological path
forever. Faced with problems of advancing current technologies, firms need to
invest an increasing amount of resources in R&D to make significant technological
progress. In order to speed up stagnating technological progress at this point of
time, firms tend to broaden their focus in search for alternative technologies. These
search processes may eventually lead to new technological regimes or to the
establishment of a new technological paradigm. Substitute technologies may offer
better perspectives and may be able to trigger off new technological paths. These
radical technological innovations often drastically alter the price/performance ratio
of high technology products and often act as forces of "creative destruction" which
threaten incumbent industry leaders and open up opportunities for new firms.
Under these circumstances it might be sensible for any organization to shift its
attention towards the new technological paradigm. However, most incumbent
firms are characterized by a strong inertia which prevents them from transforming
their current product and technologies. Their position as reliable and accountable
organizations as well as their sunk costs in equipment and personnel prevents
them from redirecting their focus to the new (more promising) paradigm. It is
found that under these conditions incumbents even tend to increase investments in
the old technological regime rather than to switch to the new technological regime
(Cooper and Schendel 1976; Foster 1986). K-strategists' elaborated and capital
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intensive production structures enable them to withstand competition for a long
time. The same structure, however prevents them from moving swiftly into new
resource spaces. The inability of these K-type firms to explore new markets that are
opened up by the new technological paradigm initiates a K to r transition. A large
number of small flexible r-type firms are able to occupy the newly emerging
market, whereas a shake-out in the 'old' market raises the dissolution rate of K-
types. Thus, competence destroying innovations may lead to the demise of large
established firms and to the rise of new r-type organizations. Therefore we
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 7: /4 paradigmaf/c fedmoZogy s/ii/i tn/r/afes a K fo r fnmsifion.
K-strategists' reliance on firmly embedded routines makes the transition to a more
promising technological paradigm very difficult. Firms with a relatively successful
background are often even more resistant to change than other firms. This so-called
'success breeds failure syndrome' (Starbuck, Greve and Hedberg, 1978) is often
observed by established industry leaders. However, the likelihood of successful
switching to a new paradigm is not only a function of willingness to change but
can also be seen as a factor of the competence to change. The possibility of
successful switching is generally depicted as a factor of distance to the new
technological paradigm (Nelson, Winter, 1982). Moreover, successful transfor-
mation is more likely if competition is weak and potential entrants are fewer
(Hagedoom, 1984; Cantwell, 1990).
Nothwitstanding the difficulties that firms face to redirect themselves towards
new opportunities and markets, firms eventually have to go through a period of
transformation. Once a new technological paradigm takes off, it often supersedes
the 'old' paradigm. Winter (1975) has argued that the only thing that is able to
attract firms away from their routinized behaviour is 'trouble'. Trouble in this
respect is described as performance that is below an organization's 'aspiration level'
(Winter, 1975). This is in accordance to Singh's (1986) view that firms which are
confronted with persistently lower revenues are induced to change. According to
Winter (1971:245) ".... firms satisfice with respect to decision rules. That is if
existing rules are functioning well, the firm is unlikely to change them: if not,
search for better rules will be stimulated". Under conditions of decline where sales
are deteriorating, organizations will be forced to make the required step to the
other paradigm. If organizations are not able to do so they will most likely cease to
exist. • • ) • • : < ! - , - > • ' . * • • • , • : • ; . . • • • • • • • . . : • • : • • • •
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In the next three chapters we aim to validate the pattern of evolution of high
technology industries as described in this chapter. We will examine the full history
of market and technological evolution of three major IT sectors and discuss the
seven basic hypotheses at the end of each chapter. =• • • - • jf •• •• •
r-rrf
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The Computer Industry
Until the Second World War, there was no sign of what would emerge as the
computer industry. The first efforts to develop a calculating device took place in
the 17th century when Blaise Pascal developed a mechanical apparatus which was
able to add and subtract figures. The only serious developments in the following
two centuries came from the efforts of Charles Babbage. In 1822, Babbage created a
device which could be seen as the precursor of today's special purpose computer
(the difference engine). Babbage's dream to create a general purpose computer (the
analytic engine) could have established a whole new technological paradigm.
Unfortunately, it was never completed due to a lack of appropriate materials and
construction know how in those days. Its design however, incorporated all the
characteristics of a modern computer. Although some further experimenting with
electromechanical calculators took place in the late 1930s, no significant
contributions were made in this area". The experiments in the 19th and early 20th
century with electromechanical computers were interesting from a technological
point of view but serious applications could not be found. As a result, a paradigm
based on electro-mechanical computers did not really take off. ;
The groundwork for what would eventually unfold as the computer industry,
was laid in 1907 with the invention of a signal amplifying device called vacuum
tube. This invention started a development which would eventually be known as
'the electronics revolution'. After a time of sitting on the fence, firms increasingly
recognized the importance of these electronic components in calculating devices.
However, the true foundation of the computer industry was not laid until the early
The most well known electro-mechanical computer was created by Aiken in 1944 (the Harvard
Mark I).
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1940s when vacuum rube technology was sufficiently developed to play a part in
electronic computers. At that time, the Second World War provided interesting
prospects for the use of computers in military applications. A commercial market
was however non-existent and most of the pioneering work in the computer area
was therefore done by the major universities and their research institutes. In 1945
Eckert and Mauchly from the University of Pensylvania introduced the first real
general purpose electronic computer. This computer which was called the
Electronic Numerical Integrator and Calculator (ENIAC) brought about a
tremendous technological revolution. The ENIAC was based on a new paradigm of
digital electronics, which made it possible to increase calculation performance of
computers with a factor of roughly two-thousand compared to its
electromechanical predecessors (Flamm, 1988). Outside the US, developments in
computer technology were primarily concentrated in those countries that were
actively involved in World War II. During the Second World War both German
and British technicians managed to build working electronic computers for
wartime applications such as coding and decoding messages. The British created
the first real digital computer (the 'Colossus') which was used to decode German
messages that were generated by the German code machine Enigma. After the
Second World War government support decreased and the European countries
gradually lost their prominent position in computer technology.
From all the research groups that were active in the field of computer research
Eckert and Mauchly were the first to conceive a sound commercial market for their
pioneering products. In 1946 they decided to leave the academic world in order to
start the world's first commercial computer firm: the Eckert and Mauchly
Computer Corporation. Soon a large number of small innovative firms would
follow Eckert and Mauchly into the newly born industry. These first mover (r-type)
organizations made use of innovative and pre-emptive strategies in order to satisfy
the needs of their technology focused customers. Although their products were
received enthusiastically by their clients, most of these small firms suffered from a
number of liabilities to newness (Stinchcombe 1965). They generally lacked the
reputation advantages and financial resources of larger established firms.
Moreover their preoccupation with high risk, high payoff technological products
made their existence very uncertain. Because of the radical and frequently
changing nature of technological developments, the environment could be referred
to as concave and fine grained. Under such environmental conditions death rates
are likely to be very high. The rapid rate with which r-specialist firms could be
established however enabled birth rates to offset the death rates of their more
troubled competitors. The first large (K-generalist) firm to believe in a commercial
computer market was the office equipment manufacturer Remington Rand.
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Remington Rand entered the computer business in 1950 by taking over the
troubled Eckert-Mauchly Computer Corporation. The first computer that was
introduced by Remington Rand in 1951 was Eckert and Mauchly's Universal
Automatic Computer, the UNIVAC I. The UNTVAC I was built according to a
concept developed by John von Neumann who described a computer containing a
central processor, memory devices, input-output devices and which made use of
sequential programming (see figure 6)^.
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FIGURE 6 The wm Neumann Architecture.
The UNTVAC I with its vacuum tube technology and von Neumann architecture
would soon become a 'basic design' which set out the direction of future
improvements in computer technology. The UNIVAC initiated a new technological
paradigm that was based on two fundamental concepts: the von Neumann
architecture and digital electronics. The direction set out by this technological
paradigm led to the establishment of a technological regime which was based on
vacuum tube technology. Shortly after the introduction of the UNIVAC, Remington
Rand reinforced its position in the computer industry by taking over another small
innovative (r-type) firm called Engineering Research Associates (ERA). This firm,
founded by former navy officers William Norris and Howard Engstrom, had
strong ties with the US Navy and therefore opened up the important military
market for Remington Rand.
This concept, known as the von Neumann design has served as a "technological guidepost' for the
past 40 years.
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At that time, the computer industry was above all characterized by freely available
technological knowledge and was thriving on government procurement and
support. Because of the academic character of computer research, technological
knowledge was exchanged at conferences and by publications in various journals.
Government procurement and support made it possible for many companies to
examine the feasibility and commercial prospects of computers. Moreover, the
reduction in technological uncertainty that was brought about by the establishment
of the new technological paradigm facilitated the entry of a number of large (K-
generalist) industrial firms (including IBM) into the computer marker". Although
direct government support declined during the 1950s, the cold war augmented
computer purchases of the United States Military. The army's preference for
innovative computer products and additional government support for risky
computer ventures made the computer industry a technology driven market in
which successful innovations created their own demand. As a result, many of the
computer research projects focused on the innovative aspects of the computer
rather than on production efficiency. The most important reason for the growing
importance of K-generalist firms in the mainframe market could be found in the
product differentiation aspects associated with the reputation of the supplier
(Dorfman, 1987). It is obvious that large established firms such as IBM and
Remington Rand did have enormous advantages over smaller firms in that respect.
Although several other large firms with enough financial resources to overcome the
start-up costs in this business tried to enter the mainframe business, they usually
lacked the reputation and client base advantages of IBM and to a lesser extent
Remington Rand. However, not only reputation advantages are important but also
enormous investments are needed to develop and produce a complex computer
system**. In addition an elaborate sales and maintenance network had to be set up
in order to assist the client in using an unfamiliar product such as the mainframe
computer. The disadvantages of small firms compared to their larger competitors
led to a wave of acquisitions in the industry. At that time large numbers of small
computer firms were taken over by larger firms. Notable examples in this respect
are; ERA and the Eckert-Mauchly Computer Corp which were bought by
Remington Rand; NCR which merged with the Computer Research Corporation
and Electro-Data Corporation which was taken over by Burroughs (Brock, 1975).
The acquisition of technologically advanced firms provided large firms with an
Most of these large firms had their roots in adjacent markets such as the office equipment industry.
*' Mainframe computers were sold as complete systems. Computer manufacturers therefore had to
invest in the production of CPUs, peripherals and in software development
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important foothold in the computer industry. At that time the gradual replacement
of small r-type organizations by larger K-type competitors initiated the start of an
overall r- to K transition of the industry.
As a typical K-type organization, IBM only slowly and gradually moved into
the computer industry. After having introduced a small number of special purpose
computers in the late 1940s, IBM hesitated to enter the commercial computer
market. The lack of an established commercial market for computers and the
uncertainties surrounding future developments made several high ranked IBM
officials very sceptical about the computer market. However, the delivery of the
UNIVAC I at the Census Bureau in 1951" and the growing need for computing
capacity during the Korean War eventually induced IBM to move into the market
for digital computers. Two years after Remington Rand's introduction of the
UNIVAC I, IBM launched a large scientific computer (the 701). Despite IBM's
hesitation to enter the commercial computer market this computer turned out to be
an instant success. One year after the introduction of the 701, IBM introduced a
small-scale computer (the 650) which was primarily directed towards its
commercial punched card machine customers. Within two years 400 IBM 650s were
installed in the U.S. This rapid success was primarily due to IBM's large existing
customer base in the punched card tabulating machine industry. With a market
share of 90%, and IBM's reputation and contacts, it was relatively easy for IBM to
sell its customers digital computers (Brock, 1975). Only three years after its entry
into the commercial computer business, IBM took over the lead in mainframe
computers from its rival Remington Rand.
3.1. The Transistor Period
A major drawback of vacuum tube based computers was their need for continual
replacement of burned-out tubes. Because unreliability was an inborn feature of
vacuum tubes, and because efforts to improve the reliability and power
consumption were not very successful, the technological search process was
directed towards more reliable, less power consuming devices. As a result,
technological trajectories shifted towards a search for improved reliability,
performance and power consumption. This shift in the direction of search would
soon lead to establishment of a new technological regime based on transistor
technology. The invention of the transistor in 1947 started a profound and radical
" Ever since 1890, the Census Bureau was one of the major customers of IBM's punched card
equipment.
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change in the computer industry. The importance of the transistor can be found in
the establishment of a totally new technological regime based on semiconductor
materials**. The (germanium) transistor which was invented by Bardeen, Brittain
and Schockly at Bell's Telephone Laboratory was much smaller, cheaper, faster,
more reliable and at the same time less power consuming than the vacuum tube.
After a period of experimenting with computers that incorporated vacuum tube
technology, the invention of the transistor in 1947, and in particular the silicon^
transistor in 1954, radically changed the price/performance ratio of computers. The
transistor, accompanied by the introduction of randomly-accessible storage media,
such as ferrite core memories made it feasible to exploit the opportunities of the
computer and gave way to a considerable growth in the installed computer base
(Cutaia, 1990). Large scientific mainframe computers with enormous computing
capabilities could now be built at prices which could not be matched by the
relatively slow and unreliable vacuum tube computers. However, it was not until
the mid 1960s (figure 7), when mass volume produced transistors became
available, that the computer industry really took off (Harper, 1986).
During the 1950s a wide variety of commercial computer products was offered
by a large number of companies. Many of the commercial computers on the market
were spun-off from government supported projects. Although the commercial
computer market was slowly but gradually expanding, few firms did invest
heavily in this market. The advent of transistor technology however opened up
opportunities for firms to compete against IBM on a technological base. The
establishment of a new technological regime could render existing skills and
advantages of industry leaders useless. In this light, it is not surprising that
Remington Rand, facing a market share decline of 84 percent in 4 years, was among
the first commercial firms to decide upon entering the transistorized computer
market (Brock 1975). Its Solid State 80 transistorized computer which was
introduced in 1958 was however rapidly surpassed by IBM's model 7090. The 7090
was an offspring of IBM's Stretch computer project which was undertaken in order
to radically improve the performance of digital computers. Its superior features
reinforced IBM's leadership in the market and established a new regime based on
transistorized computers.
Its relevance is underscored by the fact that semiconductor materials are still the most important
material in use today.
*' The silicon transistor operated much faster and could be used under a much wider temperature
range than the germanium transistor. (Swann, 1986)
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The importance of the commercial computer market remained modest until in the
early 1960s volume produced transistors became available. Experience curve effects
and economies of scale drove down costs, and prices of transistorized components
declined dramatically. Low cost computers could now be made available for use in
all kinds of business applications. Aroused by the establishment of a large
commercial computer market considerable numbers of large (K-generalist) firms
entered the transistorized computer market in the early 1960s. The greater part of
these firms came from adjacent markets such as the office equipment industry (e.g.
NCR and Burroughs) or the consumer electronics industry (e.g. Philco, RCA and
GE). The last important group of firms that entered the computer industry were
created by technicians who worked on computers in large firms or university labs
(e.g. Control Data Corporation and Digital Equipment Corporation).
Because advances that emerge from superiority and experience in the 'old'
technological regime are often nullified by the establishment of a new technological
regime, we would expect forces of creative destruction' to take place. On the basis
of our integrated framework we expect an invasion of fast to build r-type firms
which are eager to explore the opportunities in the new regime. A close
. I
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examination of the computer industry however shows that after the establishment
of the new technological regime the computer industry was still dominated by the
same large firms that controlled the previous period. The eight largest computer
manufacturers still occupied 98 percent of the total market (Dorfman, 1987). IBM
accounted for 74 percent and was known as Snow White, whereas the others were
referred to as the seven dwarfs. These dwarfs included Sperry Rand, Control Data
Corporation (CDC), Burroughs, Honeywell, Radio Corporation of America (RCA),
National Cash Registers (NCR) and General Electric (GE). Although technological
entry barriers decreased rapidly, the continued dominance of these firms clearly
reflects the importance of non-technological entry barriers. Smaller companies
usually didin't have the resources that were needed to set up production ande R&D
facilities. Neither did they have the reputation and client-base advantages of their
larger competitors. Clients were very reluctant to buy an unfamiliar product such
as a mainframe computer from an unestablished firm, especially if this firm did not
have an adequate sales and maintenance network. In the late 1950's IBM raised
entry barriers by introducing a policy of leasing. In order to compete effectively
with IBM, other firms had to set up their own leasing conditions too. Because
leasing implies that it takes much longer to generate a cash flow, demand for
financial resources increased enormously. Soma (1976:26) stated that " in the
recent Industrial Reorganization Hearings, Collins testified that the first-year
operation of a hypothetical firm selling its equipment would yield profits of $20
million. On the other hand, the leasing operations for the first year of that same
hypothetical company would yield a net loss of $36 million." ^ As a result, only
large firms which where able to cope with major temporary losses would be able to
compete effectively in this market. IBM's supremacy and the high barriers to entry
during these days spurred smaller firms to find market ruches in order to avoid
head on competition with IBM. One of the new entrants in the computer industry
was Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC). DEC tried to bypass the entry barriers
in the mainframe industry by providing low cost small business machines. In 1960
DEC introduced the PDP-1 which became the world's first so-called mini-
computer. Although he PDP-1 turned out to be a success, it was not until the
advent of mass-produced integrated circuits in the mid 1960s that a considerable
market for mini-computers was established.
••- VTi
* Hearings on S. 1167 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. pt. 7, at 5383 (July 23-26,1974) (The Industrial Reorganization
Act- The Computer Industry) (Statement by Eugene K. Collins, Director of Research, Evans and Co.,
N.Y., N.Y.)
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The transistor-based regime was characterized by the use of discrete devices which
accommodated only one device per chip. With the invention of the Integrated
Circuit in 1959 and the discovery of the planar process" a new technological
regime was initiated which made possible the integration of a number of
components on a single chip. Because miniaturization turned out to be a major
means to achieve improved reliability and performance, miniturization started to
dominate the overall technological trajectory (see Braun and Macdonald, 1982;
Steinmueller, 1987). The Integrated Circuit which was originally developed at the
laboratories of Texas Instruments radically increased the diffusion of
semiconductor technology in computer circuitry. As described above, the transistor
was much smaller, cheaper, faster, more reliable and required less power than its
predecessor. Once again these characteristics were significantly improved by the
invention of the Integrated Circuit (IC). The planar process facilitated large scale,
low cost manufacturing of the Integrated Circuit and made it possible to integrate
a substantial number of components on a single chip. The small size of these
integrated circuits made it possible to incorporate them into a very broad range of
products, whereas their steady declining costs made low cost complex computer-
designs possible. Moreover, the gradual replacement of hardwire logic by Stored
Programme Control (SPC) vastly increased the flexibility of the computer. This
flexibility was further reinforced by the emergence of higher level programming
languages and the introduction of more sophisticated operating systems.
Notwithstanding substantial improvements in programmers' productivity, a
major problem which confronted computer manufacturers in those days was the
rapid increase in software development costs. In the mid 1960s the point was
reached where software costs equaled hardware development and application
costs. At that time software that was developed for one system type could not be
easily transferred to another type. This considerably reduced economies of scope in
software development. The potential scope and scale economies in software were
however very high due to the fact that marginal costs of an extra copy of a software
package are often negligible*. In its efforts to gain more from economies of scope
in software development and hardware design IBM came up with a family of
computers in 1967. These so-called 360 computers featured compatible central
The planar process was a revolutionary production process which could be used to produce cost
effective transistors. The Planar process would soon become suited for batch processing of Integrated
Ci
This is due to the extremely low costs of duplicating the program.
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processing units, a standard programming system and incorporated interface
standards for peripherals. Although development costs of the 360 were up to five
billion dollars (Fortune, 1966), the 360 soon became a major financial success. The
ability to use the same software on all types of 360 machines provided business
firms with an enormous versatility to upgrade their current 360 machines in the
future. Because of its standardized components and architecture, IBM's 360
rendered economies of scope in personnel, maintenance, production, research and
development and software (Dorfman, 1987). IBM's creation of a defacto standard
for mainframe computers and peripherals opened up opportunities for
independent peripheral manufacturers. Peripheral makers could now manufacture
devices which replaced IBM's own peripherals. These peripherals were known as
Plug Compatible Equipment (PCE) because they could be plugged into every
computer of the IBM's 360 series. The newly created market for peripherals was
characterized by much lower entry barriers than the mainframe computer market
itself. Development costs were relatively low and IBM was not entitled to forbid
their users to buy non-IBM peripherals. The combination of low development costs
(due to practices of reverse engineering) and IBM's high-price strategy offered
significant opportunities for plug compatible peripheral companies to undercut
IBM's prices.
Radical cost decreases which stemmed from the mass-production of IC's
opened up previously untapped markets. One of these markets was opened up by
Digital Equipment Corporation which introduced a low cost mini-computer, the
PDP-8. For 18,000 dollars, firms which were previously unable to purchase a
computer could now benefit from the advantages of electronic data processing.
From that time onward mini-computers were increasingly used in industrial
applications and for communication purposes. Because initial investments and
R&D costs were relatively low and head on competition with IBM could be
avoided, many firms followed DEC into the mini-computer market. The entrance
of so many firms into a relatively small market however initiated a period of
intense competition. • .... . ,. •
After a period of considerable market growth in the 1950s and early 1960s, the
computer industry faced a period of more moderate technological and market
growth. The further sophistication of computer users in the 1960s led to a stronger
proliferation of user demand. Gradually the industry transformed from an
industry that was characterized by technology pushed technological innovation
towards a demand-led industry. During time, the Integrated Circuit regime had
become a very strong guidepost for further development of the computer. The
combination of a large and transparent market and relatively stable technological
progress made it feasible to use standardized mass production processes. Whereas
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technological leadership was an important concern in the previous stages of the
mainframe industry's life cycle, emphasis now shifted towards market leadership
as the key to competitive success. In order to survive under such conditions, firms
needed to cut costs in order to compete at lower prices. The most important cost
factors of mainframe computer manufacturers were, in particular production,
marketing, development and software costs. It is clear that organizations that were
able to spread these costs over a large number of products had significant
advantages over other companies in such a price sensitive market. The emphasis on
large efficient organization structures and a strategy aimed at market leadership in
combination with a slowing growth rate in the computer industry resulted in
increased competition among firms. Not only did r to K transition become more
important, competition between large K-type organizations also increased
enormously. The assumption that continued reliance on scale economies and mass
production processes leads to a shake out in the market was supported by the
disappearance of two major mainframe manufacturers; RCA sold its computer
business to Sperry Rand and General Electric sold its computer division to
Honeywell. IBM's position was however not affected by increased competition. Its
installed base and its ability to gain economies of scope from its 360 family of
computers provided it with sufficient scale and scope advantages to reinforce its
leadership in the market.
3.3. The LSI and VLSI Period ^ - • , • ;
Although in the previous period a large number of components could be placed on
a single chip, the direction of the technological trajectory was clearly directed
towards the accommodation of an even larger number of components on a chip. A
breakthrough which radically increased the number of components on a chip was
made by Intel in 1971. By producing a so-called micro-processor, Intel managed to
build almost an entire computer on a single chip. This invention led to the advent
of a new era in chip technology which would become known as the Large Scale
Integration (LSI) period. Because miniaturization was generally seen as an
important characteristic of the new technological trajectory, incremental 'normal
technological' progress in the semiconductor industry focused on the increase of
the number of components on an integrated circuit (table 2). This progress could be
made due to an increase in chip size and by a corresponding decrease in the size of
its components. One of the first people to recognize this trajectory was Gordon
,*«.
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Moore in 1964 who observed that the number of components within a single chip
was doubling every year^.
Whereas previous changes of technological regimes were characterized by
radical technological discontinuities which rendered existing technological
competencies useless, the switch from the Integrated Circuit to the LSI/VLSI
period was characterized by competence enhancing technological changes. Instead
of destroying the competencies of incumbent firms, the introduction of the
microprocessor reinforced the position of these firms. Technological capabilities of
firms in Integrated Circuit technology were generally seen as a pre-requisite for a
successful development of microprocessor based computers. Competence-
enhancing instead of competence-destroying technological discontinuities often
lead to a further concentration of the industry. As argued by Tushman and
Anderson (1986:37) ".... competence-enhancing discontinuities consolidate
leadership in a product class; the rich get richer as liabilities of newness plague
new entrants" . It is clear that under these conditions it is very difficult to attack
incumbent firms on a technological basis. Experience effects that arise from the
cumulative production of products provide incumbent firms with clear advantages
to other competitors. Given the extremely high technological and non-technological
market barriers in the traditional mainframe industry it is obvious that new firms
did not manage to enter the industry at that time. Although the invention of the
microprocessor could not lead to a penetration of new firms into the mainframe
industry, it provided small firms with the tools to carve out new market niches
which were initially disregarded by large incumbent firms. „ . . . . ,
TABLE 2 Integration o/components per chip. ' ' ' '" ' '*' "*
Degree of integration Components per chip
Small Scale Integration (SSI)
Medium Scale Integration (MSI)
Large Scale Integration (LSI)
Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI)
Ultra Large Scale Integration (ULSI)
2-50
•••••.:•-". 5 0 - 5 0 0 0 U
.... . ,,..; 5000-100,000
100,000-1,000,000
> 1,000,000
. • • • • • -" '<• ; - , - • . - . • . . • - i r ! "
' This observation, known as Moore's law, still holds today.
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3.4. New Niches : The Super Computer and Plug Compatible Mainframe Market
In the 1970's the mainframe computer market gradually developed into a highly
concentrated mature market in which traditional computer manufacturers
competed aggressively for market share. Because entrance into the traditional
mainframe business was virtually impossible, firms tried to avoid head on
competition with IBM by entering market niches in which IBM was not (yet) active.
In 1971 Control Data Corporation opened up the super-computer market by
introducing a super fast computer called the Star 100 which was aimed at the high-
end of the mainframe market. Although very successfully from a technological
perspective commercially it was only a moderate commercial success. The first
really successful entrant in the super-computer industry was a firm called Cray
Research. Cray research was established by former CDC chief engineer Seymour
Cray. By introducing a computer which was far more powerful than IBM's fastest
computers Cray created a market for totally new applications**. Soon Cray research
would manage to take more than 75 percent of the world market of super
computers (Forester, 1993).
In the 1970s we also witnessed the rise of the plug compatible mainframe
business. The idea behind the plug compatible mainframe was to design an IBM
compatible processor unit, complement it with on the market available plug
compatible peripherals, and bundle it into a complete system. In 1970 Gene M.
Amdahl left IBM in order to found the first plug compatible mainframe company.
In 1972 additional financial support was provided to Amdahl by the Japanese
manufacturer Fujitsu. The aim was to provide high performance mainframes for a
fraction of the prices IBM charged^. In 1975 Amdahl delivered its first computer.
The low priced high performance device immediately lured a large number of
buyers away from IBM. Fujitsu's support for Amdahl coincided with the entrance
of many Japanese firms into the international computer market. In order to avoid
direct competition with IBM and to gain access to the European and US market,
Japanese companies strengthened their ties with European and US-based firms.
The most common strategy in this respect was the use of Original Equipment
Manufacturing (OEM)*" agreements. Examples of OEM agreements include
Cray's success was therefore in a large part due to the fact that Cray, unlike CDC, did not challenge
I B M d i r e c t l y . : , » ; * * > . . , ; ; * , - -.-,: ^ n i • • ; » - t : ! ^ ; * : ? < « r » . j t * ^ ' ' • • W - * - ( < ¥ r T < - ; , . - . ; •:•• - . . • , - , • ;
The first Amdahl computer had a 50% better performance/price ratio than IBM's most competitive
machine (Dorfman, 1987:92)
Through an OEM agreement one firm supplies an other firm with components or complete
products, the final product is then sold under the brand name of the acquiring company.
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alliances between Siemens-Fujitsu, Bull-NEC Amdahl-NEC, Olivetti-NEC, BASF-
NEC, ICL-NEC and Olivetti-Hitachi.
The invention of the microprocessor also made it feasible to introduce new
types of small computers. The microprocessor equipped mini-computer makers
with a powerful tool for a further decrease in the size and costs of their machines.
The extremely rapidly improving price/performance (see figure 8) ratio of small
computers opened up a large number of previously untapped markets. Whereas in
the previous period, mini-computers where primarily used for manufacturing and
communication purposes, the incorporation of the microprocessor made the mini-
computer an attractive tool for all kinds of business applications. This led to a rapid
diffusion of the mini-computer after the mid 1970s.
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FIGURE 8 Price/^er/brmance improvements o/computer systems.
Source: flirnim, 77ie Broolnn^s institute. • .-
Further development of the microprocessor in the 1970s led to even smaller
computer systems, so-called micro-computers. These computers were equipped
with user-friendly displays and facilitated the wide-spread use of computers in
businesses and at home. The first commercial micro-computer was introduced in
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1975 by a firm called Micro Instrumentation and Telemetry Systems (MITS). It was
called the Altair micro-computer and was based on Intel's first 8-bit
microprocessor. The Altair was sold as a construction kit for about $400. Its low
price and innovative features made it very popular with a large number of
hobbyists and technicians. Inspired by the introduction of this micro-computer,
several computer clubs were initiated in the US. In one of those computer clubs
Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak unveiled their own computer (the Apple I) which
was based on parts supplied by Atari and Hewlett-Packard. Motivated by the
enthusiasm of the other members of the computer club, they started production of
the Apple I with a mere $1300 in cash. Although its creators at first were severely
confined by a limited amount of cash, the Apple I soon became a instant success^.
This led to a wave of new entrants into the newly created micro-computer market.
Typically, IBM's reaction to the opportunities in the new market was relatively
slow. The disadvantages of large incumbent firms in dealing with new
opportunities in the market are often tried to be overcome by setting up an
independent subsidiary which takes care of the new market opportunity. Free from
cultural or bureaucratic forces, these ventures are able to deal effectively with new
developments in the market. In the early 1980s IBM used this strategy in its efforts
to bring a personal computer to the market. IBM created an independent division
which had almost complete freedom to build a personal computer. In 1981 IBM's
microcomputer division came up with a technologically unsophisticated and
relatively expensive computer, the IBM PC. In spite of is relatively low
price/performance ratio IBM's marketing skills and reputation enabled it once
again to dominate this market. Because IBM disclosed the design features of its
personal computer to encourage software development, it was relatively easy for
other firms to 'clone' IBM's personal computer. By buying off-the-shelf components,
hundreds of start-up firms were able to enter the clone' PC-market with only
minor investments. However due to the 1984-1985 recession in the computer
industry a shake out was well under way. At the outset, entry barriers to the micro-
computer market were almost nil. In the mid 1980s these barriers started to rise
rapidly due to the growing importance of marketing and distribution networks.
The crowded personal computer market unleashed a fight for shelf space at the
computer stores. As a result, the micro-computer market would soon be known as
the most competitive computer market of all. IBM's success in the personal
computer market and its disclosure of design features induced hundreds of small
firms to enter the newly created market for IBM-compatible products such as
The apple I would soon be supperseded by its successor the Apple Q.
i
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computers, programmes and peripherals. Because of market share competition and
subsequent price wars a phase of consolidation and shake-out would soon
characterize this part of the industry as well. In a reaction to IBM's attack on its
dominant position in the micro-computer industry, Apple introduced a new
computer (the Macintosh) in 1984**. The Macintosh featured a graphical user
friendly operating system and was much more powerful than its much more
expensive predecessor, the Lisa. Due to the rapid diffusion of the micro computer,
users increasingly felt the need to connect their computers. This led to the
emergence of a large number of Local and Wide Area Networks (LANs and
WANs). Local Area Networks (LANs) are types of networks that are used to share
data between several types of computers within a building or a campus where
information can be transmitted and received without making use of the public
telecommunications system, whereas Wide-Area Networks (WANs) are networks
that connect offices in different geographical areas. The introduction of these
networks made it possible to use so-called distributed processing techniques
(figure 9). Distributed processing can be seen as a form of parallel processing
which makes use of geographically dispersed computer systems that are linked
through transmission media and which make use of each others data and
processing capabilities. The need for communication between various computer
systems would soon lead to a number of communication and software standards.
At the same time a number of relatively cheap standardized application software
packages became available. Standardized software packages reduced the need for
in-house programming capabilities and made available hundreds of sophisticated
software packages to the public (see also Steinmueller, 1994). Furthermore,
advances in micro-electronics facilitated the replacement of magnetic core
memories by much faster, high capacity Integrated Circuits. Because memory
devices were generally seen as the 'bottleneck' of computers, the incorporation of
these devices facilitated a considerable increase in the speed of computers and
fostered a rapid growth of the installed base of micro-computers.
J -*-.-.;-•'ii-fll
*^ Ever since the introduction of the Apple I, Apple had successfully penetrated the market with the
Apple II and III models.
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3.5. Recent Trends : Decline or Rejuvenation ?
Ever since the development of the vacuum tube, the computer industry has been
characterized by rapid technological progress and a dynamic market structure.
Today however we are witnessing a rapid maturation of the computer industry.
Signs of the maturing character of the computer industry can be found in; slower
growth rates, declining profit margins, the standardization of products, an
increased sophistication of users, globalisation and a further consolidation of the
industry. After decades of double digit growth figures, revenue growth is currently
slowing down (see Rappaport and Halevi, 1991). Saturation of demand started in
the early 1980s in the mainframe industry where replacement purchases started to
overtake new procurements. Today even the relatively young mini-computer
market is transforming into a replacement market. The only growth potential
which is left is found in the rapidly rising workstation market and to a lesser
extend in the PC business. Although the rise in the total number of machines sold
in the computer market is still high, this rise is for the larger part due to the sales of
relatively low priced PCs. Market saturation and a shift towards lower priced
computers are primarily responsible for a slowing growth rate measured in sales
volume. It looks like carrying capacity is gradually being approached. Double digit
growth rates in almost all segments in the mid 1980s have made way for single
digit and sometimes even negative growth rates in the current period (figure 10).
Moreover, price decreases of over 20 to 25 percent annually indicate that demand
must rise with an equal amount to prevent the computer market from shrinking. A
growing degree of saturation of the market however makes it very difficult to
achieve such a growth rate.
A second indication of the maturing character of the computer industry can be
found in the drive towards standardization. At present, there is a clear transition
going on away from proprietary systems towards more 'open systems'. Standard-
ization was introduced in the computer industry in the late 1960s when IBM
introduced the IBM 360 family of computers. Because IBM had an installed number
of computers which was several times larger than that of its competitors it
experienced significant cost and user lock-in" advantages. Since then IBM's
dominant position enabled it to impose its proprietary standard as the market
standard. Because other proprietary computer makers did not have the opportunity
to benefit from such a large installed base, they faced severe difficulties in
* User lock-in advantages arise from the considerable switching costs which are involved in switching
from one make of computer to another. For a more extensive review of lock-in effects in the computer
industry, see Greenstein (1991).
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contesting IBM's domination in the market. In an attempt to attack IBM's
domination of the industry several computer manufacturers joined forces in the
early 1980s in order to come up with a non-proprietary industry standard. These
efforts would lead to strong support for AT&T's UNIX operating system and the
OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) system* " -*?<««•>
89 90 91 92
<^—M'"<fr»"c -a-Super mini -B-Mini -»-Micro computer* J)
FIGURE 10 Groart/i o/revenues in annua/ percentages, 1986-1992.
. ...... Source Gartner Group, 1993.
The process towards standardization is further reinforced by the increasing
globalisation that takes place in the business community. Communication needs
between different departments and divisions demand connectivity and
compatibility between heterogenous computers in different geographical areas.
One of the factors that led to such degree of globalisation of the industry is found
in the extremely high R&D and equipment costs that characterize the industry.
Measured by R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales, the computer industry is
OSI provides a conceptual design which describes ways to interconnect previously incompatible
computers.
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only surpassed by the highly government sponsored aircraft and missiles industry
(Flamm, 1988). Both equipment and R&D costs are still rapidly rising due to the
growing complexity of technology and the exploitation of mass production
techniques, while at the same time, product lives are shortening due to increased
competition. Hence, these costs can only be recouped by firms which are able to
capture a significant share of the market. In order to achieve such market share,
firms have to expand internationally. In other words, the drive towards lower costs
leads to the invasion of global markets in order to spread R&D and production
costs over a larger volume of sales'".
A fourth characteristic of a mature industry is the further sophistication of
users. Ever since World War II the computer industry was driven by technology.
Technological changes which were initiated from within or from outside the
industry augmented demand and opened up opportunities for new applications
and for new markets. Today's computer market is however increasingly
characterized by sophisticated users who have the ability to steer the direction of
technological developments. The maturing character of the industry has important
implications for the structure of competition in the computer industry. The
transition towards open systems increasingly transforms computers into
commodities. This transformation brings about considerable price competition in
the market. Under such conditions cost structures become more important than
differentiation policies. This will in particular be advantageous to large firms
which are able to spread their costs over a larger number of products and which
employ mass production techniques. Whereas entry barriers are rapidly rising for
broad-line suppliers, the trend towards open systems also opens up a number of
opportunities for smaller firms to establish themselves in niche markets.
Standardization makes it possible to enter the commercial computer market
without the need to sell an entire product line of computers. All kinds of small
firms are able to invade the industry by selling parts, small computers,
communication systems or peripherals. In such an industry large routinized firms
dominate the technological and economic developments whereas small firms
survive in market niches or by providing supplementary services. Firms which are
not able to gain cost leadership advantages nor differentiation advantages are
found to be 'stuck in the middle' (Porter, 1980,1985) and face though competition
from firms that are able to gain from one of those advantages.
Continuous declining prices combined with rapid advances in speed, size and
capacity in the past decades have diminished the opportunities in the current
*' See chapter eight for an elaborated discussion of the globalisation process.
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computer paradigm. Whereas technological change in the 1960s and 1970s opened
up a number of opportunities for the creation of completely new markets, in the
1980s new markets have hardly been found. Ever since the construction of the
UNIVAC I in 1951, computers were built according to the rules of the von
Neumann paradigm. After 40 years now, the limits of this paradigm seem to have
been approached. This is exemplified by the fact that companies are increasingly
confronted with diminishing returns from their R&D efforts. In order to achieve the
same amount of technological progress an increasing amount of resources have to
be invested in R&D. Slower technological growth rates are most clearly observed in
the technologically most advanced and best-developed sectors of the computer
industry. In the mainframe computer industry capacity of computers in the 1980s
has only increased with a mere 7%, whereas in the relatively new personal
computer industry capacity increased over 30% annually (Computable, 17-8-90). If
we accept the view that the search for a new paradigm increases with the
difficulties of finding satisfactory solutions in the current paradigm, we might
witness a paradigmatic shift in the near future. "itvn -.(" v, rfi'*a*i..
Signs of such rejuvenation can be found in two distinct but related areas. The
origin of the first factor which might lead to a paradigmatic shift is found in the
digitalization of the telecommunications network which enables computers to
communicate with each other and which provides opportunities for a whole range
of new services. Digitalization of the telecommunications network implies that
signals (e.g. computer data) can be transferred in digital form from one point to
another through means of digital switching and digital transmission equipment.
The ability to communicate with other computers will become of the utmost
importance for a further acceleration of the performance of computers. A
paradigmatic change away from centralised computers towards distributed
computing environments in which computers share resources, data and make use
of each others processing abilities creates enormous opportunities for the computer
industry. It will undoubtedly result in an increased standardization of computer
and communication products and opens up opportunities for entirely new services
in the digital network. With the introduction of the Integrated Service Digital
Network (ISDN) an even larger number of new services will be introduced. In
ISDN networks voice, data and graphics can be sent to other computers in digital
form through new transmission media". Radical improvements in technology and
the use of new processing architectures will be needed in order to equip computers
with the processing and storage capacities that are needed to support these kinds of
See Steinmueller and David (1994) for a more elaborated discussion on ISDN.
• ' • • • '
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applications. It was noted by Cutaia (1990:42) that ".... these forms of data require
approximately 30 times the amount of information flow through the system,
require 10-15 times the storage per end user, and require system processor(s) to
supply approximately 64 MIPS capacity growth from 1987 to the year 2000" . The
very high requirements needed to support voice/data/images applications will
continually challenge the abilities of current generation computers and
telecommunications equipment. In order to cope with these huge demands for
computing and storage capacity, computer manufacturers are searching for new
ways to improve the speed of their computers. At present, parallel computers seem
to be well equipped to satisfy these needs. Hence, parallel computers might
represent the second part of the new paradigm. Parallel computers can be seen as
computers which incorporate a number of microprocessors, each working on parts
of a problem at the same time. Most super-computer manufacturers have already
successfully introduced parallel computing techniques in the past few years. A
rapid acceptance of the parallel computing paradigm will however primarily
depend on the availability of software for these computers. Because parallel
computers require totally new programming techniques, past experience and lock-
in advantages of current users will be rendered useless. Moreover, totally new
markets will be opened up by advances in distributed computing. This may bring
about forces of creative destruction which might challenge the position of current
industry leaders. Undoubtedly, an effective participation in this new paradigm
requires significant knowledge of communication systems, software and
s e m i c o n d u c t o r s . - . . = . < , . , , ,••,- ,_.••;_ . ;..; ;;^.:- ; : > " • - e -•
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Whereas IBM continues to dominate virtually every segment of the market, its total
market share is gradually declining. In the mainframe industry, the Japanese
broad-line suppliers (e.g. Fujitsu, Hitachi, Amdahl) have captured a significant
share of the market through their efficient production and marketing of IBM-
compatible systems. Their low-cost production structures, government support and
the use of OEM strategies for the invasion of new markets has made these firms
very successful. Whereas no Japanese firm was able to penetrate the top ten of the
computer industry by the early 1980s, no less than 3 Japanese firms managed to
enter the top 5 in 1992. Fujitsu ranked second, whereas NEC and Hitachi ranked
3th and 5th respectively (see Figure 11).
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IBM has retained its positions as the industry leader. Although the
establishment of a de-facto standard in the mainframe industry drastically lowered
entry barriers which arose from lock-in effects, a large increase in production and
R&D costs has raised financial entry barriers once again. Therefore only firms with
sufficient financial resources are able to enter the industry. The enormous financial
resources which are needed to overcome the huge entry barriers are exemplified by
Digital Equipment's R&D spending of over $ 1 billion for its VAX 9000 computer
system. Whereas both U.S. and Japanese firms tend to operate on the basis of a
well-developed technological base. All the major European computer makers tend
to rely on foreign technological inputs (Malerba et al, 1991). Olivetti, Siemens and
ICL (acquired by Fujitsu) rely on Japanese technological knowledge for their
mainframe products. The French national champion Groupe Bull relies on
mainframe technology from its US subsidiary Honeywell. »-<,
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Today the mini-computer market is gradually branching out in three directions;
traditional mini-computers, super-minis and workstations. Because the traditional
mini-market is dominated by the industry giants IBM and DEC, small firms have
started to explore new market opportunities at both the high and the low-end of
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the mini-computer market. In the high end of the market, so-called super-mini-
computers are currently challenging traditional mainframe computers. Fast growth
of this segment is expected due to an increasing demand for powerful client/server
applications and large graphical applications. On the other end of the mini-
computer market, specialist firms such as Sun microsystems, Silicon Graphics and
Apollo (H-P) carved out a new markets for so-called workstations. Workstations
are increasingly used for technical applications as well as for local area network
servers. The introduction of both super-mini-computers and workstations has
blurred the traditional distinction between personal computers, mini-computers
and, mainframes.
In contrast to IBM's market share in mini-computers, its dominant position in
the micro-computer market is gradually decreasing (figure 12). Whereas the early
1980s were characterized by a large number of proprietary PC-makers, today most
of these PC-makers experience severe drawbacks in sales and therefore redirect
their focus towards IBM-compatibility. In the late 1980's technological
developments in components and LCD screens made it possible to introduce
portable computers. The early portable computer market was dominated by a US
company called Zenith'". Japanese firms were particularly well placed to achieve a
dominant position in the portable computer market. Their leading positions in
critical areas such as LCD displays, diskdrives, memory chips and their ability to
manufacturer very small complex components made Japanese firms particularly
equipped to produce small portable computers for the newly emerging market.
One of the first Japanese firms to enter the portable computer market was Toshiba.
In 1990 Toshiba managed to take over the leading position in the US market from
Zenith. At that time Toshiba held 21 percent of the US laptop market followed by
Zenith and Compaq each holding 10 percent of the market. Other important
competitors included Sharp and NEC which followed closely with 9 and 8 percent
of the US market respectively (Forester, 1993). With the advent of even smaller, so-
called notebook' computers the laptop market experiences even more market
growth and is well under way to achieve a market size comparable to the desktop
micro-computer market.
IBM once again failed to make use of the opportunities in the early portable
computer market. In spite of its ability to gain economies of scale and scope in
production, R&D and marketing IBM turned into a bureaucratic rigid organization
that was unable to meet new demands in the market. IBM seems to have retained
its traditional emphasis on the relatively slow growing mainframe and mini-
** Zenith's best selling computer (the Z-181) was however built by the Japanese manufacturer Sanyo
(Forester, 1993).
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computer markets. Its once dominant position in one of the most promising
markets, the micro-computer market seems to be increasingly attacked by other
more flexible organizations. In another fast growing market, the workstation
market IBM takes an intermediate position following behind specialist workstation
manufacturers Silicon Graphics and Sun Microsystems. IBM's inability to
participate successfully in the most dynamic (and most promising) new markets
was exemplified by its major losses in 1992 and 1993. These losses have induced
IBM to take on a major reorganization programme which dramatically ended IBM's
commitment to lifetime employment of its employees. During 1993 more than one
fifth of its employees were laid off and more layoffs are expected in 1994. IBM is
however not alone in its inability to take advantage of newly emerging market
opportunities. Whereas traditional US computer manufacturers are still a dominant
force in mainframe and mini-computers, only a few of them have been able to gain
a significant market share in the fastest growing markets for workstations, portable
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In the second chapter we posed a number of hypotheses about the evolution of
complex industrial systems over time. We assumed that at the time of founding of
a new industrial system both market and technological uncertainties were too high
to be accepted by commercial firms. For commercial firms it will be very difficult to
persuade investors and financial institutions to support their entrants into such a
newly born market. Therefore, universities and government institutions are
expected to play the role of incubators of the new technology (faypotfiesis 2). In the
computer industry this role was played by universities that carried out government
financed projects. The most important projects were carried out by among others;
Jay Forester of MIT who was working on the Whirlwind I, Howard Aitken from
Harvard working on the Harvard MARK I and, J. Presper Eckert and John W.
Mauchly from the University of Pensylvania who were building the first general
purpose electronic computer, the ENIAC. In Germany and Britain government
support was used to build computers for wartime applications. The importance of
universities and government institutions at that time therefore seems to support
our /i'rsf Ziypof/iesis that the role of these organizations as incubators of a new
technology is very important.
After the 'incubator period' we expect that a number of flexible fast to build
organizations (r-specialists) enter the market (/lypot/tesis 2). This hypothesis is
supported by our findings in the computer industry. During the late 1940s and
early 1950s we saw the entrance of a large number of newly established
organizations into the market. Most of these organizations were spin-offs from
universities. The Eckert-Mauchly Computer Corporation, Engineering Research
Associates (ERA), Electro-Data Corporation and the Computer Research
Corporation are the most well know exponents of these r-type organizations. Those
small organizations carried out innovative government sponsored research
projects. The ease with which these organizations could be established enabled a
considerable number of new organizations to enter the market at this stage. At that
time competitive strategies were aimed at satisfying the needs of technology-
focused customers. Especially military institutions showed a keen interest in the
new technology. This resulted in a technology-driven industry in which some firms
were able to grow rapidly and managed to reap high profits from their highly
innovative products whereas other organizations suffered from liabilities of
newness and were soon dissolved. •
One of the products of these r-type organizations, Eckert and Mauchly's
UNIVAC I, would soon be recognized as a technological guidepost for future
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developments in technology. In the second chapter we assume that the
establishment of a basic design leads to a substitution of radical technological
development by incremental cumulative improvements along a specific
technological path or trajectory (Hypotfzesis 3). In the computer industry we saw
that ever since the invention of the UNIVAC I the far majority of computers were
built according to the rules set out by John von Neumann. The second aspect of the
new technological paradigm was the use of digital components. These components
are, although in a changed form, still in use today. It is remarkable to see that in
such a dynamic industry as the computer industry, the two basic pillars of the
technological paradigm have remained basically unchanged for over 40 years now.
This provides strong support to the hypothesis that once a technological paradigm
has been established technological progress is guided by specific technological
paths or trajectories. ..ivr^*?*;';;?,;« Jiv-iti••£•*}•,*, fes j^.v.;..:,t ;Y;,Ji...:«v ..... ... ;* .^-i.:,.i
• In our /ourM Ziypof/iesi's we argue that the standardized direction of
technological progress as set out by the new technological paradigm would open
up opportunities for larger, so-called K-type organizations, which are able to
benefit from the economies of scale and scope that can be gained from their
elaborated and efficient organizational structures. The first K-type firm to enter the
computer industry was Remington Rand. Its early success would soon lead to the
entrance of a number of other K-generalist firms from adjacent markets. Our
integrated framework predicts that the reduction in both market and technological
uncertainty as a result of the establishment of the new technological paradigm
would lead to a state in which K-generalists and polymorphists are able to
outcompete r-specialists (Hypof/iesis 4). The start of the so-called r- to K transition is
clearly illustrated in the computer industry by a wave of acquisitions. All the major
r-type organizations that we described above were taken over by large K-type
competitors during the 1950s. K-type organizations are often equipped with a huge
sales force and an efficient production apparatus. Moreover, their reputation and
client base in adjacent markets enables them to gain rapid social acceptance
(legitimation). The entrance of these K-generalist firms into the market could be
seen as a confirmation of the establishment of the new industry. However, the lack
of reliability and performance of the vacuum tube components prevented the
market from developing into a mass market. Inabilities to make sufficient
improvements in the current technology base led a number of firms to broaden
their search procedures into other directions.
The first technological regime shift in the computer industry was brought
about by the invention of the transistor. We expected to see forces of 'creative
destruction' to take place because incumbent firms could now be attacked on a
technological base. Incumbent organizations are expected to have severe
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difficulties to redirect their focus towards the new regime. This should give way to
an invasion of fast to build innovative (r-type) organizations that are able to benefit
from the new opportunities in the market. The computer industry however shows
a significantly different picture. All of the major K-type firms that dominated the
previous period were able to redirect their focus to the new regime and were able
to dominate the transistor period in the same way they dominated the vacuum tube
period. The same large firms that dominated the previous period now accounted
for 98 percent of the transistor market. Even in a so-called high-tech' industry non-
technological entry barriers were of more importance to the industry than
technological entry barriers. Huge start-up costs, reputation and client-base
advantages and IBM's leasing policy made it very difficult for new organizations to
compete against the larger incumbent firms. In fact, the r- to K transition which
started in the vacuum tube period accelerated in the following period.
It was not until the advent of the integrated circuit and the invention of the
microprocessor that r-type organizations found opportunities to compete
effectively in the computer market. Typically their importance was not found in the
invasion of the mainframe computer market but in opening up new markets.
Although increasing competitive pressures forced two major competitors RCA and
General Electric to abandon the computer market, five of the seven traditional
leaders retained their dominant position in the mainframe market. The mainframe
market had grown into a transparent market with relatively stable technological
progress. The increasing importance of static economies of scale and scope once
again increased the relative importance of large established firms. This is in line
with the assumption in /n/poMesis 5 that increased density raises competitive
pressures and increases the r- to K transition in the market. IBM proved to be a
master in taking advantage of these static economies by introducing its IBM 360
series of computers. Other firms faced more problems in dealing with such a
competitive environment and a first shakeout in the mainframe industry was well
under way. The following period which is referred to in the text as the LSI and
VLSI period was characterized by cumulative competence enhancing technological
progress. Because technological competence in Integrated Circuit technology was a
pre-requisite for a successful competitive position in the new period, the power of
well established incumbent firms was not challenged by new organisations. High
barriers to entry in the mainframe market, IBM's power to control the market and
the emphasis on price-based competition gave small new firms not a single
opportunity to compete effectively in this market. As a result, attention of new
firms concentrated on promising new market niches. R-type organizations opened
up the mini-computer market (DEC), the super-computer market (Amdahl) and the
micro-computer market (Apple). At first, these markets were only small niches but
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they would soon grow into important markets themselves. In line with our
expectation, as put forward in /zypof/zes/s 6, specialist firms were the first to enter
these specific market niches. The emergence of a mass-market is generally seen as
one of the preconditions that make a strategy of segmentation viable. However in
the computer industry there was another important factor that influenced the
emergence of multiple market niches. The emergence of new niches was also for a
large part due to the establishment of new technological regimes which made it
possible to manufacture smaller (mini and micro-computers) and faster (super
computers) computers.
Today's market place is characterized by a rapid maturation of the industry.
Slowing growth rates in all the industry sectors increased competition and reduced
profit margins. Emphasis on standardized products induces firms to compete on
price instead of performance. Because technological progress in the current
paradigm seems to approach its natural limits and carrying capacity of the niche is
gradually approached, firms have to broaden their search strategies in order to find
new opportunities in the market. Decreasing opportunities in the existing
paradigm may well lead to the replacement of the current paradigm by a paradigm
based on parallel computers and distributed computing environments. Although a
K to r transition has not (yet) taken place, the success of innovative r-type
organizations such as Maspar, NCube, Convergent Technologies Inc., Thinking
Machines Inc. and other firms" that drive on the success of parallel computers and
the recent losses of incumbent firms may be an indication of the rise in r-type
organizations at the expense of K-types. The research programmes of almost all of
the major computer manufacturers however reveal that they are all involved in
research on parallel computing and distributed computing architectures. Therefore
it is very unlikely that they will not succeed in transforming their strategies when
a paradigmatic shift takes place and a K to r transition occurs (Hypof/iesis 7).
To summarize, the integrated framework as presented in the second chapter
was able to describe fairly accurately the technological and market developments
in the history of the computer industry. The framework however seems to
overstate the destructive forces of technological change and was found to
underestimate the various non-technological forces that enabled firms to master
changing environments. Although technological regime shifts in the computer
industry were not able to initiate a gale of creative market destruction, the expected
paradigmatic shift will undoubtedly challenge the flexibility and adaptiveness of
incumbent organisations. .
** After a period of fierce growth, some of these companies had to cope with some major drawbacks in
terms of decreasing profits.
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The Telecommunications Industry^
Although the telecommunications revolution is often referred to as a phenomenon
which started after the second world war, basic means of communication over long
distances are already in use for several thousand years. Whereas the early indians
made use of huge fires, the romans depended on high towers for sending
information to distant locations. The most well-known communication system
which made use of visual telegraphy was designed by Claude Chappe during the
French revolution. Chappe constructed a system which consisted of towers
containing semaphore arms to send messages. These towers covered a distance of
over 3000 miles and made available rapid communications throughout the country.
Soon this system would turn out to be a key factor for the French military success
in those days. Commercial applications however could not be easily found.
The birth of the 'modern' telecommunications industry can be traced back to
the invention of the first practical telegraph in England by Cooke and
Wheaterstone in 1837. Their telegraphic instrument made use of electrical signals
which caused a needle to point to a specific letter (Brock, 1981). A few months later
Samuel Morse patented a somewhat similar device which made use of dot-and-
dash based codes. Morse demonstrated his telegraph by transmitting messages in
code from Washington to Baltimore in 1844. This event marked the start of a new
technological paradigm based on the transmission of electrical signals over long
distances. Morse's telegraph system would soon become a basic design which had
a major impact on future developments in telegraphy. At that time telegraphic
Because of the heterogenous character of the telecommunications industry and the absense of
international competition before the 1980s, this chapter will be primarily concerned with the evolution
of the largest of all domestic telecommunications markets: the US telecommunications industry.
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codes were transmitted over copper wire cables. The resistance of the wires
however made long-distance reliable telegraphy very difficult. As a result research
was primarily directed towards the improvement of distance and reliability.
In contrast to regulatory policies in the rest of the world** the US telegraph
system was operated by privately held firms. Within 15 years after the invention of
the telegraph more than 50 small (r-type) private telegraph companies were active
in the United States (Belitsos and Misra, 1986). In spite of the active involvement of
small firms in the industry, future demand for such an expensive service as the
telegraph made larger firms very sceptical about entering the business. Early
demand for telegraphic services came primarily from time-sensitive customers
such as stock market traders, newspaper agencies and for railroad purposes.
Alongside these commercial clients the government made increasing use of the
telegraph for military applications. This small but well-paying group of customers
provided a large incentive for further development and expansion of the systems
and enabled the entrance of new organizations into the market. The newly created
telegraph firms operated under a large number of different patents. In the early
1850's the Morse patent would establish itself as the most important patent.
Infringement suits against competing patents resulted in the elimination of a large
number of active firms (Brock, 1981). One of the largest producers and exploiters of
telegraph wires and equipment (the Western Union Telegraph Company) made
use of its rights on the Morse patent and its acquired system economies of scale to
monopolize the market. Its exclusive railroad contracts enabled Western Union to
construct by far the largest telegraph network in the entire world. In the mid 1850s
extensive telegraph systems covered most of the US and Europe^. Although many
small telegraph companies were active in the US at that time, Western Union
would rapidly succeed in the establishment of an almost monopolistic position in
the last half of the 19th century. However, a major challenge to its until then
uncontested position was well under way in the form of a new technological
innovation, namely the telephone.
' In most European countries the telegraph system was rapidly placed under the same regulatory
regime as the postal systems. This inaugurated an era dominated by huge national institutions which
after the introduction of the telephone would be called Post, Telegraph and Telecommunications
Administrations (PTTs).
** Among the countries with the most sophisticated systems in Europe were Great Britain, France and
Germany.
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4.1. The Telephone " - ^ " ^ 7 „..
Following the invention of the telegraph, the telecommunications industry gained
further impetus through the invention of the telephone by Alexander Graham Bell
in 1875. Bell filed its basic patent on the telephone only a few hours before Elisha
Gray filed a similar invention. Although at first its commercial value was very low,
it would eventually result in the establishment of a new technological paradigm
based on analogue voice communications. This new paradigm would soon remain
side by side with the telegraph paradigm for a considerable period of time. At the
outset the telephone was merely regarded as a complementary product which
could be used in a restricted number of specific application areas only. Telephone
equipment was not very advanced at that time and telephone applications were
severely handicapped because they could be used for short distance services only.
Whereas the telegraph was already well equipped to deal with long distance
communications, the telephone was only effective at distances of less than 20 miles.
In spite of its limited functionality and its inability to operate at longer
distances Bell's telephone soon evolved into a basic design which would serve as a
technological guidepost and which would remain to a large extend unchanged for
more than a century. Bell started its commercial business as a manufacturing
company selling telephones to the public. At the outset private lines connected the
telephones of two premises. However, soon people recognized that the value of a
telephone could be enhanced tremendously by connecting existing telephone lines
to each other. In order to provide switching services so-called operating companies
were franchised by Bell. In 1878 the first of these operating companies was formed
in New England. During the same year telegraph giant Western Union entered the
telephone industry through the formation of the American Speaking Telephone
Company. In a very short period of time Western Union would grow into Bell's
major competitor. Western Union operated on the basis of Elisha Gray's patents
and took advantage of its control of a large network of telegraph lines. In spite of
its relatively late start Western Union rapidly established a prominent position in
the telephone industry. This was possible because telephone and telegraph devices
could be served over the same lines and because Western Union did not allow
Bell's telephones to be connected to its enormous network. Moreover, its huge
financial assets and reputation advantages enabled Western Union to outcompete
Bell in a very short period of time. •.nn**w*«:-:*««ai; r
The inability to compete effectively with such a powerful corporation induced
Bell to file a suit against Western Union for infringement of Bell's patents. Western
Union, considering the telephone business as merely a small niche market, agreed
to exit the telephone industry and gave Bell access to all its telephone patents in
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return for a percentage of Bell's rents and royalties. The Bell company committed
itself not to enter the market for telegraphy until the expiration of its basic
telephone patents in 1894. This agreement, signed in 1879, provided Bell with an
almost monopolistic position in the telephone industry. The agreement is often
referred to as the second of two critical mistakes in the history of Western Union.
The first mistake was its refusal of Bell's offer in 1877 to buy all Bell's basic patents
for $100,000. By signing the agreement with Bell in 1879 Western Union failed to
recognize the opportunities of the telephone outside the limited areas in which it
played a role in those days. The decision to sign the agreement was however not as
remarkable as it seemed. At that time the telephone was barely functional and
distances of 20 miles were achieved only under the best possible conditions
(Wasserman, 1985). One year after signing the agreement the Bell company
transformed itself into the American Bell Company. Western Union redirected its
focus towards the telegraph industry and by a merger with its major competitor the
American Union Telegraph company it was able to establish a virtual monopoly in
that market. In 1881 the American Bell Company strengthened its manufacturing
capability by acquiring a controlling stake in Western Electric which traditionally
operated as Western Unions major supplier. One year later the American Bell
Company signed an agreement with Western Electric in which Western Electric
agreed to sell its products exclusively to Bell.
The first technological regime to emerge within the telephone paradigm was
based on essentially the same transmission and switching technology as the
telegraph. Copper wires were used to transmit analogue voice signals and
switching was done manually. Because both telegraph and telephone technologies
experienced the same difficulties, research on transmission equipment was also
directed towards lowering the resistance of the transmission wires and improving
the distance which could be achieved. At the same time efforts in switching
equipment focused on the improvement of the efficiency with which signals could
be routed. At first switchboards were operated by men, later women replaced these
operators. This 'process innovation' proved to be very successful. According to an
executive of an American telephone company in
 1881, women " are steadier, do
not drink beer and are always on hand" (Rhodes, 1929:154). However, the limits in
technological opportunity of the technological regime based on manual switching
would soon be reached. This is illustrated by the fact that the cost of manual
switching increased enormously with each new subscriber. Every increase in the
number of subscribers made it necessary to connect more circuits to one another. In
many cases a call had to be routed through a number of exchanges before it was
transferred. This so-called 'switchboard problem' (Mueller, 1989) was so immense
that a Bell telephone manager complained that " so far as he could see, all he had
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to do was get enough subscribers and the company would go broke" (Pool et al.,
1977:130). As usual in the case of diminishing returns from technological progress
within a specific regime, search processes were broadened and other opportunities
were explored. A solution to the pressing problems would eventually be found in
a new technological regime which was based on electro-mechanical technology.
Shielded by a strong patent position and its acquired system scale economies it
was not very difficult for the American Bell company to maintain its monopolistic
position in the industry. However potential competition could be expected to enter
the market after 1893 and 1894 when Bell's basic patents expired. Although entry
barriers were still high due to system economies of scale, its reputation advantages
and Bell's vertical integrated structure, many firms tried to enter the industry after
1894. Bell's absence in rural areas and its high tariff structure gave many
independent telephone companies the chance to compete in the industry. Within 15
years after the expirement of Bell's basic patents, independent telephone companies
managed to capture more than half the market for telephone subscribers (Bornholz
and Evans, 1983). The newly established independent telephone companies set up
local private systems and attracted customers by charging lower prices than Bell
did. Bell on the other hand dominated long distance services. Because Bell refused
interconnection to its system the local systems remained relatively isolated. After
the expirement of its basic patents Bell tried to combat the independent telephone
companies by pursuing a low price strategy, by enhancing its service and by filing
patent suits against its major competitors. However to Bell's dismay these strategies
were quite ineffective (Bornholz and Evans, 1983). After a few years Bell changed
its tactics and tried to regain its grip on the telephone industry by aggressively
acquiring independent telephone companies. The weak financial resources of these
small (r-type) organizations made them an easy prey for Bell's aggressive
acquisition strategies. In the meantime the American Bell Company made an
attempt to escape from the strict Massachusetts laws which prevented it from
achieving its expansion goals by relocating its stocks to the New York based
American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) in 1899. In the following
years a growing number of observers argued that AT&T abused its power and
made use of aggressive acquisition strategies in order to monopolize the industry.
AT&T's president Theodore Vail in turn argued that it was in the country's best
interest to have 'One system, one policy and universal service'. Ongoing criticism
about the dominant role of AT&T in the telecommunications industry however led
to an increased call for nationalization of the telephone system. In an attempt to
escape from being nationalized AT&T gradually accepted government regulation.
AT&T embraced government regulation for three reasons (Brock and Evans, 1983).
First, regulation was seen as a better alternative than nationalization. Second,
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regulatory actions could lead to a more favourable regulatory setting, and finally,
regulation could lead to the elimination of competition from independent
competitors. In 1913 AT&T deterred further nationalization threats by signing the
Kingsbury Commitment in which AT&T agreed to stop the acquisition of telephone
companies, to divest its interests in Western Union and to enable independent
telephone companies to interconnect to its system. By adopting the Kingsbury
commitment AT&T agreed to accept strict government regulation in return for a
virtual monopolistic position in the US telecommunications industry.
i . / r ••>»£»,•
4.2. The Electronic Vacuum Tube (Valve) Period
The invention of the vacuum tube in 1907 radically changed the nature of the
telecommunications industry. The vacuum tube made it possible to use thinner
wires by amplifying signals through vacuum tube repeaters. By using these
repeaters the transmitting distance of wires could be more than doubled (Jewett,
1928). Moreover it gave way to so called frequency division multiplexing, which is
a technique used for transmitting several calls over a single pair of wires. The
combination of vacuum tube repeaters and frequency division multiplexing
techniques paved the way for even more cost-effective long-distance telephony
(Harper, 1986). Traditionally the major advantage of telegraphy over telephony
was its ability to operate over much longer distances. The invention of the vacuum
tube however started an era in which the telephone could operate on about the
same distance. This enabled the telephone to replace the telegraph as the most
important telecommunications device. AT&T was among the first to recognize the
importance of the vacuum tube and it rapidly purchased the DeForest patents in
order to preserve its prominent position in the industry. This move protected
AT&T from the dangers of radical technological changes which could have led to a
gale of creative destruction' in the industry. AT&T would however soon face
another threat to its monopolistic position. A threat which came from the early
development of wireless communication. Wireless communications was made
possible by the further development of an invention by Guglielmo Marconi who
discovered a method of transmitting messages through the air. This so-called radio
transmission was increasingly used to send telegraphic messages in the form of
dot-and-dash based codes. The success of this new transmission regime spurred
inventors to examine the opportunities of wireless voice applications. Moreover,
the start of the first World War provided another incentive to the use of radio
communication for military applications. Military contracts to several scientists in
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the field of radio transmission would soon lead to the recognition of the
advantages of transmitting voice over long distances through the air. Because
transmission equipment was very expensive during the early days of radio
operation, commercial prospects were not very promising. Radio communication
was expected to be only feasible for very long distance services. However, as soon
as radio equipment became less expensive it could become a major competitor of
wired telecommun-ications. This would pose a major threat to AT&T's
monopolistic position. Because AT&T's monopoly position was in large part due to
its elaborated wired network, it could render one of AT&T's major barriers to entry
useless. Potential competitors would then be able to enter the market for long
distance services without the need to come up with major expenditures in wires
and rights of way. The growing complexity of technological and economic forces
and the regulatory problems associated with newly emerging technologies such as
radio transmission made it increasingly difficult for the US Congress to make well
balanced decisions on regulatory issues. In order to provide better regulatory
actions the Congress passed a Communications Act in 1934 in which the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) was established in order to regulate interstate
long distance telecommunications and broadcasting. One of the most pressing tasks
that the FCC was expected to deal with was the question of whether radio
communications needed to be regulated. The newly established FCC decided to
grant the common carriers exclusive access to the available frequency bands. This
decision in combination with its patents on the vacuum tube enabled AT&T to
benefit from a relatively stable monopolistic position until the 1950's. At that time
AT&T firmly dominated local and long distance telephone service as well as the
telephone equipment market (Belitsos and Misra, 1986).
Notwithstanding their major impact on transmission equipment, the impact of
valves on telecommunication exchanges turned out to be less successful.
Experimental electronic switches that incorporated valves were too unreliable and
their power consumption was too high to be effective in commercial applications.
In those days continual replacement of burned-out tubes was needed and a single
switching device required several thousands of energy-consuming tubes. Because
fully electronic switches appeared not to be feasible at this stage, research focused
on electro-mechanical switches. These electro-mechanical switches would slowly
but gradually replace the old regime based on manual switches during the period
between the 1920s and 1960s. In first instance electro-mechanical switches were of
the Strowger and Rotary types. Later more flexible so-called crossbar switches
dominated switching technology. These smaller and faster semi-electronic
exchanges featured high capacities which made it possible to remove the bottleneck
in switching that was due to the 'switchboard problem' (Mueller, 1989). The
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improvements in both transmission and switching equipment made lower costs
and therefore lower charges feasible. This gave way to a significant growth in the
number of installed telephones. (Figure 13).
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4.3. The Transistor Period . -. . , o . ,
For the telecommunications industry, the invention of the transistor in 1949 at Bell
Laboratories initiated the first step into what would come to be known as the
digitalization process. Whereas the vacuum tube turned out to be too unreliable for
use in switching equipment, the new regime based on the transistor provided a
cheaper and more reliable alternative to electromechanical components. It was by
no means a coincidence that an important invention like the transistor took place in
the laboratories of a telecommunications firm. The telecommunications industry
clearly had the need for low cost reliable components for use in their switching
equipment. By incorporating transistors into their switching equipment (semi)
electronic switches could be produced which featured only minor maintenance
costs and which were much smaller than their electromechanical counterparts. In
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addition they provided more versatibility and enabled a broad range of high
quality services (Guy, 1985). The first practical electronic exchange was installed in
the US in 1960. Its use of transistors and program control made it comparable to a
large computer (Harper, 1986). From that time onwards computer and switching
equipment were increasingly influenced by the same technological regime. The
electronics regime that drove the electronic computer market ever since it
originated in the 1940s increasingly determined the rate and direction of
technological progress in the telecommunications industry. This convergence of
technological regimes can be seen as the start of what would be known as the
overall convergence process of Information Technologies'". The shared
technological base of computers and communications implied that economies of
scope could be achieved by simultaneously producing computers and
communications equipment. Although the convergence of communications and
computers could have brought about important implications for AT&T's definition
of its business, the 1956 Consent Decree barred AT&T from entering any other
business than communications. The Consent Decree was the result of an antitrust
case filed by the Justice Department in 1949 which claimed that AT&T violated the
Sherman Act by monopolizing the industry for telephones and related devices.
Apart from barring AT&T enterance into other markets than the regulated
telephone services market, the decree also imposed AT&T to accept a policy of
liberal licensing of its patents. The 1956 Consent Decree ruled that a large part of
AT&T's semiconductor patents granted before 1956 had to be made available to all
US firms at no charge. In addition all post-1956 patents should be made available to
the same firms at a moderate fee. The decree implied a departure from one of
AT&T's traditional basic means of entry deterrence but it also protected AT&T
against the entrance of another industry giant 'IBM' which was not allowed to enter
the regulated communications industry. AT&T had been using its prominent
patent position in order to monopolize the industry ever since 1875 when Bell
issued its first patent on the telephone. Although the abolishment of patent
protection could have evoked intense competition in the following years, federal
regulatory actions had already replaced patents as the main entry barrier in the
telecommunications industry. Ever since AT&T embraced government regulation
in the 1920s it was engaged in a policy of licensing other firms at a 'reasonable cost'
(OTA 1985). By 1956 AT&T was almost completely protected from competition by
federal regulation rather than by patents or other entry barriers (Brock, 1981).
Whereas digital techniques had a major impact on switching equipment,
customer premises equipment and transmission equipment were not directly
Chapter 6 is concerned with a more elaborated analysis of the convergence process.
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influenced by the digitalization process. However, the increased capacity and
flexibility of switching equipment transferred the bottleneck in telecommunications
from switching to transmission speed and capacity. As a result, technological
trajectories were redirected in order to improve these characteristics.
4.4. Digitalization : An Era of Structural Transformation * <
In the telecommunications industry, further improvements in reliability, speed,
size and power consumption due to the invention of the integrated circuit paved
the way for the evolution towards a fully electronic telecommunications network.
Such an electronic network would be based on digital techniques and would be
much faster and flexible than everything that was invented before. The first actual
introduction of digital techniques into telecommunications equipment came about
by the introduction of Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) in the 1960s. This technique,
which was already invented in the 1930s but was not economical feasible until
more sophisticated solid state electronics came to the market, could be used for the
translation of analogue signals into digital form (Clark, 1991). The first electronic
exchange system which made use of pulse code modulation was AT&T's Electronic
Switching System no. 1 (ESS1) which was first installed in 1965. This innovative
system would soon be recognized as a basic design which directed technological
progress away from analogue technology towards digital techniques**. Another
important impetus to the digitalization of the telecommunications network came
from the introduction of Stored Program Control (SPC) in electronic exchanges.
Successful use of stored program control in computer equipment induced
telecommunication equipment manufacturers to experiment with SPC control in
their electronic exchanges. The modification of the SPC concept for use in the
telecommunications industry was not very difficult because electronic exchanges at
that time were already build and operated as a kind of computer. Overall the
gradual replacement of hardwire logic by programme controlled digital
components radically increased the speed and flexibility with which signals could
be routed**. Meanwhile coaxial cables were gradually replacing copper wires as the
major transmission medium. High capacity coaxial cables were able to transmit
large trunks of data or voice signals over a single cable. The combination of pulse
*' Even today Pulse Code Modulation is still in use in the latest telecommunications equipment.
Another important feature of SPC controlled digital switches was that they enabled a large number
of intelligent services to the public.
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code modulation, stored program control and the use of coaxial cables had an
enormous impact on the speed and flexibility of the telecommunications network.
In the 1970s the invention of the microprocessor and subsequent developments
in computer and semiconductor technology once again speeded up the
digitalization process in the telecommunications industry. Since then, almost every
single product in the industry has been affected by digital techniques. The ongoing
digitalization of telecommunications equipment made it possible to think of a
network in which all signals would be transmitted, switched and received in
digital form. This notion was reinforced by the emergence of satellite transmission
systems and fibre-optic cables which were able to transmit pulses of light at very
high speeds. Satellite systems emerged slowly in the 1960s and posed a major
threat to the established position of telecommunication network operators. In
contrast to wired network operators, operators of satellite systems did not have to
make the enormous upfront investments which were needed to erect a global
wired network. The invention of these satellite systems gave private operators the
opportunity to bypass AT&T's network and to install their own private lines.
Today satellite equipment is produced in three more or less separate markets: i.e.
satellites, launchers and ground systems (Hills, 1986). Opportunities for
telecommunication equipment manufacturers are primarily found in the ground
station market. The market for satellites and launchers is closely related to defence
and aerospace applications. It is therefore not surprising that aerospace agencies
such as
 NASA, Delta and Ariane and defence and aerospace manufacturers such as
Hughes Aircraft, General Electric and Ford Aerospace dominate the respective
markets for launchers and satellites. Telecommunication manufacturers such as ITT
and NEC were however able to grasp a considerable share of the ground station
market. Today, the satellite systems market is characterized by rapidly increasing
upfront costs, intensifying competition and a slowing growth rate. It is clear that
under these conditions it is very difficult for new firms to enter the market
successfully.
Although satellite transmission is particularly effective for very long distance
and point-to-multipoint transmission it faces competition from another relatively
new transmission medium, namely optical fibres. Although the possibilities of
fibre-optic technology were already demonstrated by Kao and Hockham in 1966,
commercial application started only in the late 1970s (Harper, 1986). Radical price
decreases and the emergence of single mode optical fibres in the 1980s have made
fibre-optic cables the single most important new transmission regime. Fibre-optic
cables are characterized by a large bandwidth coupled with reliable data
transmission at very high transmission speeds. During the 1980s optical fibres
developed into cost-effective high capacity transmission media that slowly but
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developed into cost-effective high capacity transmission media that slowly but
gradually penetrated specific application areas in which satellite transmission
tended to dominate. Today, optical fibres are much cheaper, have a higher capacity
and speed and are very reliable for both long and short distance transmission. As a
result fibre optics are used extensively in Local and Wide Area Networks (LANs
and WANs) that require high capacity lines. Moreover, optical fibres are likely to
play a very important role as the basic transmission element in the emerging
Integrated Services Digital Networks (ISDN)". Competition between optical fibres
and satellites is most likely to take place in long distance communications, with on
the one hand traditional telecommunications carriers such as AT&T and ITT which
are rapidly integrating optical fibres into their long-distance lines and on the other
hand the major satellite system operators such as SBS and Intelsat.
It is obvious that, to make developments in transmission speed and costs fully
effective, they have to be accompanied by similar developments in the field of
switching equipment. In the 1970s the first completely digital time- division
switches were introduced. These digital switches could be seen as special-purpose
computers that were able to handle the high data transmission speeds which were
made possible by developments in transmission equipment (Morgan and Sayer,
1988). Their enormous capacity enabled them to switch both, sound, data and
images. The combination of high speed broadband transmission, very fast digital
switches and the invention of mini- and microcomputers in the computer industry
made it economically feasible to link computers in distant locations. The ability to
share computing and data resources is evolving into a whole infrastructure of
Local- and Wide-Area Networks (LANs and WANs) which are connected to the
public network. The software used by these 'hybrid networks' also enables the
supply of various 'New Interactive Services' or Value Added Services such as
electronic mail, electronic banking and data storage, retrieval and processing. Such
'intelligent network' allows users to share processing capacity and information
sources in distant locations and opens up a whole set of new application areas in
computers and telecommunications.
" ISDN can be seen as an agreed development path towards a future digital broadband
telecommunications network. An ISDN network will feature broadband transmission of voice, data
and images at high standardized transmission speeds and will provide the basic infrastructure for a
broad range of 'intelligent services'.
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4.5. Deregulation and Liberalisation -«<
The increasing use of digital components in telecommunications products and the
establishment of large digital networks gave way to shifting boundaries between
the computer and telecommunications market. The blurring boundaries between
the regulated communications and the unregulated computer market caused
confusion about the parts of the market that were regulated and those that were
competitive. In an attempt to deal with these problems, the FCC started its "Inquiry
into regulatory and policy problems presented by the interdependence of computer
and communication services and facilities", the so-called Computer I inquiry. In
1971 the FCC ruled that regulation applied to pure communications and hybrid
services with a dominating communications component, whereas pure
dataprocessing and hybrid services in which the data processing component
dominated would remain unregulated.
•*'* However, as both voice and data communications were increasingly
transmitted in digital form the distinction between voice and data communications
became artificial (see Hills, 1986). It became increasingly difficult to discriminate
between services that were data processing related and those that were primarily
directed towards communications. In order to clarify matters, the FCC initiated a
second inquiry, Computer II in 1976. In the results which were issued in 1980 the
FCC discriminated between two types of services 'basic and enhanced'. Basic voice
services would remain regulated whereas those services that added value to the
basic service (enhanced services) would be deregulated. In addition the Computer
II decision ruled that the market for terminal equipment would be deregulated.
These deregulatory actions paved the way for a large number of firms to enter the
terminal equipment market. AT&T itself was now allowed to offer both voice and
data terminal equipment and to offer enhanced services through a subsidiary
which would be created under the name AT&T Information Services (ATTIS).
The decision to open up the market for terminal equipment ended a long and
heavy dispute between AT&T on the one hand and its large users and potential
competitors on the other. The first confrontation in the market for terminal
equipment and attachment products occurred short after the second world war in
1948 when a company called the Hush-A-Phone company requested the FCC to
allow it to sell a telephone attachment that diminished noise interference. AT&T
had never allowed attachment products to be connected to its telephone network
because it argued that they could cause damage to the system. After a seven-year
legal battle the FCC decided that the product did not harm the system and Hush-
A-Phone was granted the right to sell its product in the market. Another
competition evoking action which was undertaken in order to crack AT&T's
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monopoly in the Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) market came about in 1966
when the Carter Electronics Corporation filed an antitrust suit against AT&T.
Carter Electronics demanded the right to market its Carterfone". In 1968 the FCC
ruled that AT&T was not allowed to prevent competing firms to sell their
attachment products to the public. The attachment product should however be
connected to the network through an interface device which protected the network
from damage. The FCC decision instantly created a new competitive market for
customer premises equipment (CPE). Within a few months after the Carterfone
decision hundreds of small, often newly established, firms entered the market. The
absence of strict regulatory and financial entry barriers would soon make it a very
competitive market in which firms competed by selling a broad range of innovative
new products. In 1978 the FCC finally removed the last regulatory barrier by
allowing direct attachment of CPE equipment to the network.
Today the CPE market is characterized by intense competition. Low priced
products are offered by in particular Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese firms,
whereas large US and European telecommunications manufacturers dominate the
higher end of the market. Their dominant position is however increasingly
attacked by the aggressive expansion strategies of large diversified (K-generalist)
Japanese manufacturers. At present the CPE market is entered primarily from two
related markets; the office equipment and the consumer-electronics market.
According to Charles, Monk and Sciberras (1989) there are two reasons for office
equipment suppliers to enter the CPE market: The first reason is that both CPE and
office equipment products are based on the same underlying technology base,
which might render economies of scope in R&D and manufacturing. The second
reason is that CPE products are increasingly integrated into the products of these
manufacturers. In spite of the possible economies of scope and other advantages
that these producers might have, the CPE market is still dominated by the major
telecommunication giants such as AT&T in the US, Alcatel, Siemens and Ericsson
in Europe and NEC in japan (Charles et al., 1989).
The CPE market was however not the only market of AT&T that was under
attack. In the transmission market, the invention of microwave systems made it
feasible for organizations to bypass AT&T's network and to erect private systems
(Hills, 1986). In response to many requests from both large users and equipment
manufacturers the FCC started an investigation in 1956 whether or not to grant
private companies the right to establish their own microwave systems. After three
years, the FCC ruled that private microwave lines above 890 Herz could be
^ The Carterfone was an attachment product that enabled the interconnection of mobile radio systems
to the public network.
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exploited by other organizations than the common carriers. AT&T argued that this
decision would lead to 'cream skimming' on the market and argued that the
concept of 'universal service' was at stake (Temin, 1987). Ever since the 1934
Communications act AT&T was bound to provide high-quality telephone services
to all the residents of the United states at a reasonable price (Simon, 1985). AT&T
would be disadvantaged by the 'above 890' decision because competing companies
would now be allowed to erect private lines only in the most profitable areas. The
FCC however did not redraw its decision and the only thing AT&T could do was
to drastically decrease its tariffs in order to deter potential competitors. Although
the above 890' decision did not lead to an immediate deterioration of AT&T's
dominant position in the industry it opened up opportunities for potential
competitors to fight AT&T's regulatory monopoly position. One of the first firms
that grabbed the opportunity to attack AT&T's position after the 'above 890'
decision was a firm called Microwave Communications Inc (MCI). In 1965 MCI
requested the FCC to build a private microwave system between St. Louis and
Chicago. In 1969, the FCC finally granted MCI the right to establish its microwave
system. Aroused by MCI's success numerous firms requested the FCC to establish
similar services. The enormous number of applications induced the FCC in 1971 to
take the Specialized Common Carrier Decision which allowed non-common
carriers to operate private line services. In 1974 AT&T was forced to allow
specialized carriers like MCI interconnection to its local exchanges (Breyer, 1982).
Soon MCI would be joined by Southern Pacific, Western Union, ITT and Satellite
Business Systems (Simon, 1985). These so-called Other Common Carriers (OCCs)
gradually captured a considerable share of the, by now, highly competitive market.
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The ongoing pressures on AT&T's monopoly position accumulated in 1974 in an
antitrust suit filed by the U.S. department of Justice. In this suit AT&T was accused
of using its vertical integrated structure to raise barriers to entry and of cross
subsidizing its unregulated activities by the profits from its regulated activities
(Crandall, 1989). After a legal battle of more than 7 years the suit was settled by a
Consent Decree on January 8,1982. The original suit was aimed at the divesture of
AT&T from its manufacturing arm (Western Electric), its long distance service
(AT&T Long Lines) and its research facilities (Bell Labs). The final settlement
however called for the divesture of AT&T from its 22 local Bell Operating
Companies (BOCs). These 22 organizations would be grouped into seven
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independent Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) which were coordinated
by a Central Services Organization (CSO). By separating AT&T from its operating
companies the justice department managed to eliminate the opportunities for
AT&T to cross-subsidize its competitive services from its monopolistic position in
the local exchange market (Bruce et al, 1986). The RBOCs would offer local
telephone services, whereas AT&T would provide inter-state and long distance
services. AT&T was also granted the right to enter overseas markets" and was
allowed to enter other (non-regulated) markets. Finally AT&T was freed from the
restrictions of the 1956 Consent Decree. The operating companies on the other hand
were confined to the supply of local services. The settlement came into effect on
January 1, 1984 and led to the breakup of the single largest corporation in the
world (figure 14). In 1980 AT&T had $150 billion in assets and more than one
million employees. It was "... as large as the next three largest corporations
combined. Nineteen of its operating companies and Western Electric were large
enough, individually to make the Fortune 500, and four of its operating companies,
as well as Western Electric, were large enough, individually to make the Fortune
100. Its yearly sales were larger than the gross national products of Finland, Greece,
Norway and Columbia" (Evans and Grossman, 1983:96). On January 1, 1984 the
settlement reduced the size of AT&T to only one-fourth of its original size. Soon
after the settlement AT&T directed its focus towards international markets,
meanwhile trying to maintain its dominant position in the US market by selectively
reducing prices and by offering new services (Davies, 1991). Competition was
however well under way by firms that were eager to enter the lucrative US market.
One of the first entrants into the US market was ITT which bought AT&T's
international interest in 1920 and now tried to re-enter the US market. ITT would
soon be joined by a number of Japanese, European and Canadian organizations.
Because of the regulated character of the international communications market
AT&T's only chance to enter foreign markets was by aligning itself with domestic
firms. AT&T started its international operations by a joint venture with Philips in
the Netherlands. Soon other alliances with e.g. Olivetti in Italy and CGE in France
would follow. The divesture of AT&T in the US did not only alter the American
marketplace but it also gave way to deregulatory actions in the rest of the world.
53 Ever since AT&T sold its overseas operations to ITT in 1920 it was not present abroad.
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4.5.2.
In Japan telecommunications services were traditionally provided by the Japanese
ministry of Communications. In 1952 a public organization (NTT) was created that
took over the provision of domestic telecommunications services in Japan. The
international telecommunications services were granted to another organization
Denshin Denwa Company Ltd (KDD). KDD operated on a commercial basis
whereas NTT was a public corporation. Further deregulatory actions came about in
1985 when two laws came into effect that aimed at a further deregulation of the
Japanese telecommunications system. The first law, the 'Telecommunications
Business Law', discriminated between two types of carriers: type I and type II
carriers. Organizations that owned their own telecommunications facilities were
referred to as Type I carriers, whereas organizations that provided services but did
not own their own facilities were referred to as Type II carriers. A restricted
number of regulatory rules applied to Type I carriers whereas Type II carriers were
almost completely free from regulatory restrictions. The second law that came into
effect in 1985 was called the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation Law.
This law called for the privatization of NTT. Today NTT faces competition in all of
its core markets.
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After 1985 a number of newly established type I carriers entered the market. The
high capital investments involved in order to install telecommunications facilities
implied that only very large businesses could enter from related fields (K-
generalist). In 1989 two major new competitors entered the market for long
distance telecommunications: International Telecom Japan Inc. and International
Digital Communications (Telecommunications, September 1990:29-38). Type II
carriers on the other hand did not have to cope with large start-up costs because
they did not own transmission facilities. The lower regulatory and financial entry
barriers for these firms gave way to the entrance of hundreds of small (r-type)
organizations in the value added services market**. . . . , , . . . . ,. . :
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European PTTs have enjoyed a steady monopolistic position ever since telephone
services were integrated into the state-owned Postal Telegraph and Telephone
administrators. In the structure of the European telecommunications industry there
was no room for private companies to challenge the position of the PTTs nor that of
their preferred suppliers. After the divesture of AT&T however some European
countries started to slowly but gradually remove the barriers to free competition.
Some years before the divesture of AT&T, Britain had already taken the first steps
towards liberalisation of the telecommunications market. Liberalisation in Britain
started in 1981 when the British Telecommunications Act came into effect. The Act
established British Telecom (BT) as a public corporation and called for the
liberalisation of the telephone equipment market (e.g. phones, modems, answering
machines). In 1984 BT was privatized and the 'Office of Telecommunication' (Oftel)
was established in order to watch over BT and to advice the government on the
future development of the telecommunications marketplace. In the same year a
license was granted to a corporation called Mercury to provide telephone services
in competition with BT. Another year later Mercury was granted the right to fully
interconnect with BT's network. Further liberalisation of the UK market came about
by the 1991 White paper' issued by the UK government. In this paper almost
complete liberalization of the networks and services market is foreseen in the near
future (OECD, 1992). In spite of these turbulent developments in Britain, the PTTs
on the continent of Europe were able to deter most of the threats on their dominant
position. In every country on mainland Europe telecommunications transmission
and voice telephony remained regulated. On 30th June 1987 the European
* The number of new carriers actually increased from 85 in 1985 to 968 in 1990 (OECD, 1992).
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commission documented its vision on the future of the European
telecommunications industry in what would be called the 'Green paper'. In this
paper it was argued that the technological convergence of information technologies
made available a large number of new services. In order to take advantage of these
new services it was necessary to make changes in the regulatory framework in
order to improve the efficiency of the European industry. Implementation of the
green paper proposals led to a liberalization of the markets for CPE and value
added services in most European countries. There is however little evidence that
the role that is played by the PTT's in the future telecommunications networks is
decreasing (Mansell, 1993). . .
4.6. Regulation, Deregulation and After ••• • v ^,m;- i » <.;>',- a ;n
Ever since its initiation the telecommunications industry has been described as a
typical example of a natural monopoly (see e.g. Baumol et al., 1982). A natural
monopoly is referred to as an industry which is characterized by economies of scale
and scope of such importance that one firm is able to serve the market more
efficiently than several firms'*: i.e. an industry which is characterized by a cost
function which is subadditive (Baumol et al, 1982). In terms of 'normal' economies
of scale however, the early telecommunications industry did not qualify as a
natural monopoly. Although some economies of scale could be gained by stringing
multiple wires on a single pole (Brock, 1981), switching equipment was clearly
characterized by diseconomies of scale. By and large, technical economies of scale
in transmission could not compensate for the loss of scale economies in switching
equipment. Thus, in terms of technical economies of scale one could hardly speak
of a natural monopoly. The importance of scale economies in the
telecommunications industry was however found in so-called system economies of
scale. The value of a telephone or telegraph network was increasing dramatically
by an increase in the number of users'*. Apart from these system economies of
scale, economies of scope can also be of particular importance. Economies of scope
can be realized whenever its less costly to produce two or more products
simultaneously than to produce them separately (Goldhar and Jelinek, 1983).
^ One of the foremost economists who put forward this argument for telecommunications regulation
was Alfred Chandler (1977). Alfred Chandler's opinion was used in court by AT&T in the late 1970s
when AT&T's monopolistic position was under attack.
* System economies of scale became particularly important when the so-called 'switchboard problem'
was solved by the invention of larger capacity electro-mechanical switches.
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Economies of scope can be seen as one of the most important rationales behind the
integration of Postal, Telegraph and Telephone services in the European countries
(Davies, 1991). In these integrated PTTs duplication of facilities could be reduced
by the joint provision of telegraph and telephone services over the same lines. The
success of the independent telephone companies soon after the expiration of
AT&T's basic patents and more recently after the divesture of AT&T however
suggests that the traditional monopoly position of AT&T has never been 'natural'
but was either due to regulatory practices or patent protection. In fact, the
expiration of Bell's basic patents in 1894 gave way to the entrance of thousands of
independent telephone companies and led to an explosive growth in the number of
installed telephones". Advocates of free competition have pointed out that a
monopoly may lead to higher prices and retards technological progress. Figure 15
shows that the rental costs of a private leased line are much lower in liberalised
countries such as the US and Brittain than in other, more regulated, countries.
In line with Schumpeter (1934) a number of authors have argued that a
monopoly position generates funds for innovative activity. However, most authors
agree that although there has to be some sort of incentive in terms of a temporary
monopoly position from innovation, the absence of competition often retards
technological progress. If we for example compare the regulated telecommuni-
cations industry with the competitive computer industry we find that there are
large differences in the speed of technological progress. Flamm (1989) for example
has shown that there are significant time lags between the incorporation of
electronic components in computers and communications. In many respects the
communications industry seems to lag behind the computer industry more than a
decade (see Appendix I). Whereas computer products are characterized by life
cycles of about six years, telecommunications switching equipment traditionally
had life cycles of 20 to 40 years and transmission equipment was only replaced
every 10 to 20 years. There are basically two explanations why regulated industries
are characterized by slower technological innovation than their unregulated
counterparts (Flamm, 1989). The first explanation can be found in the so-called
'Arrow-effect'. Kenneth Arrow (1962a) was one of the first to recognize that
monopolistic firms such as AT&T have less incentive to undertake innovative
activities than firms that compete in a competitive environment. The second
explanation is found in the use of rate-of-rerurn regulation by the US government.
Rate-of-return regulation refers to the system in which a regulated firm is not
" The average growth rate of installed telephones increased from an average of 9 per cent a year in
the period between 1881 and 1895 to an average of more than 27 per cent a year by the turn of the
century (Wasserman, 1985). .,
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allowed to make profits that exceed a certain fair rate of return. Such a regulatory
system encourages so-called 'gold plating' of plants and equipment. In a seminal
paper on the effects of regulation on firm behaviour Averch and Johnson (1962)
showed that rate-of-return regulation induced firms to behave inefficient (see also
Train, 1991). Under conditions of rate-of-return regulation carriers are induced to
invest in expensive equipment which is depreciated much slower than they would
otherwise do. This led to a system which featured high tariffs, long lived plants
and low emphasis on services (Martin, 1977). i% jr*fr>»*j'}if._r» i*ru
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Although a monopoly may seem uneconomic in terms of public interests, there are
a number of non-economic reasons that played an important role in the arguments
in favour of regulation. Especially the goal of 'universal service at an average price'
seems to be very important in this respect. The term universal service is used to
describe the goal that all people should be able to make use of telecommunications
services at a reasonable price. A monopolistic market structure was thought to be
the best framework to offer such services. Therefore, the general opinion was that
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regulatory actions were needed in order to secure universal service. In the
telecommunications industry we found two different regulatory approaches (see
Ergas, 1988). In the US the regulatory approach was characterized by a structure in
which private companies competed in the marketplace, although they were subject
to regulatory agencies. In Europe and Japan on the other hand telecommunications
services were provided in a more or less autonomous way by a public enterprise.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the digitalization process made it increasingly
difficult to maintain the traditional divide among regulated voice and unregulated
data transmission. At the same time pressures from large users and potential
competitors increased to open up the market for telecommunications services and
equipment. Today deregulation and liberalization are high on the agenda in most
countries. Deregulation and liberalisation are seen as a means to speed up the
process of technological innovation, to boost new services, to increase competition
and to establish a global digital broadband telecommunications network.
Whereas technological changes and deregulatory actions continue to alter the
telecommunications marketplace, there is a growing debate among theorists and
practitioners about the shape of tomorrow's market. As put forward by Mansell
(1993), there are two distinct views on the future relationship between
technological innovation and the institutional environment. The first perspective
which was labelled the idealistic model' envisages an increase in competition and
a decreasing need for regulatory actions. The second view, which is represented by
the 'strategic model', foresees the establishment of an oligopolistic market that is
dominated by a few very large global operating firms who posses the power to
influence the structure of the future public network. The latter model would call
for further regulatory actions in order to protect public interests. Deregulation in
the US, subsequent movements in Japan and Great Britain and slow but gradual
deregulatory actions on mainland Europe have led to further globalization of the
market and initiated increased competition in the international telecommunications
marketplace. Today the competitive process in the CPE and services market can be
seen to approach the rules of perfect competition and therefore closely resemble the
expectations of the idealistic model. Empirical evidence from the switching and
transmission markets however shows that these markets are increasingly
dominated by a small number of large globally operating companies. The structure
of these markets is determined by enormous upfront costs which are needed to
develop a new generation of switching equipment, satellite systems or optical
fibres. The growing importance of economies of scale in combination with
shrinking product life cycles brings about particular advantages for those firms
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that succeed in capturing a larger share of these markets'*. These conditions might
lead to a setting which is characterized by oligopolistic rivalry among a few large
firms and therefore closely resembles the view put forward by the 'strategic model'.
Radical technological discontinuities did not affect the dominant position of the
leading telecommunications firms. Their technological competencies and
integrated structures enabled them to retain their lead in the world market. In the
US the major telecommunications services supplier AT&T still dominates all of its
core markets** and is still vertically integrated with its main supplier Western
Electric. Although in Europe the relationships between PTTs and their preferred
suppliers are becoming less tied, the need for backward compatibility between old
and new equipment has forced network suppliers to retain most of their quasi-
vertical relationships with their traditional suppliers (Mansell, 1993). It must
however be stressed that these so-called national champions' are currently slowly
losing their relatively protected market to larger foreign competitors. The relatively
fragmented market and the dependence on their home country makes it very
difficult for the relatively small national firms to deal with the ever increasing R&D
outlays needed to develop new generations of equipment. It therefore seems that
the 'strategic model' describes the core of the telecommunications industry more
accurately.
4 . 7 . D i s c u s s i o n : : ; - . - ; • , . - - - • •;;. . • • .- • _-; ;>
In the second chapter we put forward an integrated framework for the analysis of
complex industrial systems over time. It might be very interesting to evaluate
whether such integrated framework, which is primarily based on the assumption
of competition, can be applied to an industry which has above all been
characterized by its regulated character. In our framework we assume that in the
first stage of an industry's evolution both market and technological uncertainty are
very high and that (because of these uncertainties) only a very limited number of
firms are willing to support research at that stage. It was thought to be very
** Whereas the costs to develop a new generation of exchanges have grown above $ 1 billion dollar,
increasing competition reduced the life cycles of digital exchanges from 20 to 40 years to less than ten
years, with R&D costs in excess of $1 billion for the current generation of digital exchanges and a
world market of only $14 billion in 1986, a supplier needs at least 10 per cent of that market to
generate adequate returns over the life of the product (Economist, 1987).
AT&T's domination in its core markets is however not all encompassing. AT&T's position in for
example switching equipment is constantly challenged by Northern Telecom and a number of non-
North American Firms. • • ^ w e . - p ^ r r r ^ ' W ^ M : r • • » ' . ;.:..-£ r , ••••---•-.._.•: - . • „ •<•••?<.-
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difficult for firms to persuade potential investors and financial institutions to
provide the required financial resources. Therefore we assume that most of the
research in this stage will be undertaken by universities and government
institutions (Hypothesis 2). The role that is played by these institutions in the
telecommunications industry has however been very modest. Both the telegraph
and telephone market were opened up by independent inventors which could be
regarded as 'entrepreneurs' in the Schumpeterian sense. In the telegraph market
this role was played by Cooke and Wheaterstone and Samuel Morse. In the
telephone market Graham Bell and Elisha Gray played a similar role. The fact that
these small entrepreneurs where able to come up with such important inventions
was probably due to the fact that their devices were relatively simple and easy to
build. Neither expensive sophisticated equipment and materials nor thorough
scientific knowledge was needed in order to build these devices. • • •*# v^r- ' -^
The 'entrepreneurs' which were responsible for the invention of the first
telecommunications devices would soon establish their own private companies in
order to bring their inventions to the market. In their efforts to market their
products they would soon be joined by a large number of newly established small
organizations. Early demand came from time-sensitive customers such as stock
brokers, newspaper agencies, railroad owners and from the government. This well-
paying group was more interested in the quality of the service and the distance that
could achieved than in the costs of the services. Therefore competition in this
period focused on the technological capabilities of the equipment rather than on
costs. This is in line with our assumption (Hypotfiesi's 2) that a newly emerging
market is likely to be explored by small r-type organizations which pursue
offensive innovation strategies in order to gain technological and market
leadership. Their flexible and fast to build organizational structures and short
communication lines enables these firms to respond rapidly to new opportunities
in the market. In the telecommunications industry the attempts to gain market
leadership by bringing a technologically dominant product to the market led to a
state of technological flux were each company marketed its own design. We
assumed however that after some time the establishment of a 'basic design' would
lead to a period of more stable technological progress along a specific path or
trajectory (Hypof/zesis 3). In the telegraph industry Morse's device would soon
become such 'basic design' on which future developments were based. Bell's
telephone played a similar role in the telephone market*". The importance of these
basic designs is demonstrated by the fact that both devices were able to rule their
"* The establishment of these devices as 'basic designs' was not due to their technological superiority
or market success but primarily to their strong patenting position.
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respective markets for more than a century. This observation clearly confirms
hypo i/ieszs 3. The establishment of these basic designs and the emergence of a
technological regime based on copper wires and manual switching led to a
considerable reduction in the uncertainty about the future direction of
technological developments. Technological developments now followed the paths
which were set out by these basic designs. In chapter two we argued that the
standardized direction of technological progress shifts competition away from
performance and design towards price. A relatively stable technological
environment is assumed to favour large efficient (k-type) organizations over their
smaller less efficient r-type competitors (Hypothesis 4). In the telegraph industry the
market would soon be dominated by the Western Union Telegraph Company. In
the telephone industry Bell would eventually establish itself as the dominant
organization. Although both organizations started out as small r-type organizations
they were able to grow into well established large (k-type) organizations. Both
Western Union and Bell managed to grow into K-type organizations by taking
advantage of their patents and rights of way". Bell's strategy was particularly
aggressive. By acquiring most of its small r-type competitors, Bell was able to
establish a virtual monopoly in its market. Western Union did not use aggressive
acquisition strategies but achieved a similar position by outcompeting its
competitors. In line with hypothesis 4 we saw that the dissolution of r-type
organizations in favour of Bell and Western Union started an r-to K transition in
the market. Bell however was only able to make the transition from an r-type
organization into a K-type because its major K-type competitor (Western Union)
failed to recognize the opportunities in the newly emerging paradigm. Western
Union did not realise that the largest threat to its dominant position did not come
from its direct competitors but from a new technological innovation, namely the
telephone. Western Union even refused Bell's offer to buy its basic patents for
$100,000. Although Western Union entered the market for telephone services and
equipment it withdrew itself a few years later by settling a patent infringement suit
with Bell. The settlement allowed Bell to survive from the pressures of competition.
Its inability to compete with a giant like Western Union had already deteriorated
Bell's financial position. Bell at that time a relatively small r-type organization, was
simply not able to compete against an already well establish (K-type) organization.
Western Union had all the tools that were needed to outcompete its smaller
competitor Bell. It could have benefitted from its technical and system economies of
scale, its large and well established maintenance and service network, its affluent
System economies of scale in the telephone market became only became important after 1915 when
local networks were technically integrated into a national system (Galambos, 1988).
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financial resources and rights of way. It failed however to recognize the
opportunities of the telephone market. Its success in the telegraph industry made
Western Union 'blind' towards the emerging opportunities in the telephone market.
This so-called 'success breeds failure syndrome' (Starbuck, Greve and Hedberg,
1978) made it possible for Bell to thrive into the newly established market, whereas
the telegraph market would gradually decline in favour of the telephone market.
This is in accordance with /zypoftesis 7 which argues that a K- to r transition takes
place after a paradigmatic technology shift. The decision of Western Union to leave
the telephone market and Bell's commitment not to enter the market for telegraphy
created a spheres-of-influence position in which Western Union dominated the
telegraph industry and Bell ruled the telephone market. The emergence of a mass
market in the early 20th century at first did not lead to the expected entrance of
new organizations into market niches. This is primarily due to the regulatory
framework in the US which prevented organizations from entering the regulated
telecommunications market. Until the 1950s AT&T enjoyed a relatively stable
monopolistic position in virtually all its markets. Since then, AT&T increasingly
faced potential competitors which tried to invade its regulated markets. Although
AT&T was able to deter most of these threats it gradually lost some of its market
share to other organizations. Threats to AT&T's dominant position came in
particular from new entrants into the Customer Premises Equipment and into the
microwave services markets. In 1984 AT&T's divesture opened up most of the
other previously regulated markets. AT&T's divesture led to a wave of
deregulatory and liberalisation actions in other countries in the world. Remarkably
these actions did not lead to the expected de-concentration of the
telecommunications market. Although swarms of new firms entered into niche
markets such as the Customer Premises Equipment and Value added services, new
firms were not able to challenge the dominant positions of the traditional
telecommunications companies in their core markets (transmission and switching).
This confirms /jypoMesis 6 which argues that mass markets open up oppor-tunities
for specialized organizations to enter niche markets. The integrated structure and
technological competencies of the incumbents enabled them to retain their
dominant position in the market. Today these core markets are characterized by
enormous minimum R&D thresholds (Freeman, 1965, 1974) and an emphasis on
static economies of scale. Oligopolistic rivalry between a small number of very
large organizations has intensified price-based competition and makes it very
difficult for other organizations to enter these markets. In fact the performance of
an organization is to a large degree related to its share of the market. It is obvious
that in such market there is no room for r-type organizations any more (see
fcypof/iesis 5 ) . > • •: ; v . . « - . • • ? • • , . . - u ^ - . . - t . . - ^ i . n ^ - ^ ' v T . - s o - „ - > . , . : : > . - , . • • • . . • .....,•••..
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Although a new paradigm based on digital electronics is increasingly altering
the marketplace there are no real indicators that the incumbent telecommunication
companies are losing their dominant positions to new small organizations.
Although newly built r-type organisations took advantage of the opportunities
which arose in the market for value added services and customer premises
equipment. The growth of these markets is likely to increase much more rapidly
than the markets for transmission and switching equipment. We might therefore
witness a power shift away from the traditional suppliers towards new services
and CPE-equipment suppliers. ' • - , - .
To summarize, it seems very difficult to apply our integrated framework to an
industry which has been ruled by patent laws and regulatory actions. In the
competitive stages of the market, the framework is however well equipped to
predict the evolution of the market. The role of universities and government
institutions is found to be much lower in the telecommunications industry than
expected. Because the industry is currently transforming technologically from
analogue to digital systems and market structural changes are brought about by
deregulatory actions and liberalisation of the markets it is very difficult to assess
whether the paradigmatic shift which is currently taking place leads to a 'creative
destruction' in the industry". Until today, the incumbent telecommunications
manufacturers managed to deter most of the threats to their dominant position in
their core markets.
" We should therefore also take into consideration that apart from technological change, changes in
the policy environment can also induce transitions in the market-structure.
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The Semiconductor Industry • ; : ( i
The micro-electronics industry was born out of the invention of the triode vacuum
tube by Lee Deforest in 1906". The triode vacuum tube was a device composed of
three electrodes which was able to amplify electrical signals. At first, the
characteristics of the vacuum tube were poorly understood and its commercial
value was rather low. Only after considerable improvements at AT&T", the
troublesome tube was transformed into a somewhat more reliable component
(Morris, 1990). In the 1930s the vacuum tube was sufficiently developed to be used
in all kinds of electronic equipment such as radar, tv and radio equipment.
Although significantly improved, the vacuum tube still suffered from a number of
serious drawbacks. Its high power consumption, large size, heat dispersion and
inherent unreliability made the vacuum tube an extremely troublesome device.
Because efforts to improve the basic characteristics of the vacuum tube were not
very successful, a number of vacuum tube producers started to search for more
reliable, smaller components. Large scale research programmes were directed
towards new materials on which future components could be based. Soon attention
would be drawn towards the specific properties of semiconductor materials.
Semiconductors were found to be neither good insulators nor good conductors.
Their conductivity depended on factors such as temperature, impurity and optical
excitation (Malerba, 1985). Because of their ability to act as either conductors or
insulators they could be used as 'active components' which were able to modulate,
rectify or amplify electrical currents (Dosi, 1984). Although in the 1930s and early
" On Oct, 25 1906 Lee deForest applied for a patent on its famous three element vacuum tube.
** AT&T had bought the radio receiver rights for the triode vacuum tube.
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1940s several attempts had been made to incorporate semiconductor materials in
electronic components*', semiconductor devices were still not sufficiently
developed to be regarded as viable alternatives to the vacuum tube. Widespread
interest in semiconductor technologies was however regained on 23 December 1947
by the invention of the point-contact germanium transistor at Bell Laboratories in
Murray Hill. The point-contact transistor was a rather simple semiconductor device
that was capable of switching or amplifying electrical currents. Commercial
production of the germanium transistor started in 1951 at AT&T's manufacturing
arm, Western Electric. Within a few years AT&T was joined by a large number of
other companies who managed to bring their own germanium transistors to the
market. Most of these companies operated under license of AT&T, who had
actively encouraged the licensing of its transistor technology to other firms. In the
spring of 1952 AT&T held a symposium on transistor technology that was attended
by 35 firms from all over the world. The attendants paid an entrance fee of $25,000,
which could be deducted from a possible license fee. The symposium turned out to
be an enormous success and speeded up the diffusion of transistor technology
tremendously. At first, transistors were not very successful in driving the much
cheaper vacuum tube components out of the market. The only commercial
customers that valued size and power consumption more than price were hearing
aid manufacturers". Somotome, one of the leading hearing aid manufacturers,
brought the first transistorized hearing aid to the market in 1953. Somotome's
device incorporated five germanium transistors and was known for its small size
and low power consumption. The use of germanium transistors for other
commercial products was however not a great success. Germanium transistors
were superior to the vacuum tube in terms of speed, size and power consumption,
but were still troublesome in terms of life expectancy, applicability, reliability and
manufacturing yields (Braun and McDonald, 1982). Although their successor, the
junction transistor was superior to the point-contact transistor in many respects"', it
was not until the invention of the silicon transistor that most of the problems were
solved. The invention of the silicon transistor by Texas Instruments in 1954 gave
way to more reliable and faster components that could be used over a much wider
temperature range (Swann, 1986). The need for devices that were able to operate
** The first point contact diode, which allowed electrical signals to flow into only one direction, was
already invented in 1938 at General Electric. „..,„-, „ . „> „
** Until the late 1950s hearing aid manufacturers would remain the most important commercial
customers of transistors.
" In comparison to the point-contact diode, the junction transistor was capable of dealing with much
higher currents, did not generate much noise, and was much easier to manufacture (Morris, 1990).
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over a broad range of temperatures was especially high in military and space
applications. In the years after the invention of the silicon transistor demand from
NASA and the US military grew exponentially. The emergence of a large and
highly profitable military market for silicon transistors vastly improved the
viability and profitability of these devices. The success of silicon transistors in the
military market established the first technological regime in a paradigm based on
semiconductor materials. The regime was based on small, fast and reliable silicon
devices. Silicon replaced germanium as the most important semiconductor material
and the technological trajectory was directed towards further improvements in
speed, size, reliability and manufacturing costs. The obvious advantages of
transistors over their vacuum rube predecessors (see table 3) gave way to a rapid
substitution of vacuum tubes by solid state devices.
- • - , . : • < • • ; • ; . : , - • - , n * - . , , ^ , _ ; . _ • . . - . - • • . . - _ . . . - ;
TABLE 3 C/ujracfen'stics o/transistors and mcuum tubes.
Source: Steutzer (2952) Op. Cit Moms (2990).
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The replacement started in military and space equipment but as soon as prices
started to decline transistors were increasingly incorporated in a large variety of
commercial products. In 1959, for the first time in the history of the semiconductor
industry, shipments of semiconductor devices were higher than those of vacuum
tubes (see figure 16).
f ' • • ; : • . ; / : ' • ' ' • . . " : '
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(-•-Semiconductors —Vacuum Tubes )
FIGURE 16 Va/ue o/industry Shipments o/ Vacuum fufees and transistors, 1952-1975.
Source: WefcWnJt (1977).
5.1. The Birth of a New Industry ,
Although at the outset manufacturing costs of transistors were much higher than
those of vacuum tubes, the particular advantages of the transistor posed a serious
threat to the dominant position of the incumbent vacuum-tube manufacturers. A
very high elasticity of substitution between the transistor and its predecessor
forced vacuum tube producers to watch the developments in transistor technology
very closely (Dosi, 1980). In the early 1950s eight major vacuum tube
manufacturers were active in the United States: CBS, General Electric, Philco,
Raytheon, RCA, Sylvania, Tung-Sol and Westinghouse. Because the transistor
made vacuum tube technology obsolete, incumbent firms were forced to enter the
transistor market in order to maintain their existing market shares. General
Electric, Raytheon and RCA started production of transistors in 1951. Soon they
were followed by the other five major vacuum tube manufacturers. Within three
years all eight companies had managed to enter the new market (Tilton, 1971).
Their vast technological, production and marketing resources enabled them to gain
market leadership in the new market. Not only did these firms manage to
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dominate the transistor market in terms of market share, they would also account
for the majority of the new technological developments in those days. Together
with Bell Laboratories they accounted for approximately 57 percent of total R&D
expenditures and were granted 66 percent of total patents over the period 1952-
1961 (Tilton, 1971).
In Europe and Japan, large scale production of transistors started under
license of Western Electric in the early 1950s. A dominant role in both markets was
played by large vertically integrated vacuum tube producing companies. In the
1950s the number of transistorized components in consumer products was rapidly
rising. Because merchant producers were non-existent at that time, consumer
electronic manufacturers were forced to enter the transistor market in order to
satisfy their own in-house needs. At that time the technological capabilities of
European firms were much higher than those of their Japanese counterparts. Ever
since the invention of the vacuum tube, European firms had been working on the
leading edge of technology. Because of their technological sophistication, European
firms were able to enter the market for transistors very rapidly. The Dutch
multinational Philips, German Siemens and the British firms GEC and Thomson-
Houston were already producing transistors in the late 1940s (OECD, 1968, op cit
Malerba, 1985). Philips even reported the production of a transistor a few weeks
after Bell's announcement of the invention of its germanium transistor (Dosi, 1981;
Malerba, 1985). In spite of their relatively weak technological capabilities all of
Japan's major vacuum tube producers managed to enter the transistor market
before 1957. A dominant role in the Japanese market was played by among others
Hitachi, Kobe Kogyo, Matsushita, Nippon Electric, Mitsubishi and Toshiba. Their
dominant position was however soon attacked by new entrants such as Sanyo, a
former washing machine producer, Fujitsu, a well known manufacturer of
communication equipment and Sony, who managed to become the first producer
of transistors in Japan (Tilton, 1971). In spite of overseas developments, US
producers were able to retain their dominant position in the semiconductor world
market. In comparison to Europe and Japan, the US had a larger market, a more
sophisticated scientific and engineering base and financing capital was more
readily available. In addition, the position of US producers was boosted by a very
strong military market and considerable government support. In Europe, the role
that was played by the military was negligible and in the case of Japan even
completely absent**. The absence of a military market for their products clearly
disadvantaged Japanese firms in terms of innovativeness.
k® Government support in Japan took off in 1972 and was substantial until 1980 (Uenohara et al.,
1984).
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The importance of transistors grew rapidly in the mid 1950s when the silicon
transistor was brought to the market. Its introduction was accompanied by two
major process innovations: the oxide-masking and the diffusion process. These
process innovations radically increased the quality and yield rate of transistors.
Before that time, manufacturing of transistors had been very troublesome. Large
scale production of transistors was not possible and yield rates were particularly
low. Braun and McDonald (1982:54) referred to the production process as a
"manufacturer's nightmare". It was not until the invention of the oxide masking
and diffusion process that batch processing of transistors became possible. At that
time there was a strong link between scientific and commercial activities.
Technology was above all embodied in people and was almost freely available
from Bell Laboratories" and a variety of well-known university institutes.
Relatively low barriers to entry and the prospects of highly profitable government
contracts led to the entrance of a large number of new firms into the transistor
market. Many of these start-up companies were created by scientists or engineers
who left incumbent organizations in order to establish their own firms. These so-
called 'spin-off companies were often backed by venture capitalists and thrived on
the knowledge of former employees of large incumbent transistor manufacturers.
Because technological knowledge was primarily people-embodied it was relatively
easy to transfer this knowledge from the incumbent to the new company. One of
the first new entrants that was able to grasp a considerable share of the transistor
market was the inventor of the silicon transistor: Texas Instruments (TI). Its
invention gave Texas Instruments a vast lead over its competitors. High prices and
considerable learning curve advantages enabled TI, a previously small geophysical
company, to grow into one of the largest competitors in the transistor market. In
1957 Texas Instruments became world's largest semiconductor manufacturer™.
Another new entrant, Transistron, would manage to grow into the second largest
producer of transistors™. At the end of the 1950s new companies had conquered
almost all of the leading positions that were previously held by large vacuum tube
producing companies. Although most of the major technological innovations were
still introduced by large established companies, smaller firms were often more
successful in the commercialization of these innovations. A relatively low
appropriability of technological innovations enabled new firms to benefit from
** The Consent Decree of 1956 forced Bell Laboratories to pursue a policy of liberal licensing.
70 It was able to retain this dominant position until 1985.
" Transistron had successfully improved and marketed the gold bounded diode that was invented at
Bell Laboratories.
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innovations that were introduced by their much larger and more research intensive
competitors. Because new firms had no commitments to a specific technology, they
were often able to move into new technological fields much faster than their
incumbent competitors. In 1957 not less than 50 companies had been able to enter
the semiconductor market (Morris, 1990). The overall market structure however
remained rather concentrated. In 1958, the twenty largest companies accounted for
97 percent of the total US market (Braun and McDonald, 1982). The high degree of
concentration in the market clearly reflects the importance of dynamic economies
of scale such as learning curve advantages during this period (Dosi, 1981). Most of
the semiconductor producing companies made use of highly offensive innovative
strategies. Their innovative products fulfilled the need of the US military for faster
and more reliable components and created temporary monopoly positions for the
most successful innovators. At that time government financed research
programmes and military procurement provided the main source of income for
most of the active transistor manufacturers. Military agencies were well prepared
to pay a premium price for highly sophisticated devices. Demand and R&D
subsidies of military organizations allowed firms to explore new technological
opportunities and established a large sophisticated market. The military's emphasis
on technological performance instead of price gave way to a rapid expansion of the
technological frontier and drove the technological trajectory towards a reduction in
size, weight and increased reliability (Braun and McDonald, 1982). A considerable
overlap between the military and the civilian trajectory enabled US manufacturers
to reinforce their leading position in the commercial world market (Dosi, 1984).
Innovative components developed under military contracts enabled companies to
establish temporary monopoly positions in the commercial market. Those
temporary monopoly positions were particularly important because the production
of semiconductor devices was characterized by steep learning curves. Firms with
larger production runs were able to learn fast through experience and were
rewarded by much higher yield rates than other organizations. Those firms that
were able to go down the learning curve fast enough faced lower costs and
correspondingly larger market shares. In order to 'buy' market share a number of
companies made use of a strategy known as 'forward pricing'. In this strategy the
company sets a price lower than average costs in order to recover its marginal
costs. By setting its prices below those of its competitors the innovator is able to
seize a large part of the market and may succeed in deterring or postponing the
entry of other companies. A strategy of forward pricing is however only viable if
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the marginal costs of the innovator decrease faster than that of its competitors due
to its greater cumulative volume^ Qelinek and Schoonhoven, 1990).
5.2. The Integrated Circuit '• -*. *
Although transistors replaced vacuum tubes in most devices, they were
increasingly challenged by new devices that were known as Integrated Circuits
(ICs). The first germanium integrated circuit was invented by Jack Kilby at the
laboratories of Texas Instruments in 1959. Compared to discrete devices, which
consisted of only one device per chip, integrated circuits joined at least two
components on a single chip. The first integrated circuits contained only two
interconnected transistors, but since then the number of transistors per chip has
doubled every single year^. This rapid increase in chip density was made possible
by a significant reduction in the size of the components and an increase in overall
chip size (Swann, 1990; Zand, 1990). Shorter paths between the various parts had a
positive effect on the reliability, speed and power consumption of these electronic
components (Swann, 1986). In spite of the improved functionality of these devices,
the production of integrated circuits turned out to be very troublesome. In 1959
Fairchild Camera and Instrument introduced a process innovation which radically
improved the batch processing of transistors. This so-called 'Planar-process'™ not
only improved the existing production techniques of transistorized devices, but
also facilitated large scale production of silicon integrated circuits. Shortly after the
invention of the planar process the first silicon integrated circuits were brought to
the market by Fairchild and Texas Instruments. Their small size and low weight
made these ICs extremely suited to be used in small electronic devices. It was
therefore not surprising that the first commercial ICs, like their predecessors, were
increasingly incorporated in hearing aid equipment. However, as soon as prices
started to decline, ICs were incorporated in a broad range of other commercial
products. During the 1960s mass produced ICs started to replace transistors in
commercial as well as in military applications. The successful introduction of
^ In general production yields are a function of cumulative production experience. During time costs
per unit decrease rapidly due to learning effects (Abemathy and Wayne, 1964). ,.-,- ; . . • .
" This pattern was first recognized by Gordon Moore at Fairchild semiconductor, and is therefore
referred to as Moore's law.
'* The Planar process build upon the oxide masking and diffusion processes and, although in
modified form, is still in use today.
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silicon ICs speeded up the replacement of germanium by silicon as the most
important semiconductor material in use. This substitution process was
accompanied by changes in the basic manufacturing technologies. At first IC
manufacturers made use of bipolar technologies such as Transistor Transistor Logic
(TIL). In the late 1960s developments branched out into two directions; faster
bipolar technologies (ECL) and parallel developments in lower power consuming
technologies (p-channel MOS)". SJ fit b.'jfi&i^ jc--;• jh>v*;w.. •: .*,=iJ<i«.,j.;«<- • ;*j&fu*v;
Promising developments in integrated circuits, faster bipolar and MOS-
technologies led to the entrance of a large number of companies which were eager
to explore the opportunities in the new technologies. In the early 1960s barriers to
entry for new firms were relatively low. Knowledge was spread freely by
universities and AT&T, and the mobility of engineers and scientists was extremely
high. Small new firms were often much more able to explore the new technological
opportunities than their larger well established competitors. Vested interests in
transistors inhibited incumbent organizations to respond quickly to new
developments in IC technology. New firms, on the other hand were much more
flexible and particularly eager to explore new technological directions. As a result
small firms were often much faster to the market with their integrated circuits than
their larger competitors.
Initially the IC market was stimulated by large scale NASA and Air Force
programs which aimed to promote the development of ICs^ *. The stimulating role
of the US government gradually decreased during the late 1960s (figure 17). At that
time, the computer industry took over the role of the US military as the most
important customer of integrated circuits (Malerba, 1985). The shift from a military
to a commercially oriented market radically increased the importance of price as a
competitive factor. Although innovativeness remained very important, large scale
efficient production became an important success factor in the IC market. During
the 1960s static barriers started to rise rapidly. Some of the new entrants managed
to survive by selling innovative devices to computer manufacturers. The growing
importance of price as a competitive factor however drove many of the new
organizations out of the market. Company turnover became particularly high
during the late 1960s when competitive forces intensified and the market became
increasingly concentrated. In the late 1960s the market was dominated by only five
major companies: i.e. Fairchild, Motorola, Signetics, Texas Instruments and
" In spite of its low speed pMOS w a s much easier to manufacture, w a s denser and had a much lower
power consumption than bipolar technologies. It w a s not until the 1980s that low power consuming
MOS technologies matched bipolar technologies in terms of speed (Swann, 1986). - , . . . . . .
* In 1962 the US government procured the entire US production of ICs. ..••-..-•• . ',•'•• v •, V
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Westinghouse. Together these five firms accounted for more than 80 percent of the
total integrated circuit market (Tilton, 1971).
Because a sophisticated computer industry was absent in most of Europe and
Japan, semiconductor companies from those regions did not feel the need to be
engaged in innovative digital ICs. European and Japanese manufacturers retained
their interest in transistors and where relatively late to enter the IC market.
Japanese companies however succeeded in catching up with their European
competitors in terms of technological sophistication. In 1965 eight major Japanese
producers were able to manufacture ICs; i.e. Fujitsu, Hitachi, Matsushita,
Mitsubishi, NEC, Oki, Sony, and Toshiba (Morris, 1990). At that time European
semiconductor firms were already far removed from the technological frontier that
was set by US companies. European electronics firms had been primarily interested
in the use of relatively unsophisticated bipolar integrated circuits for use in their
consumer electronic and heavy electrical devices, whereas US companies focused
on digital ICs for use in advanced computer systems.
Dosi (1984) argued that there were three factors that were primarily responsible
for Europe's lag vis-a-vis its US competitors in semiconductor technology:First, the
number and size of companies in Europe that undertook research efforts in
semiconductors was much lower than in the USA. Second, minimum R&D
thresholds could only be met by a very limited number of European firms (Philips
and Siemens). The third factor is associated with the availability of so-called
bridging institutions in the USA which closed the gap between scientific research
and the commercialization of inventions. In addition Dosi (1984:50) stressed "
the mobility of scientists and engineers, the availability of venture capital, and the
size and sophistication of the American market". The cumulative nature of
technological developments in the 1960s was responsible for the stability in the
time lag between US firms and their European competitors. Because venture capital
was very scarce and the mobility of engineers was very low, new firms did not
play an important role in the European semiconductor industry. Therefore, a
process of 'creative destruction' as found in the US market did not take place. The
very same firms that dominated the vacuum tube industry in the 1940s and 1950s
were still the dominant players in the integrated circuit market of the 1960s.
Because the market for innovative IC technologies was growing much faster than
the market for the unsophisticated transistor devices, European firms did not only
lose their prominent technological position but also lost a considerable part of their
world-wide market share. The price war of 1970-71 drove all but five European
companies out of the mass semiconductor markets (Dosi, 1980). At that time a
number of European companies started to move into more specialized markets. In
the US large vertically integrated vacuum tube producers, like their European
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counterparts, remained focussed on the production of relatively old-fashioned
components such as transistors and linear integrated circuits. After the recession of
1970-71 none of the leading companies in the mid-fifties had been able to retain it
dominant position. The top five positions were now taken by IBM, TI, Motorola,
Western Electric and Fairchild (Braun and MacDonald, 1982).
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5.3. The LSI/VLSI Period
The integrated circuit regime was marked by a strong trajectory that aimed to
increase the number of components on a chip. Although initially this trajectory
proved to be very successful it ran into a growing number of difficulties. The
ongoing increase in the number of components per chip gave way to increasingly
specialised devices. Because semiconductor devices lost their general-purpose
character it became increasingly difficult to reap economies of scale in the
manufacturing process. The rapidly growing design and production costs of the
highly complex devices were now increasingly difficult to recoup by the relatively
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small production runs that were characteristic for such complex devices. The
difficulties associated with the existing technological regime gave way to a search
for more attractive alternatives. Again the search was led by small new
organizations. One of those firms (Intel) managed to bring a radically new product
to the market. Intel's new device which was first described as a 'computer on a
chip' but would soon be known as 'micro-processor' came to the market in 1971^.
The device was essentially a central processing unit on a chip''*. In the
microprocessor software replaced the hardwire logic that was character-istic of
earlier components. The use of software gave the microprocessor an unsurpassed
flexibility. The same mass-produced microprocessor could now be used for
completely different applications simply by making changes in the software. Intel's
4-bit microprocessor established a new technological regime and offered new
organisations the chance to attack the dominant positions of incumbent
organizations. From the established IC producers only Motorola managed to enter
the early microprocessor market successfully. Other established firms were not able
to bring viable products to the market until 1975 when TI and Fairchild introduced
their own microprocessors. - ;,~- > • r • * ;
Although static barriers to entry rose rapidly during the 1960s they remained
relatively modest until the mid 1970s. Riding on the waves of new technologies, a
large number of new companies entered the market with only a modest amount of
capital. National Semiconductor entered the market in 1967 with a mere $1 million
in cash, whereas InteP managed to invade the market two years later with only $3
million (Unido, 1981, Ernst, 1983). During the second half of the 1970s technology
became increasingly embodied in equipment instead of in people. Scientific
advances that played a critical role during the early years of the semiconductor
industry became less important. The ever increasing densities of semiconductor
devices required highly sophisticated equipment rather than scientific advances
(Morris, 1990). Extremely high R&D and manufacturing outlays were needed to
design and manufacture the highly complex devices. Because of the rising capital
requirements, R&D and production thresholds were raised and barriers to entry
became more important. These conditions clearly favoured large firms which were
^ Although Texas Instruments invented the first microprocessor, Intel managed to bring the first
commercial microprocessor to the market.
™ By adding memory and input-output devices one could build a complete computer out of this
single chip (Dorfman, 1987).
" Intel was one of the so-called 'Fairchildren'. Fairchildren were spin-off companies from the large US
manufacturer Fairchild. Fairchild spun-off a large number of new companies in the 1960s such as
AMD, Amdahl, Apple, DEC, Intel, Mostek and Zilog.
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able to amortize costs over a larger number of products. As a result the number of
newly created spin-off companies decreased rapidly during the 1970s (Dosi,
1980)*°. The lack of sufficient resources in combination with an inefficient
production scale made it increasingly difficult for small specialised companies to
survive under the at that time highly competitive conditions. Braun and
MacDonald (1982) have shown that from 35 semiconductor companies which
started production of semiconductor components in the period 1966-1975, only
seven companies were still independent in 1980. Only those companies that were
able to combine innovativeness with excellence in manufacturing managed to
survive. A typical example of such company was Intel. Only one year after the
introduction of its 4-bit microprocessor Intel managed to produce a much more
powerful 8-bit equivalent. Intel, as well as other organizations, followed a strong
trajectory which focused on an increase in processing capacity, a larger bit-size,
increased functionality and further reductions in costs (Swann, 1990). In 1973 even
before most firms had been able to enter the 4-bit microprocessor market, Intel
introduced an improved version of its 8-bit microprocessor, the 8080 (Wilson et al,
1980). Its technological superiority gave Intel a leading edge against potential
competitors. Within three years after the introduction of its first microprocessor
Intel had been able to achieve an almost monopolistic position in the rapid growing
microprocessor market. Because at that time software packages started to replace
custom programmed applications, the availability of software packages became an
increasingly important success factor in the microprocessor market. Intel's
domination of the market encouraged a large number of companies to write
software for Intel's microprocessors. Very soon a large number of software
packages became available for Intel's microprocessors. Because Intel did not want
to jeopardise such a large stock of software, compatibility among the various
generations of microprocessors became Intel's most important strategy. IBM's
choice to incorporate Intel's microprocessor in its PC line once again boosted Intel's
sales and established the MS-DOS/Intel/IBM standard in the PC market (Blair,
1991)". The availability of a large stock of software combined with the innovative
capabilities of Intel's microprocessors and the support of IBM left not much room
for other organizations in the market. In the 1980s Intel came up with a number of
backward compatible microprocessors. Intel's presence in the 16-bit market started
** Another factor for the decreasing number of spin-off companies in the 1970s is that less venture
capital became available due to high capital-gains taxes in the US (Hazewindus, 1982) and because
investors became more cautious after some serious industry crises in the 1960s.
*' For a long time, the only serious competition in the PC market came from the Apple-Motorola
a l l i a n c e . -•••••:. -: - • >->;-;*.- ' , ;••:•.•-•••• , • • « . ' ..*!>., - . v - t o - p e « » . s w , ; s v j f > i : > ' < v - ' - J ; . , r f t j ,«: \»^ i « - ' . . ; J V
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with the 80286 microprocessor. In 1986 this microprocessor would be replaced by
the 32-bit 80386, followed in 1989 by the much more powerful 80486. Recently,
Intel introduced an even more powerful device, the so-called Pentium'
microprocessor. Intel, the by now undisputed leader used to be a well known
practitioner of the 'cream-skimming' strategy. It sold its innovative products at a
premium price and decided to leave the sector as soon as competition became
fierce and prices went down. Intel then moved on to other (more profitable)
markets. Today Intel chooses to stay in its 'old' markets and harvests profits which
it invests in more promising new markets. Until recently most of the technological
developments in the microprocessor market have been competence enhancing,
thereby increasing the domination of the existing market leaders. Today's
microprocessor market is characterized by a virtual duopoly of Motorola and
InteP. Their microprocessor architectures are however under increasing pressure.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s a growing number of radically new designs have
been brought to the market. Whereas traditional Complex Instruction Set
Computer (CISC) microprocessor producers tried to increase the number of
components and instructions on a single microprocessor, a number of non-leading
competitors and new entrants started to focus on a completely different trajectory.
Instead of increasing the number of instructions embedded in a microprocessor,
they radically reduced the instruction set of their microprocessors. These so-called
Reduced Instruction Set Computers (RISC) incorporate only the most important
instructions. The relatively simple structure of these devices gave way to much
faster and more reliable components as compared to the traditional CISC-based
microprocessors. The opportunity to attack Intel's dominant position in the
microprocessor market has attracted a large number of new and established
companies into the emerging RISC market. The RISC market was opened up in the
late 1980s by two producers of workstation computers:MIPS Computer Systems"
and its arch rival Sun Microsystems. As soon as their microprocessors proved
viable they were followed by a number of larger computer companies. Hewlett
Packard formed the Precision RISC Organization (PRO) to promote its PA-RISC
architecture and more recently industry giants IBM and Apple joined forces with
Motorola to develop the so-called PowerPC microprocessor. In 1993 they were
followed by DEC who brought its Alpha RISC processor to the market. The
apparent advantages of RISC technologies over the traditional CISC microprocessor
** Together, Intel and Motorola are reported to account for more than 90% of total advanced
microprocessor sales (Molina, 1992).
' MIPS Computer Systems is now part of Silicon Graphics Corporation.
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forced Intel to come up with its own RISC processors. Until now no single RISC
architecture has been able to establish itself as the industry standard. Competition
between the various competitive designs is however extremely fierce".
5.3.2. Semiconductor Memories
The growing importance of the computer industry did not only affect the
microprocessor market but was also illustrated by the initiating role it played in the
development of memory chips. Until the 1970s magnetic core memories were the
most important random access memory devices in use. Magnetic core memories
were relatively slow and were able to store only limited amounts of information.
The advent of highly sophisticated von Neumann computer designs in the 1960s
rapidly increased the need for more advanced memory chips. Because
semiconductor materials were already in use in most micro-electronic devices,
research was directed towards memories based on semiconductor materials. The
first semiconductor memory chips were brought to the market in the mid 1960s.
Their impact was however limited until 1970 when Intel brought the Ik DRAM to
the market (Gill, 1990). Intel's device was based on sophisticated MOS technology
and managed to drive the traditional magnetic core memories out of the market.
Their smaller size and much higher speed made semiconductor memories
particularly suited to be incorporated in sophisticated computer systems. In the
early days of the DRAM market the leading positions were occupied by small
innovative US companies such as Intel and Mostek. Established firms, with the
exception of Texas Instruments failed to recognize the opportunities in the
semiconductor memory market (Wilson et al, 1980). In 1975 the first Japanese
competitor (NEC) entered the DRAM market. NEC would soon be followed by a
number of other Japanese firms. Their entrance into the memory market was
primarily provoked by the effects of the 1974-75 recession. After a boom in the
early 1970s the US semiconductor market was struck by a major recession in 1974-
75. US firms were forced to halt investments in R&D and new manufacturing
plants and laid off thousands of people during the recession. Because of the
cutbacks in plant and labour most US firms were unable to meet demand when the
recession came to an end. Japanese companies, on the other hand, were particularly
eager to fill this gap by bringing large quantities of low priced mass produced
memory chips to the US market.
** For a more detailed description of the RISC market see Duystere and Vanhaverbeke (1993)
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The Japanese involvement in the US semiconductor market started in 1959
when for the first time in the history of the semiconductor industry Japanese
companies shipped large amounts of (Germanium) transistors to the US (Braun and
MacDonald, 1982). Ever since the 1960s Japanese companies made vigorous
attempts to increase their technological capabilities by practices of reverse
engineering. The Japanese government allowed them to build up production in a
protected home market and once they established a firm position on the Japanese
market they started to attack foreign markets by pursuing a low price strategy in
order to buy market share. Price competition would turn out to be a particularly
viable strategy in the DRAM market because memory devices were all nearly
perfect substitutes. The diversified nature of Japanese firms enabled them to cross-
subsidize their component divisions in order to sustain investment in plant and
R&D during periods of temporary cutbacks in sales. Moreover, their high levels of
vertical and horizontal integration ensured a large captive market. After several
years of catching up with the USA, Japanese companies succeeded in cracking the
dominant position of US firms in the early 1980s. Japanese firms had lagged behind
in the introduction of 1,4 and 16K DRAMs but succeeded in bringing the first 64K
DRAM to the market. While US firms were struggling to develop a new very
complex 64K RAM chip, Fujitsu managed to come up with a larger version of its
16K RAM device®*. Fujitsu was soon followed by a number of other Japanese firms
that used a similar strategy. The Japanese design was not only faster to the market,
but would also prove to be much more reliable than its more complex US
counterpart (Weinstein et al, 1984). Learning curve advantages stemming from the
rapid introduction of the 64K RAM enabled Japanese companies to seize a
considerable market share. US firms, on the other hand entered the market
relatively late and were facing rapidly decreasing returns. These decreasing returns
made it very difficult for a large part of those companies to invest into new
generation of DRAMs. In 1982 Japanese companies managed to capture 70 percent
of the 64K RAM market (Weinstein et. al., 1984). At that time, all of the leading
positions that were previously held by small pioneering firms were now taken over
by much more efficient large vertically integrated competitors (see figure 18).
Because technological change became increasingly cumulative and moved along
strongly focused trajectories, it became increasingly difficult to catch up with the
leaders. Dosi (1981) has argued that in such a strong and cumulative regime the
position that is currently occupied determines the ability to keep up with the
movements of the technological frontier. As a result the market gradually changed
The only US exception was Motorola which pursued a somewhat similar strategy as its Japanese
competitors. • - . . . - • • •• .
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from a dynamic marketplace which was dominated by innovative small start-up
companies into a highly concentrated market structure in which only the most
efficient producers managed to survive.
The Japanese domination of the DRAM market was not only important in
terms of profits, but was also of strategic importance to the Japanese IT industry.
DRAMs were generally considered to be one of the most important technology
drivers. Production and technological experience in DRAM technology was
considered to be a perquisite to the entrance of higher-end markets. The strategic
importance of DRAMs was well understood by the Japanese ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI). Ever since the 1960s MITI had been trying
to improve the competitive position of Japan. MITI protected the Japanese market
from foreign imports and actively encouraged the diffusion of technological
knowledge among the various Japanese companies. In 1975 MITI and the
telecommunication giant NTT initiated a large scale collaborative research
programme which was aimed at the investigation of VLSI technology. Active
members of this programme included all the major electronic companies such as
Fujitsu, Hitachi, Mitsubishi, NEC and Toshiba. In the following years six major
research labs would be established in Japan. The VLSI programme which ended in
1979 radically improved the technological capabilities of Japanese firms. The
project resulted in no less than 100 patents and about 460 technical papers
(Uenoharaet al, 1984) . . . . , . . „ ,
5.3.2. Semiconductor Cyc/es .•:••••. ., < : . , ,
In order to secure themselves from vital components, firms often tend to order
components in excess of their short-term needs (Blair, 1991). Component
manufacturers respond to these needs by increasing their capacities during periods
of high demand, but once the new plants start operating they often face
overcapacity. This leads to the typical semiconductor cycles. According to Gordon
Moore " The balance of supply and demand in this industry lasts for about 35
minutes" (Forester, 1993:62). Since 1977 the semiconductor market is hit by a
recession about every four years**. It is therefore not surprising that a major boom
in 1984 was followed by the worst recession of all times. US semiconductor
companies lost approximately $500 million in the 1985-86 recession. This recession
which was for a large part due to a recession in the computer industry led to the
** Since 1977 the industry was struck by 4 major recessions in 1977, 1981, 1985 and 1990-1991
(Okimoto et al, 1984) :
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exit of all US companies except Texas Instruments from the DRAM market. In spite
of the overcapacity which characterized the industry during the recession years
Japanese companies managed once again to maintain their investments in plants,
R&D and equipment. The ability of Japanese companies to outperform US firms
during and short after recessions is widely discussed in the literature (see e.g.
Okimoto et al., 1984; Hobday, 1989; Gill, 1990; Jelinek and Schoonhoven, 1990;
Forester, 1993). Most authors have argued that Japanese companies are particularly
successful because of their specific industry structure in which Japanese companies
are linked to large conglomerates of other companies and financial institutions.
These conglomerates which are often referred to as 'Keiretsus' can be described as
systems in which organizations have a large number of horizontal and vertical
links to other organizations in the system and to specific banks. Firms in the
Keiretsu favour each other by preferential contracting and sub-contracting,
whereas the banks in the Keiretsu generously provide capital on a long-term, low
interest basis (Hobday, 1989, 1990; Todd, 1990; Forester, 1993). The Keiretsu
structure allows for long-term strategies as opposed to the US situation where
firms feel constant pressure from their stock-holders to produce short-term results.
The large size, long-term low interest loans and deep pockets of Japanese firms
enables them to deal effectively with temporary cutbacks in demand. These
advantages combined with their excellence in manufacturing and quality control
accounts for the success of Japanese firms in virtually all commodity IC markets.
US firms were clearly not able to compete effectively against their Japanese
competitors in high volume commodity IC markets in which success is for a large
degree dependent on market share (production volume). In a market where capital
and R&D investments have increased dramatically with every new generation of
DRAMs only very large efficient organizations are able to survive. Because new
generations of DRAMs are introduced every three or four years a very high market
share is needed in order to recoup the rising capital and R&D costs. During the
1985-86 recession all of the major Japanese firms maintained their investments in
plants and equipment and some of them even managed to expand their production
capacity. Japanese companies were particularly successful in the memory market
because software capabilities, services and close links with the computer industry
were not very important. In this market it was manufacturing capability that
counted most. In 1986, at the end of the recession, Japanese companies managed to
overtake US companies in terms of world-market share in the semiconductor
industry and established an almost monopolistic position in the memory market. A
large number of American firms, including the former industry leaders Intel and
Mostek, left the high volume commodity DRAM market and directed their
attention towards (semi) custom ICs and microprocessors. At that time only Texas
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Instruments and the small producer Micron Technology remained active in the
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In spite of their inability to compete effectively in the DRAM industry, US firms
were well known to be ahead of Japanese companies in terms of design- and
software skills. Because of their close contacts with worldwide leading US
computer firms they were also superior to their Japanese competitors in terms of
user-producer interactions. The exit from high volume commodity markets drove
US firms into new markets where efficient production was subordinate to design
and software skills. One of the markets that was invaded by a large number of US
semiconductor manufacturers was the emerging market for semi-custom ICs. Semi-
custom chips were designed as a reaction to the inefficient production runs of
custom chips. Semi-custom chips are based on the same basic chips. These basic
chips are modified in a later stage in order to tailor the chip for use with a specific
application. The use of the same basic chips enables companies to reap economies
of scope in the manufacturing process. Semi-custom chips are not only much
cheaper to produce but also pay off in terms of design lead times and costs (Ernst,
1983). The relatively new and rapidly growing market for Application Specific ICs
(ASICs) gave small US start-up firms the opportunity to bypass the major barriers
to entry in commodity markets. Success in the ASIC market is not dependent on
large scale production efficiency but on design skills and customer relationships.
Although manufacturing costs remained very high during the 1980s, design costs
have decreased enormously by the availability of relatively low cost CAD
equipment and software. A large number of new entrepreneurial firms which
employed highly skilled designers started so-called fab-less firms which
concentrated on design and contracted out their manufacturing. In the US, firms
such as Chips and Technologies, Weitec and Maxim have successfully pursued this
strategy. Other new entrants abandoned the design part and specialized in the
manufacturing of ASICs. A large number of these so-called 'silicon-foundries'
however suffered from a chronic lack of funds. Fixed costs in terms of plants and
equipment have increased tremendously with every new generation of
semiconductors. Jelinek and Schoonhoven (1991:35) have argued that "
production technology for semiconductor products is easily the most complex
process ever adapted to mass production". Today a new generation chip line
would cost about 1 billion US dollars. A very large market share seems necessary
to recoup these extremely high capital outlays^. Apart from economies of scale in
the production of electronic components, economies of scope (Goldhar and Jelinek,
1983) are gaining increasing importance. As demonstrated above, high costs of
R&D and production equipment call for very large production runs in order to
** The importance of market share is shown by Forester (1993) who has shown that every doubling of
production volume decreases manufacturing costs by 30 percent.
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amortize these costs. The rapid rate of succession between various generations of
products however, makes it increasingly difficult to achieve a sufficient scale of
production for one product. An efficient number of products can often only be
achieved by using the same equipment to produce various different products.
Jelinek and Schoonhoven (1991:37) have argued that the growing share of ASICs in
total production has considerably increased the need for such economies of scope.
They argued that because of the semi-custom character of ASICs " no single user
will order enough of any product to cover the heavy investment in production
equipment". Therefore equipment must be able to produce a broad scala of
designs. During the 1980s US firms have invested heavily in state-of-the-art FMS
equipment which allowed them to move swiftly between the production of
different ASIC designs. Even in Europe where traditional vacuum tube producers
have always dominated the marketplace, small firms started to enter the ASIC
market. Hobday (1989) reports start ups in countries like Belgium (Mietec),
Holland (Advanced Silicon Corporation), Switzerland (Lassaray) as well as pan-
European initiatives (European Silicon Structures). In spite of the noted
disadvantages of Japanese companies in high-end applications such as ASICs,
Japanese firms started to entered the ASIC market in the mid 1980s. Within a few
years, they even managed to become the world-leaders in the low-end ASIC
market (Morgan and Sayer, 1988). A recent article on Japanese start-ups (Solid State
Technology, September 1990:45-46) showed that nine out of eleven newly
established semiconductor companies aimed to enter the market for ASICs.
• -•• c *
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The relatively modest position of European firms in the international
semiconductor industry is indicated by its world market share (figure 19).
European firms have lagged behind in advanced MOS and microprocessor
technology (Hazewindus, 1982). They specialized in relatively old-fashioned
discrete components. In-house needs were generally valued more than merchant
production. In order to catch up with the US and Japan, the EC initiated European-
wide collaborative pre-competitive R&D projects in the mid 1980s. Although these
R&D projects were successful in technological terms, they did not lead to an
improved position of European companies on the world market (Hobday, 1990).
The predicted rapid growth of the European semiconductor market however may
be an important stimulus to the European manufacturers to improve their
competitive position. ' *"'v ' '
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In 1991, Japanese firms captured 46 percent of the semiconductor market whereas
the share of US firms decreased to 39 percent. Today six out of the top ten
semiconductor manufacturers are Japanese firms. In the DRAM market Japanese
companies face only serious competition from competitors from the so-called
Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs)"®. Companies from those countries have
specialized in low cost production of commodity chips. US firms, on the other
hand, are particularly successful in high end components and in application- and
system specific ICs.
Increasingly worried about the deteriorating competitive position of US firms,
the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) initiated a government-industry
R&D consortium called Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Project
(Sematech). Sematech was established in 1987 by 14 leading semiconductor
companies and was funded by those companies and a subsidy of $100 million from
the US government. Its aim was to regain worldwide semiconductor
88 Especially from Korean firms such as Samsung, Hyundai and Goldstar.
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manufacturing leadership. Members of Sematech include AMD, AT&T, DEC,
Harris Corporation, H-P, Intel, IBM, LSI Logic, Micron Technology Inc., Motorola,
National Semiconductor Corporation, NCR, Rockwell International and Texas
Instruments. At that time Japanese companies had captured between 80- and 90%
of the world DRAM market (Hobday, 1989) and were a dominant force in
equipment manufacturing. In 1989 a second consortium was established in order to
facilitate the reentrance of US firms into memory chips. The participation of US
firms in the memory market was of strategic importance because profound
knowledge in DRAM technology was seen as a prequisite for the successful
participation in other sectors of the semiconductor market. The consortium which
was known as 'US memories' did however never really take off and collapsed in
January 1990. At that time a number of US firms had already been able to reenter
the DRAM market. In line with the US consortia, Japanese firms established their
own collaborative research project (TRON) which aimed to attack the US lead in
microprocessors. This strategy was in line with previous attempts to attack high-
end markets from an established base in low-end markets. In spite of persistent
Japanese efforts to crack the hegemony of US microprocessor manufacturers, US
domination of the market is still all encompassing. In 1991 the two largest US
competitors, Intel and Motorola, accounted for more than 90% of the market for
advanced microprocessors (Molina, 1992). The existing market structure might
however be severely destroyed by the advent of new powerful RISC-based
microprocessors. Although RISC microprocessors pose a serious threat to the
dominant position of both Motorola and Intel, it does not seem to jeopardise the
position of US firms in the microprocessor market. Both Japan and Europe have
only a minor presence in the emerging RISC market (Molina, 1991). Most of the
threat comes from other major US companies such as Sun microsystems, DEC,
Hewlett Packard and the alliance of IBM, Motorola and Apple. Therefore we
believe that in spite of the ongoing 'creative destruction' in the market place (see
Table 4) the existing duopoly of the US (microprocessors) and Japan (commodity
markets) will remain basically unchanged in the near future.
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The semiconductor industry can be seen as the driving force of technological
change for virtually all sectors of the information technology industry. The
semiconductor industry is of strategic importance, not only in terms of market size,
but also because its outputs are vital components in a wide range of other products.
In hypoffaesis 1 we stressed the role of universities and government institutions as
the most important incubators of new technologies. The role of these institutions
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would be particularly important because emerging markets were often
characterized by a great deal of uncertainty about the technological feasibility of
innovations and their potential market size. In contrast, the first semiconductor
device was a relatively simple device that could be used as a replacement of an
existing device (the vacuum tube). Therefore, both market and technological
uncertainties were rather low. The extremely high elasticity of substitution between
the transistor and its vacuum tube predecessor and the emergence of a large and
profitable military market raised the interest of large incumbent vacuum tube
producers.
Not only in terms of market size, but also in terms of technological
sophistication, large well-established firms were a dominant force during the first
decade of the newly born semiconductor industry. One organization in particular,
Bell Laboratories, played a vital role in the creation and diffusion of new
semiconductor technologies. Its liberal licensing policies enabled a large number of
companies to explore the opportunities in the early semiconductor market.
Although our first hypothesis cannot be confirmed by our analysis, government
procurement and support played an extremely important role at a time that
commercial demand was almost non-existent. In particular military demand
played a vital role in shaping the direction of technological progress.
Relatively low barriers to entry and the prospects of highly profitable
government contracts induced a large number of small specialist companies to
enter the newly established market. Because the largest customer, the US military,
clearly favoured innovativeness over price, efficient production was less important
than the ability to improve the existing technological characteristics. Because small
new organizations had no commitments to existing technologies, they were able to
respond rapidly to the new opportunities in the market. This is in line with
Ziypofftes/s 2 which states that a new market is likely to be explored by small
specialist organizations that pursue an offensive innovation strategy. It must
however be stressed that in the
 US small companies were relatively late to enter the
semiconductor market. As described above the early market was dominated by
large well established firms. In 1960 however nearly all the major vacuum rube
producers were driven out of the market by smaller new specialist competitors. In
Europe and Japan however, a very low mobility of engineers and the lack of
venture capital inhibited the emergence of small start-up companies. Therefore
hypothesis 2 cannot be confirmed for these regions. . i~ - ••;*•. • • • •• , r.
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Texas Instruments' invention of the silicon transistor established a technological
regime that was based on small, fast and reliable semiconductor components. From
that time onwards silicon became the most important material in use. The
importance of radical product innovations decreased after the invention of the
silicon transistor. Process innovations on the other hand became more important
after the establishment of the transistor regime. Two major process innovations
were particularly important during this period:i.e. the diffusion and the oxide
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masking process. The decreasing importance of radical product innovations
supports /lypof/iesis 3 which argues that the emergence of a 'basic design' leads to a
substitution of radical technological developments by incremental cumulative
improvements along a specific technological path or trajectory. In general, a more
standardized direction of technological progress shifts competition away from
performance and design towards price. In the semiconductor industry this process
was speeded up by the replacement of the US military by the computer industry as
the most important source of demand. The emergence of a commercial market
increased price-based competition. In the semiconductor industry costs per unit
were not only dependent on static economies of scale in the production of these
devices, but also on more dynamic scale economies such as learning economies. It
was therefore particularly important for firms to stay close to the technological
frontier. Those firms that were able to combine static economies of scale and
learning economies were most successful in the semiconductor industry. This is in
concordance with hypothesis 4 which asserted that after the establishment of a new
technological regime, large K-generalists start to outperform smaller r-specialists.
In line with hypothesis 5 which proposed an r- to K transition during times of fierce
competition we found that large firms with a high tech orientation were best
equipped to thrive under such environmental conditions. Although newly
established firms entered the market on a very large scale after the invention of the
Integrated Circuit, the IC market would soon be dominated by only five major
firms that accounted for more than 80 percent of the total IC market (Tilton, 1971).
In the early 1970s a paradigmatic shift took place in the semiconductor
industry. Microprocessors started to replace Integrated Circuits in a large number
of applications. As we have argued in frypof/iesis 7, a paradigmatic shift often
deteriorates the position of large well established companies in favour of small
newly established companies. From the established IC producing companies only
Motorola managed to enter the early microprocessor market successfully. At about
the same time, semiconductors started to replace magnetic core memories as the
basic memory units in computers. Again new firms rapidly invaded the new
market, whereas the incumbent organizations retained their focus on the old'
technologies. This confirms our earlier expectation that was put forward in
hypothesis 7. Once the basic technologies were well understood and the market
turned into a well-established mass market, production efficiency became more
important. Technological progress turned out to become increasingly incremental
and radical changes were very rare.
Once a mass market is established, windows of opportunity are likely to occur
and firms tend to invade multiple market niches (hypothesis 6). During the second
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half of the 1980s, application-specific memory devices, custom chips and RISC
microprocessors created opportunities for firms to bypass the enormous barriers to
entry in production and research. This confirms the proposition that was put
forward in hypothesis 6. Specialization did not only take place within market
niches but took also place within the value chain. Some organizations specialized in
the production of semiconductors whereas other organizations restricted their
attention to the design part. Such pattern of vertical specialization was particularly
found in the (semi)custom IC market.
To summarize, the integrated framework as presented in the second chapter
was able to predict fairly accurately the technological and market developments in
the history of the semiconductor industry. Two hypotheses however could not be
validated: Ziypof/iesfs 2 and 2. Hypothesis 2 which stresses the role of universities and
government institutions as incubators of new technologies could not be validated
by the existing evidence because, in contrast to what was expected in chapter two,
technological and market uncertainty was not very high during this period. Low
market and technological uncertainties and a very high elasticity of substitution
between the transistor and the vacuum tube would soon arise the interest of large
incumbent vacuum tube producing companies. The role of small companies in the
early semiconductor industry was therefore much lower than was expected in
hypothesis 2. The importance of small companies however, rose rapidly during the
1950s in the USA. Virtually, every change in technological regime in the
semiconductor industry was accompanied by forces of 'creative destruction' and
the emergence of new companies in the market place.
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Technological Convergence: An Empirical Analysis
In the previous chapters we have argued that technological convergence is
gradually removing the sectoral boundaries between the various IT industry
segments**. Such process of convergence can be ascribed to a growing similarity
among the technological foundations of the different IT segments. For a very long
time technological developments in telecommunications and computers have
followed very distinct trajectories. Today, the basic design parameters which form
the core of technological regimes (Georghiou, et al. 1986) have become increasingly
similar, not only in terms of the material properties but also with respect to the
manufacturing process involved. Although the convergence process started in the
late 1950s it was not until the early 1970s that it really took off. At that time large
numbers of powerful digital components were brought to the market at relatively
low costs. In the following years subsequent improvements accelerated the rate of
adoption of these components in all kinds of electronic equipment. Today almost
every single electronic device has become based on the same digital technology.
Digitalization of telecommunications and computer equipment has broadened the
existing technology base and facilitated the emergence of large scale
communication networks that carried voice, data and images. As computers were
increasingly accommodated within those telecommuni-cations networks, previous
existing technological and market boundaries became vague. The blurring
boundaries between the computer and telecommunications markets soon
challenged the core competencies of the traditional suppliers and induced 'lateral
entry': i.e. entrance of firms from adjacent markets. In the telecommunications
For a multi-market competition perspective on technological convergence see van Wegberg (1994).
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industry the first signs of convergence appeared through the introduction of Stored
Program Control (SPC) in the field of digital switching*". The second wave of
convergence took place during the mid 1980s when analogue telephone systems
were gradually transformed into fully digital networks (Davies, 1991). The rise in
distributed computing and the digitalization of the telecommunications network
induced a number of telecommunication firms to accumulate skills in software and
micro-electronics and raised the interests of computer manufacturers in
telecommunication technology. At that time a number of authors and industry
practitioners argued that the IT industry would eventually offer a continuum of
products, which could not be referred to as either telecommunication or computer
products. They envisioned that all the different IT markets would melt into one
giant 'information and entertainment industry' and that firms would react to the
new opportunities by lateral entry into each others markets (de Jonquieres, 1989,
Business Week, 25-5-1992: 69-71).
After decades of stable development, the existing institutional and
technological structure of the telecommunications industry was suddenly
challenged by a wave of new technologies. The digitalization of
telecommunications networks made it impossible to think of computers and
telecommunications as separate technologies. The convergence process created a
huge potential for new products and services and turned out to be a large impetus
to deregulatory forces in the industry. All over the world technological
convergence induced governments to reexamine the existing regulatory
frameworks and to implement deregulatory and liberalising actions. Although
computer and telecommunications equipment are now based on the same enabling
technologies they have traditionally been produced by different companies. A
relatively stable environment that characterized the computer industry and more in
particular the telecommunications industry induced firms to develop a stable set of
routines to deal with their environment. Today such routinized behaviour does not
seem sufficient to deal with the technological convergence process in information
technologies. The required technological competencies in adjacent technologies is
often not present within the existing technology base. For those companies several
options are open to acquire the essential technological knowledge. Technology can
be developed in-house or it can be acquired on the market by arms'-length
transactions (e.g. using R&D contracts) or through the acquisition of technological
sophisticated companies. Between these two extremes, acquisition or internal
development, several options are open to a company. Companies may perform
The introduction of Stored Program Control (SPC) in electronic switches made it possible to replace
mechanical control systems by much more flexible software-based control programmes.
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R&D together with a partner, license-in technology or use other forms of
cooperation. Internal development is costly but often necessary to achieve the
required technological base. Cooperative strategies on the other hand involve less
capital and are particularly suited to monitor new technological developments. In
the past decade the number of cooperative agreements by firms has rocketed (see
Chapter 7). The use of cooperative agreements is however often only effective in
combination with internal development. Haklisch (1989) has convincely argued
interdependence is often uses as a viable strategy to strengthen independence.
In the early 1980s many industry observers expected that the convergence
process would provoke a battle between the industry giants IBM and AT&T
(Tunstall, 1986). After its divesture in 1984 AT&T was allowed to enter other
(unregulated) markets and bought MOS Technology and more recently NCR. IBM
on the other hand grasped the opportunity to strengthen its presence in the
telecommunications market and bought telecom equipment makers Rolm
Corporation and SBS Satellite. AT&T turned its focus on the computer industry by
acquiring a stake in Olivetti. Although acquisition of knowledgeable companies
seems to be an attractive option for companies that have to deal with convergent
technologies, acquisition strategies are hampered by at least three main problems
(Aldrich and Auster, 1986). The first problem is associated with information
distortion and opportunism that may mislead the acquiring company. A second
problem is that creative and innovative companies that are incorporated in a large
and bureaucratic structure often lose their flexibility and therefore lose much of
their original creativity and innovativeness. The third problem is related to the
externalities that are connected to the acquisition of a company. It is often difficult
to divest those assets that are not sought for in the first place. An additional
problem that is associated with acquisitions occurs if a company does not have an
already sufficiently developed level of technological knowledge in a specific field.
Then it turns out to be extremely difficult to absorb the acquired knowledge into its
own technological core. It is often noted that a firm's absorptive capability is to a
large degree dependent on the degree of knowledge in a specific field (Dodgson,
1989; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Levinthal, 1994). Therefore we might argue that if
the core of a company's technology base is not sufficiently adapted to the new
technology then the absorbtion of acquired technological knowledge within the
technological core of a company is very difficult. The combination of those factors
may explain why most of the acquisitions were (until today) not very successful. In
the late 1980s IBM moved out of telecommunications by selling its share in Rolm,
whereas a large number of telecommunications companies sold their interests in
computer equipment (Malerba et al, 1991). In the early 1990s it gradually became
clear that the expected 'lateral entry' between the telecommunications and
i.
134 TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE
computer markets had not taken place (Mansell, 1993). Two factors seemed to be
responsible for the low degree of lateral entry that was found in the
telecommunications and computer markets; i.e. economies of scope that turned out
to be lower than expected and the continuing importance of scale economies
(Malerba et al, 1991). Economies of scope that were gained by the joint production
of telecommunication and computer equipment were simply not able to offset the
loss of economies of scale. In this chapter we will argue that there is a third, maybe
even more important factor, that influenced the low degree of convergence within
firms, namely inertia. Following evolutionary and ecological theory we will argue
that both external and internal inertial forces significantly reduce the ability of
firms to deal with changes in their technological cores. Firms are often simply not
able to adapt swiftly to their changing technological environments.
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Although most of the attention has been dedicated to the technological convergence
between telecommunications and computers, such processes are not restricted to
those two markets. The pervasive effect of micro-electronics and software can be
found to drive convergence between virtually all the major IT markets: consumer
electronics, broadcasting, instrumentation, military electronics, software,
computing and telecommunications. Until the late 1970s the boundaries between
those markets were clearly defined. Since then the convergence process has blurred
the once existing boundaries. Patterns of convergence are found to occur at a
number of different levels: the product-market level, the technology level and the
firm level (von Tunzelmann, 1988). At the product-market level we find well-
known examples such as 'multi-media' products which bring together software,
computers and consumer electronics and a whole range of new products that are
referred to as 'tele-matics' products which embody the convergence between
computer and telecommunications technology. At the technology level we find a
change away from analogue devices towards completely digital devices. Today
virtually all segments of the IT market have been affected by the pervasive effect of
micro-electronics and software.
Although in this thesis (so far) a great deal of attention has been attributed
to the product- and the technology level, considerably less attention was payed to
the third level of convergence, that within firms. In order to account for the full
implications of the convergence process it seems however also relevant to pay
somewhat more attention to this level of convergence. What we therefore wish to
examine is whether and to what degree firms from different markets are affected
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by the technological convergence process. The major aim of this chapter is to
examine whether the so-called convergence of information and communication
technologies has led to a growing similarity of firms that are active in different IT
markets. Although telecommunications and computer equipment are based on the
same enabling technologies it can be argued that the convergence process has taken
place much more slowly than was expected in the early 1980s. (Malerba et al, 1991;
von Tunzelmann and Soete, 1987; von Tunzelmann, 1988). The few empirical
studies on the convergence process within firms (Von Tunzelmann and Soete, 1987,
von Tunzelmann, 1988) showed that patterns of convergence had not significantly
affected the core competencies of the major IT firms". Their analyses were based on
US patent data which covered the period 1969-1984 and 1969-1986. Most industry
observers and practitioners however agree that the convergence process accelerated
in the late 1980s and early 1990s'*. Therefore an analysis that is based on data until
1986 is likely to underestimate the current magnitude and importance of the
convergence process. Extending the time-frame might therefore be an important
step forwards in understanding the broader implications of these patterns of
convergence in IT markets.
In terms of the methodological aspects the aim of the chapter is to provide
an analysis of patterns of convergence in the IT industry that combines quantitative
and semi-quantitative methodologies. In this chapter we will apply a combination
of descriptive and analytical approaches to study trends in the by now familiar
industries; dataprocessing, tele-communications and micro-electronics.
6.2. Hypotheses - > •, .. .-..-. . :•
In this thesis we abandon the common shared (strategic management) view of
organizations as rapid, flexible adapters and stress the importance of inertial forces
that prevent organizations from transforming their strategies and structures
according to new demands of the environment. Following evolutionary theorists
we argue that apart from a stochastic element in the choice of decisions and their
outcomes, most of the behaviour of firms is relatively predictable and repetitive.
Such standard patterns of behaviour are often labelled 'routines' (Nelson and
Winter, 1982) or 'comps' (McKelvey, 1982). Routines can be compared to biological
genes because they govern a firm's behaviour and are heritable in the sense that
In this chapter the term 'core competencies' is used to describe the traditional focus of the companies
in our analysis.
** Harper (1986) observed that in the early 1980s only a very limited number of products embodied
both communications and computing functions. . , . „ • . . • ... •., ,,, . . . .^..,
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future behaviour is largely based on today's characteristics (Nelson and Winter,
1982). A firm's reliance on basic routines severely reduces its speed of adaptation.
It would however be a caricature to characterize firms as static organizations that
are unable to change. Firms can be engaged in a search' process in an attempt to
increase their 'fit' with the environment. Change mechanisms are however only
triggered if the performance of an organization is well below its aspiration level
(Cyert and March, 1963, Lant and Mezias, 1992). Firms with a relatively successful
past are therefore often even more resistant to change than other firms. This so-
called 'success breeds failure syndrome' (Starbuck, Greve and Hedberg, 1978) is
often observed with established industry leaders. Evolutionary theorists argue that
firms that are engaged in a search process do not explore all possible directions but
confine their search to the most promising directions. Firms are often engaged in
'local search' only, which means that search is often limited to related areas. Local
search and a continued reliance on their basic routines implies that firms are much
better in doing more of the same than they are in adapting to change. We therefore
expect that companies stick to their core businesses and therefore patterns of
convergence are not likely to be found. The first and probably most important
hypothesis is therefore:
Hypof/iesis 8 : Ongoing patterns o/fec/i«o/ogi'ca/ and producf-marfcet convergence /uroe
not si'gni/icanffy averted Me fec/ino/ogica/ cores o/tfie parficipafrng companies.
The second issue we will deal with in this chapter is concerned with the question of
whether convergence is taking place more persistently in firms that are active in
some particular market segments than in others, and will also be concerned with an
analysis of patterns of strategic technology alliances over time. Although the
existing empirical studies on the convergence process did not study strategic
alliance data, von Tunzelmann (1988: 3) suggested that " various 'stopgap'
arrangements like strategic alliances were being sought to grapple with
circumstances where this was proving a major competitive liability". Because of
increasing capital and surging R&D costs in combination with shrinking life cycles
in all IT segments firms are no longer able to monitor all the technological
developments in the IT industry. Therefore, access to knowledge from other
players in adjacent markets is becoming increasingly important (Economic
Commission for Europe, 1987; Korzeniowski, 1988). The convergence process
causes the blurring of traditional technological and sectoral boundaries and
therefore increases the need for companies to keep up with many different
technologies (van Tulder and Junne, 1988). Broadening the existing technology
base by internal development would call for a considerable increase of the already
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heavy R&D cost burden. The combination of rising R&D costs and shorter life
cycles induces firms to search for alternatives to internal development. Cooperation
is often considered as a viable means to monitor several technological
developments at relatively low costs. Given the problems of with acquisitions as
noted above it seems therefore interesting to consider whether strategic technology
alliances are increasingly used to deal with patterns of technological convergence
(see van Tulder and Junne, 1988; Leban et al, 1989; Raphael, 1989; Charles et al,
1989). In other words we try to find out whether firms prefer to use strategic
alliances as a basic means to deal with the process of technological convergence.
Therefore we argue that:
A:
Hypotftesis 9 : Firms tewi to converge fnrowgH meows o/sfrafegic fedmoZogy a/Z/ances, in
f/ie sense fnat fne number o/strategic tec/inoZogy oZIiances in neig/iboMring sectors
increased signi/icantZy oi>er time as compared to t te aZZiances iw 'core' sectors.
6.3. Data
For our analysis we make use of two types of data: patent data and data on
strategic technology alliances. The patent data is based on a database that is
compiled by the European Patent Office (EPO). The European Patent Office was
established in 1978 on behalf of 13 European countries. Inventors which desire the
protection of their invention can apply at EPO for a patent in one or more of the 13
associated countries. The use of patent statistics has been criticized on many
different grounds (Cohen and Levin, 1989; Griliches, 1990; Archibugi, 1992) The
first and probably most important criticism is related to the use of patents as a
measure of innovative output. It is argued that firms differ considerably in their
propensity to patent. Some firms consider patenting as a viable means to protect
their innovations whereas others make use of other methods to safeguard their
technological improvements. There are also large country specific differences in the
approach towards patenting. Japanese firms for example tend to patent every
claim, whereas US companies are used to bundle several claims into one patent
(see Cohen and Levin, 1989). The propensity to patent does not only differ across
firms but also differ across industry sectors. Patent protection for example seems to
be fairly effective in the semi-conductor industry but to a lesser extent for
computers (Nelson, 1987).
Another problem of patent statistics is related to the large differences that
exist in the economic and technological importance of individual patents. Although
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some patents can be associated with major technological breakthroughs, a far larger
number of patents are of considerable less importance and many patents are not
even commercially exploited" (Dorfman, 1987; Graoutzi et al, 1988; Cohen and
Levin, 1989). A related problem is that the far majority of patents are applied for
product improvements. Although process innovations are usually not less
significant in both economic and technological terms they are often not patented. In
the case of process innovations often secrecy turns out to be a viable alternative to
patenting. For process innovations lead time and learning curve advantages also
seem to be sufficient to protect the innovation (Nelson, 1987; Dosi, 1988).
There are however also a number of advantages of using patent statistics.
An important advantage of patent data over innovation input data is that patents
are assigned to different technology classes which in turn can be (partly) translated
into different economic sectors (Pavitt, 1988; Acs and Audretsch, 1989). Another
important factor is that the chances of a patent to be granted are closely related to
the technological sophistication of a product and its innovative features. We might
therefore argue that patents are a relatively good indicator of the level of
technological sophistication of a company (Nystrom and Edvardsson, 1980). We
must however keep in mind that patent statistics can not be used to measure the
complete set of technological variables. Patent statistics cannot be used to measure
issues such as tacit elements of technology. They can only measure the codifiable
part of technology. A more serious problem for the analysis of the IT sector is that
for a long time software was not patentable. Today software is being patented on a
very limited scale only.
' ' In this chapter patents statistics will be used to measure changes in the
technological cores of major IT companies. In order to guarantee the 'global'
character of our sample we incorporated all the leading companies in each sector:
i.e. computers, telecommunications and semiconductors. We deliberately did not
assign companies to a certain sectoral category on the basis of their profile but on
the basis of their sales level in a specific sector. That means that we did not a priori'
label companies as being either computer firms, telecommunications firms or
semiconductor producing firms according to their past or present profile. If we had
only included firms that fit a certain profile we would not have accounted for the
convergence that existed at the beginning of the time-period. Company level
aggregation of subsidiaries was performed for every year of the analysis*.
" Differences in the importance of patents can be assessed by using data on patent renewals or by
means of a patent citation analysis (Cohen and Levin, 1989). Another alternative is to assign a value to
individual innovations (Dorfman, 1987). This is however an extremely time-consuming undertaking.
** The full list of companies that are analyzed in this chapter can be found in Appendix A. v
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Information on company subsidiaries were taken from annual reports and from
multiple volumes of Who Owns Whom (Dun and Bradstreet, 1970-1994). Company
structures therefore differ with respect to the year in which they are analyzed. Such
approach enables us to include also that part of the convergence that can be
attributed to take-overs in adjacent markets. Changes in the technological cores of
major IT producing companies were measured by analyzing the distribution of
patents among three major IT sectors; computers, telecommunications and
semiconductors. We assume that shifts in the core (technological) competencies of
firms are reflected in changes in the relative number of patents that are applied for
in a specific sector.
The data on strategic technology alliances were taken from MERIT'S CATI-
database (see appendix II). The CATI-database contains information on over 10,000
agreements (of which some 5000 agreements are related to the information
technology sector). All the alliances in the database are either related to technology
transfer or to some sort of joint innovative effort. In the present chapter we will use
the term alliance to refer to those cooperative agreements that are not connected
through majority ownership. An alliance can normally be seen as an agreement
which is positioned between two extremes; arm's length transactions on the market
on the one hand and the complete merger of the two firms on the other. Our
present study focuses on those alliances that were established in the period 1980-
1993. As in the case of patents we have to use the strategic alliances with care. The
CATI-database is somewhat biased in terms of 1) A skewness in the distribution of
modes of organizations towards those that are more often reported in the literature;
2) a possible over-representation of large firms; 3) the underestimation of certain
technology fields which do not belong to the core technologies and; 4) A possible
bias towards Anglo-Saxon organizations. Our preoccupation with rather large
companies and IT markets however implies that our analysis is unlikely to be
seriously biased by these drawbacks.
Data on strategic technology alliances was used to measure the degree to
which alliances are used to cope with the convergence process. As in the case of
patents we measured for each company the distribution of alliances among three
major IT sectors; computers, telecommunications and semiconductors. In order to
safeguard the strategic element in our sample we will study only those alliances
that are undertaken for strategic reasons. Following Hagedoorn (1992:164) we will
refer to alliances as being strategic if they "...can reasonably be assumed to effect
the long-term product market positioning of at least one partner". Because alliances
between government or academic institutions and private companies are
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frequently undertaken for different economic reasons than the alliances between
two or more private companies'* (see e.g. Haklish, 1986), we will restrict our
attention to those alliances that are established between private companies. For the
same reason we do not pay attention to government initiated or EC-wide R&D
cost-sharing programs such as ESPRIT, EUREKA or JESSI.
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A first indicator of the degree of convergence within leading information
technology companies is the presence of companies in more than one table of
leading companies (see appendix III). In our sample of leading IT manufacturers
eight companies are among the leading producers of all three types of equipment:
i.e. computers, telecommunications and semiconductors. With the exception of
AT&T (and IBM if one includes captive production) all those players have a
European (Philips, Siemens) or Japanese background (Fujitsu, Hitachi, Matsushita,
NEC, Toshiba). This is not remarkable because it is well known that Japanese and
European multinationals have a more diversified character than their US counter-
parts'*. For each of the sectors we describe the overall distribution of patents and
strategic technology alliances in semi quantitative and quantitative terms respect-
ively. All the data in graphs are shown as three year moving averages in order to
correct for yearly fluctuations that might attract too much attention away from the
overall trends. Figure 19 shows the distribution of patents of leading computer
producing companies as a percentage of their combined number of patents in all
three sectors. Convergence seems to be an essential feature of these firms ever since
the early 1980s. Involvement in telecommunications has always been very high and
this high level of telecommunications patents turns out to be relatively stable over
time. The data however indicate a decreasing trend of semiconductor patents in
favour of computer patents.
Figure 20 displays a more diffuse pattern. It shows the distribution of strategic
technology alliances of leading computer producing companies. In general the
percentages of alliances in the different sectors seem to be somewhat inversely
related to the percentages of patents. Computers seem to take an intermediate
position, whereas semiconductor alliances account for a relatively large share of all
• • ' • ' - • ; •- • • • • • o • v ; _ ; ' - . » i • . • . • . • i f ' / ; - : . - o ' S " " £ » > . J M ; - ; . ^ 3 > i > » - - . \ - C * ;•.'.• r • . " ? . - - . •• . • ;;
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* We assume that alliances between government or academic institutions and private companies are
often less profit seeking and are to a lesser extend used for product development.
* For a further analysis of structural and strategic differences among companies from various home
countries we will refer to chapter eight. •
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alliances. Telecommunication alliances on the other hand seem to play a relatively
modest role. The data does not indicate any significant trends except for a rise in
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semiconductor alliances during the period 1988-1990 and a corresponding decrease
of computer and telecommunication alliances during the same period. In order to
test our main hypotheses we will now turn to a more quantitative approach. The
first step in our analysis is to test hypothesis 8 which assumes that ongoing patterns
of technological and product-market convergence have not significantly affected
the technological cores of the participating companies. We therefore assume that
there is no positive relationship between time and relative sectoral patenting. A
simple linear regression was used to measure the correlation between time (coded
as 1..14) and the relative importance of patents and alliances in a particular sector.
We made use of linear regression technique because we expected a linear
relationship between patenting behaviour and time and also because the graphs
that were presented above did not indicate a non-linear pattern. Because we
assumed that the number of patents or alliances in one period could be related to
the number of patents in the immediate preceding periods we tested the results for
autocorrelation. In only one case (telecommunication patents for semiconductor
firms) autocorrelation was found to exist (Durbin Watson: 0.93880). We therefore
decided to use an autoregression analysis for that particular case in order to correct
the results for autocorrelation.
We will now test hypothesis 8 which assumes that there is no linear
relationship between time and relative sectoral patenting for major computer
producing companies. Table 6 shows the results of a study on the trends in relative
patenting and alliancing behaviour over time.
TABLE 6 /tesuiu o/;Ae regregion a/w(yj!j on <2//iance; and paten/* o/mayor computer producing companies.
Computers
Patents
Alliances
Telecom
Patents
Alliances
Micro-elec.
Patents
Alliances
B
1.036
-0.171
-0.191
-0.171
t
-0.845
0.330
SEB
0.244
0.698
0.288
0.699
' . - .-.Li A i
0.193
0.790
T
4.243
-0.245
-0.664
-0.245
-4.380
0.417
sigT
0.011
0.811
0.519
0.811
0.001
0.684
R=
0.599
0.005
0.035
0.005
0.615
0.014
SE
3.686
10.538
4.346
10.536
2.911
11.919
F
17.999'
0.060
0.441
0.060
19.181"
0.174
Const
29.040
33.729
42.750
33.729
28.206
36.380
p < 0.01
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The overall measure of goodness of fit for the linear model is represented by the
coefficient of determination (R*). High R squares are found for computer patents
and semiconductor patents. R squares for all the other variables are very low. In
the case of computer patents almost 60 percent of the variance is accounted for by
the regression, in the case of semiconductor patents this figure is about 62 percent.
The F values that are used to test the significance of the R*s and for the significance
of the dependent variable in the equation show that both computer patents and
semiconductor patents are significantly dependent on the independent variable
(time). The Beta for computer patents shows a positive sign whereas the Beta for
semiconductor patents is represented by a negative sign. This implies that
computer producing companies have significantly decreased their relative interest
in semiconductors in favour of a growing number of patents in their 'core business'.
These results indicate that hypothesis 8 which asserted that patterns of
technological and product-market convergence have not significantly affected the
technological cores of the participating companies can be confirmed for computer
companies. ><-. :,-i.; ,. .
For the relative distribution of strategic technology alliances we did not find
any significant trends except for the constant in the equation which is significant
for all cases. This indicates a strong stability in the relative distribution of alliances
over time. It is therefore very unlikely that firms converge through means of
strategic alliances as put forward by hypothesis 9, at least in the analysis of leading
computer producing companies. This means that hypothesis 9 cannot be confirmed
on the basis of our analysis.
For leading telecommunication equipment producing companies we found a
quite different pattern (see Figure 21). Convergence processes seem to have had
only a modest impact on telecommunication equipment producing companies. By
far the largest number of technological activity measured by patents takes place in
the telecommunications field. Overall there seems to be only a slight interest in
computer technology and a decline in the number of semiconductor patents. *• •
The distribution of strategic alliances as shown in Figure 22 shows a similar
low degree of involvement in computer technology. Alliances in the field of
semiconductors now account for a significantly larger share. The share of
semiconductor alliances as a percentage of the total number of alliances however
does not seem to be rising during time. Since the mid 1980s telecommunication
alliances account for most of the IT alliances of telecommunications producing
companies.
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The results of the linear regression (Table 7) show relatively high R*s for patents in
telecommunications and semiconductors. Corresponding significance levels are
0.05 in the case of telecommunications patents and 0.01 in the case of
semiconductor patents indicate major shifts in the distribution of patents among
different technological sectors. The results of the analysis for computers however
d o not indicate a significant trend in the relative importance of computer patents
for telecommunication equipment producing companies. Again w e find a growth
in the relative importance of 'core' telecommunications patents (p<0.05) and a
significant decrease in the relative importance of semiconductor patents (p<0.001).
This, once again, confirms hypothesis 8 that convergence has not been able to
change the relative importance of the core technological competencies.
The result for strategic alliances resemble the previous findings for alliances in
the sense that they do not indicate a growing degree of convergence through means
of strategic technology alliances. That means that once again hypothesis 9 cannot be
confirmed by our analysis. • -••• ••••'..
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TABLE 7 Resu/fs o/tfte regression ana/ysis on a//iances and patents o/ma/or te/ecommunicafion eauipment
producing companies.
Computers
Patents
Alliances
Telecom
Patents
Alliances
Micro-elec.
Patents
Alliances
B
0.291
0.266
0.431
0.752
-0.722
-0.901
SEB
0.180
0.534
0.198
0.724
0.154
0.701
T
1.618
0.498
2.171
1.039
-4.681
-1.286
sigT
0.132
0.628
0.050
0.319
0.001
0.223
0.179
0.020
0.282
0.083
0.646
0.121
SE
2.717
8.048
2.992
10.918
2.326
10.570
F
2.617
0.248
4.712'
1.080
21.912"
1.654
Const
15.015
11.616
54.765
40.633
30.220
46.457
" p < 0.05
"p<0.01
•.•'i-j'i-•:' '•: ,."_.-Vf"
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The third analysis is concerned with the patents and strategic technology alliances
of major semiconductor producing companies. The results of this analysis cannot
be used to confirm or reject our basic hypothesis because technological convergence
affects semiconductor companies in a different way. In this case the relationship
with the other sectors is vertical instead of being horizontal. Leading
semiconductor companies are affected by the convergence process basically by a
change in the degree of diffusion of their components in the end products of the
computer- and telecommunications industry. Because micro-electronic components
have become the single most important parts of both telecommunications as well as
computer equipment and because micro-electronics components are increasingly
customized to the end-products we expect that semiconductor firms are urged to
acquire technological knowledge in both fields. We therefore expect to find an
increasing involvement of semiconductor firms in telecommunications and
computer equipment.
For the leading semiconductor firms telecommunication patents seem to be
of particular importance (see figure 23). More than half of their patents are applied
for in the telecommunications field. There is however only a modest, but steady
growing interest in computer patents from major semiconductor producing
companies. The relative amount of semiconductors seems to be relatively stable
over time.
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For strategic technology alliances figure 24 shows a quite different picture.
Alliances in the core-field semiconductors account for the far majority of all
alliances. Alliances in the telecom field are, in contrast to telecommunications
patents, quite insignificant. During the mid 1980s we find a short upheaval in the
number of telecommunications alliances. This upheaval is however reversed in the
following years. The relative importance of computer alliances is modest and
seems to be rising marginally during the period 1985 to 1988. The results of the
regression analysis as shown in table 8 indicate that there is only one significant
trend. The relative importance of patents in the field of computers seems to be
rising during time. Although not significant, the results of the patent analysis
indicate also a higher degree of vertical quasi-integration in the case of
telecommunications patents. The results of the analysis on technological alliances
indicate a relatively stable pattern during time. Again no significant trends are
found for the strategic technology alliances of major semiconductor producing
companies over time.
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TABLE 8 Results o/tJie regression ana/ysis on affiances and patents o/ma/'or semiconductor producing
companies.
Computers
Patents
Alliances
Telecom
Patents
Alliances
Micro-elec.
Patents
Alliances
' p < 0.05
0.398
0.556
0.108
-0.423
-0.156
-0.134
6.5. Discussion
SEB
0.146
0.471
0.498
0.579
0.247
0.664
7
2.714
1.181
0.217
-0.730
-0.631
-0.201
sigT
0.019
0.261
0.204
0.479
0.540
0.844
*
0.380
0.104
0.501
0.042
0.032
0.003
SE
2.210
7.108
4.062
8.736
3.724
10.020
F
7.364"
1.394
4.350
0.532
0.398
0.041
Const
15.217
11.642
51.516
20.818
29.568
67.540
In this chapter we analyzed how major computer and telecommunications
equipment producing companies have been affected by the technological
convergence process. The results of the regression analyses have shown that firms
are basically unaffected by technological convergence during the period 1980-1993.
The results indicate a confirmation of hypothesis 8 which argued that firms are still
doing more of the same instead of being involved in a process of redefining their
'core' business. Hypothesis 9 which argued that firms tend to converge through
means of strategic technology alliances could not be confirmed on the basis of our
analysis. In spite of a significant growth in the absolute number of alliances in all
sectors, cooperative agreements do not seem to be used extensively for dealing
with technological convergence. We may therefore conclude that technological
convergence, although apparent on the technological and product/market level,
does not seem to have affected the core' competencies of major IT producing
companies. Firms seemed to have maintained their original technological form.
According to Stinchcombe (1965) there are three reasons that can be responsible for
the persistence of traditional forms. The first reason is that the original form is still
the most efficient form. The second reason is that the original form may be
pertained by institutional forces, vested interests or a strong ideological position.
The third reason is based on the existence of a natural monopoly or an assured
funding base. We believe that in today's deregulated and liberalised market
structures institutional forces are not strong enough to induce firms to take on a
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particular form. For manufacturing companies the argument of a natural monopoly
or assured funding base does not seem to be relevant any more. That means that it
is very likely that for many organizations the original form is still the most efficient
form. Despite the observed technological convergence we are therefore still able to
discern different forms of organization instead of one converged form.
Aldrich (1979) has argued that different organizational forms can only coexist if
they are dependent on different environmental resources. That means that
although they are influenced by the same technological regime computers and
telecommunications constitute a different niche. It is remarkable to see that despite
the noted convergence at the start of the period both computer and
telecommunications firms have retained most of their interest in their 'old'
technological regime and have basically neglected the important developments in
the new regime. Given the cumulative nature of technological development this
implies that firms that do not invest in a specific technological field soon enough
have the chance to become 'locked-out' of a specific technological path (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990). This means that for companies that are active in one particular
sector it becomes increasingly difficult to acquire the required knowledge in
another field. The likelihood of successful switching to a new regime is therefore
not only a function of willingness to change but can also be seen as a factor of the
competence to change. The possibility of successful switching is generally referred
to as a factor of distance to the new technological regime (Nelson, Winter, 1982,
Cantwell, 1990). The inability to benefit from new opportunities might however
also have to do with so-called 'liabilities of age and size' (Aldrich and Auster, 1986)
which assert that organizations become increasingly inert as their age or size
increases. The relatively old and large organizations that constitute our population
tend to develop a relatively stable and bureaucratic structure that does not leave
room for flexible adaptive behaviour to new opportunities. Instead of changing,
these firms increasingly rely on the retention and replication of existing routines.
Once a set of routines has become embedded within a firm, those firms tend to
change only gradually. Existing routines often determine the direction of possible
future paths. It is however not very likely that new small organizations are able to
attack the leading positions of the industry leaders. New organizations often suffer
from liabilities to newness as well as from liabilities of smallness. In the IT industry
they face huge barriers to entry which are due to increased R&D and production
cost. In addition the cumulativeness of the technological regimes significantly
reduces the changes of success for new organizations. It is often very difficult for
new organizations to acquire skills in production and R&D that are mastered for
decades by their larger competitors.
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Overall our findings do not indicate a pattern of increased technological
convergence within firms. The ongoing process of technological convergence at the
product/market and the technology level has not been accompanied by a
significant rise in the relative number of patents or alliances in adjacent
technologies. From an evolutionary perspective such patterns of resistance to
change are not unexpected. We believe however that in the near future companies
will have severe difficulties to achieve their aspiration levels of performance.
Therefore we think that at that time companies are forced to redefine their core'
business and adapt their existing technology base according to the demands of the
new technological regime. Strategic technology alliances in combination with
internal development can be an important means to achieve that goal. Although
strategic technology alliances do not seem to be used extensively to deal with the
convergence process we believe that given the rapid increase in the number of
newly established strategic technology alliances these alliances can still play a very
important role in high technology sectors. In the next chapter we therefore aim to
find out what the specific contribution of strategic technology alliances is for
companies that are active in the information technology industry.
7
Inter-firm Relationships in Major IT Networks
In traditional business literature organizations were typically described as
independent self-contained units (Contractor and Lorange, 1988). Only recently,
organizational theorists have devoted more attention to the connections among
organizations. The concept of inter-organizational relationships has been
introduced in organizational literature in the late 1960s by among others Evan
(1966) and Warren (1967). These authors put forward a view in which
organizations were described in terms of their relationships with other
organizations (e.g. key suppliers, buyers or competitors). In the following years,
only a few articles on this subject were published in the leading journals. The
attention that was drawn by these publications remained however rather modest.
Although relationships between companies have been ignored in business
literature for a long time, a rapid increase in the number of alliances in the 1980s
(Harrigan, 1985b; Haklisch, 1986, 1989; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Mowery,
1988; Hagedoorn, 1990) gave way to a growing body of literature on both the use
and structure of such agreements. Today cooperative agreements have become an
important and recurrent issue in strategic management, international business,
industrial economics as well as in organization studies. With a few notable
exceptions (see e.g. Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1990, 1991, 1993; Nohria and
Garcia Pont, 1991; Nohria and Eccles, 1992) agreements have been studied from a
dyadic or firm level perspective. In this chapter we will however argue that the
strategic value of strategic alliances can only be assessed by paying attention to the
overall structure of the network in which a firm is embedded. From a network
perspective the number of links of a particular company is only one of several basic
variables. Knoke and Kuklinski (1982:13) for example noted that" the structure
of relations among actors and the location of individual actors in the network have
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important behavioral, perceptual, and attitudinal consequences both for the
individual units and for the system as a whole." Therefore the evaluation of the
power of organizations in a network requires an extensive analysis of an
organization's position in the network, its connection to other players as well as its
ability to control flows of information. . „, .
I* '
7.1. Research Q u e s t i o n s , .•••,••...•
Before the 1980s cooperative agreements (usually joint ventures) were typically
undertaken between somewhat smaller companies. During the 1980s also large
Multi-National Enterprises (MNEs) came to play a role in the establishment of
strategic alliances (Hladik, 1985). Traditionally most of these alliances were
undertaken in order to gain access to foreign markets or to bypass government
regulations (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Hamel et al, 1986; Haklisch, 1989;
Porter and Fueller, 1986). Today we observe an increasing number of multinational
corporations, more or less comparable in size, that link up with each other. The
scope of these alliances is usually global and the modes of cooperation can take
numerous forms: e.g. consortia, cross licensing agreements, joint ventures, research
partnerships, franchising etc. Whereas cooperative agreements used to be
undertaken on the basis of short-term objectives, today firms are increasingly
recognizing the strategic importance of these agreements (Harrigan, 1985b; Porter
and Fuller, 1986; Contractor and Lorange, 1988). In today's global markets in which
technological progress is extremely rapid, boundary spanning strategic technology
alliances have become an important factor for the overall competitive position of a
company. Firms are now often engaged in multiple strategic alliances with
different partners at the same time. It seems therefore necessary to focus not only
on the alliances of one specific organization, but to consider all ties between the
players in a specific sector. A one firm or dyadic level of analysis seems simply
inadequate to study industry sectors where virtually all companies are linked to
each other. This chapter is therefore concerned with an empirical analysis of the
evolution of cooperative networks. More in particular we aim to enhance our basic
understanding of cooperative behaviour in three major high-technology sectors: i.e.
computers, telecommunications and semiconductors. Before the mid-1970s there
appeared to be an inverse relationship between R&D-intensity and cooperative
alliances (Stopford and Wells, 1972; Friedman, Berg and Duncan, 1979; Haklisch,
1989). Today, high technology sectors account for the majority of all newly
established alliances (Fushfeld and Haklisch, 1985; Osbom and Baughn, 1990,
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Mytelka, 1991, Hagedoom 1993). Changes in the relative importance of strategic
technology alliances for high technology sectors are above all due to fundamental
shifts in the structure of the global environment and in the process of technological
change (Haklisch 1989). Fierce competition, the homogenization of markets and
ongoing globalization tendencies account for most of the structural changes,
whereas rapid growing capital and R&D costs, the ever increasing complexity of
products and a significant increase in the speed of technological developments are
important drivers from a technological point of view (Haklisch, 1988). The rapidly
changing technological and competitive settings induced firms to search for new
ways to increase their flexibility. In the late 1970s and early 1980s a number of
companies started to trade their traditional practices like mergers and foreign
direct investment for new forms of cooperation such as joint ventures, joint
development agreements and various types of technology sharing agreements.
These new forms of agreements gave firms a previously unknown degree of
flexibility in terms of the acquisition of technology and for market entry purposes
(Vonortas, 1989). Given the increased need for flexibility and the rapid changing
structural and technological conditions in high technology markets we assume that:
Hypoffiesis 20 : Hig/i fec/mology industries ore character/zed by a Jarge iwcrease «H f/ic
number a/strategic tec/iMo/ogy a//iances during the 1980s and ear/y 1990s.
A second related hypothesis is concerned with the above mentioned drive towards
flexibility that occurred during the 1980s (see e.g. Harrigan, 1985a; Schreuder and
van Cayseele, 1988; Vonortas, 1989). If firms are indeed trying to increase their
overall flexibility this might be reflected in a trend towards more flexible forms of
cooperative organization. We would then expect a reduction in the relative
importance of equity agreements in favour of more flexible non-equity agreements
during the 1980s and early 1990s. -.-;<;.-.;-J.:"-.-1<: •a.e'i-•,-**oi>-!i uo *:£u:-••-..-.-.; ••?
Hyporftests 11 : 77ie efluiry/non-equiry ratio o/sfrafegic fec/mo/ogy a//iflnces /zas decreased
considenzbZy oz>er time.
Ever since the 1980s all of the major IT sectors have been subject to major structural
and technological turbulence. IT sectors have increasingly been characterized by
rapid rising costs of equipment and R&D accompanied by steep learning curves
and ever shortening product life cycles. These developments urge firms to
cooperate in order to share development costs and to reduce lead times for
innovative products. A reduction in lead times allows firms to preempt the market
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and enables them to move faster down the learning curve. Another very important
development came through the emergence of new technological regimes and the
ongoing complexity of technology that raised the need for flexibility in order to
respond quickly to changing market needs and to new technological opportunities.
Because of the rising costs of R&D in all sectors of the IT industry no single
organization seems able to monitor such broad range of technologies by itself.
Given these specific characteristics of the present-day information technology
industry we assume that traditional motives for the establishment of strategic
technology alliances have made way for rationales that are related to either a
reduction in lead times, technological complementarity, and the reduction of the
costs of R&D. Hypothesis 12 is therefore formulated as :
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Hypothesis 12 : /Uffeough rfte fradzfzona/ rafzona/e /or the esfaWzsnmerzf o/ strategic
affiances Crnarfcet access) is sfi'i/ euident, its importance /ias decreased ouer f/ze 1950s in
/auour o/of/zer rafzona/es such as a reduction in Jead times, techno/ogica/ comp/ementarz'fy
awd a reduction o/t«e costs o/research and deue/opment. w •?. t xfn*.! «^«i'-i f!': •<<,
After we established some basic understanding of historical trends of strategic
partnering over time we will pay attention to the overall network structure of the
different IT sectors. Our basic assumption is that networks of strategic partnering
reflect a sector's underlying competitive structure. Therefore we try to find out
whether differences among technological and competitive drivers in each of the
sectors has led to differences in network structures and in differences among the
network positions of major players. We will deal with this issue by focusing on two
levels of analysis. The first level of analysis is concerned with the overall network
characteristics whereas the second level focuses on the differences among focal
companies in terms of their network centrality. At the overall network level we will
try to elaborate on hypothesis 10 which assumed that high technology industries
are characterized by an increasing number of alliances during the 1980s and early
1990s. We argue that the increase in the number of alliances is not only due to an
increase in the number of firms that undertakes alliances but is for an important
part due to an increase in the relative number of alliances by the focal players.
Therefore we hypothesize:
Hypof/iesis 13 : 77ie netoorJfcs o/ strategic technoZogy aZ/zarzces in a// ma;'or /T sectors
under study nape euo/ued/rom sparse neruwfcs during the ear/y 1970s into uery dense
networAs in t/!e/b//ou>ing periods.
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Another question that will be addressed in the network analyses is concerned with
the relationship between patterns of strategic technology alliances and market
structural aspects of the major IT sectors"". In the literature strategic partnering has
often been described in terms of oligopolistic rivalry among large multinational
companies (Casson, 1987; Chesnais, 1988; Mytelka, 1991). In contrast to Porter's
(1990) assumption that strategic partnering is primarily used by 'second-tier
competitors' to catch up with the leading companies most of the literature has
argued that networks of strategic partnering are dominated by the leading
companies in the market. In this chapter we will try to assess whether market
structural changes are reflected in changes in network positions of the companies
involved. One of the most important trends in terms of the market structural
positions of the major companies is found in the increasing involvement and
domination of Japanese competitors in all IT segments. This trend is shown in the
large scale entrance of Japanese companies in the international IT industry during
the mid 1970s and their dominant position in the industry in the most recent
period. Japanese firms were not very active in the international IT industry until
the mid 1970s. We therefore expect that Japanese firms are absent in the first period
(1970-1977) but that they show up in the second period (1978-1985). In the last
period (1986-1993) we expect that Japanese firms have moved out of their
peripheral positions in the second period to more central positions. This leads to
t h e f o l l o w i n g h y p o t h e s i s : i ^ - n t ; , . • ' ; • ; - . : - ; : - , : . . - , • ; » - , ' . •••• • i . • , < - • J ^ i i i ? !
HypofJiesis 14 : Japanese/irms haue become apparent in cooperative networks during Me
period I97S-29S5 and ftave moved info centra/ positions during the /ate 1950s and ear/y
1990s.
V j ' J V ; ' • " • • • ' • • . • • . • • • • • • ; ; • . . . • i • • • • " - i • • ,
Apart from these 'generic' features of the networks we will pose a number of
hypothesis about the evolution of networks in the specific industry sectors. In the
computer industry we expect to find a network structure that closely resembles its
oligopolistic market structure. This network is expected to be build around a small
number of focal players. In this 'oligopolistic' network IBM is likely to stand out as
the single most dominant player. Thus: , , . , , , . . , _ . , - . . . . , . . . ....... . , . . , , . , .
Hj/potrtesis 25 : T7ie cooperative network in trte computer industry is dominated by IBM
and a sma// number o//arge we// estab/isfted companies. Dij^ erences in netoorfc cenfra/ity 0/
f/iose companies compared to ofner companies in trte network are very rtigft. •,.;... .yin«
For a detailed discussion of this relationship we refer to Hagedoorn (1995).
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In the semiconductor market we expect to find a quite different network structure.
Extremely high expenditures on production and R&D (even compared to the
computer industry) have induced virtually all firms in this market to establish
strategic alliances. Joint development of products has become a necessity to survive
under the extremely high competitive pressures that are characteristic for this
sector. We therefore expect to find a very dense network which is characterized by
a much more equally spread distribution of centrality values : . • ? :• > »••- :
Hypothesis 26 : 77ie cooperative network o/fte semiconductor sector is characterized by a
iarge number o/more or Zess eaua/Jy distributed /info among uirtuaZZy a// actiue companies.
•.. ' . ••: " " ' • : • ' " - > : • : ' . ' ? • * • • • • \ v < ' . * " • . - " . . " ' r • ' : ? • K S . ' - : ' v i ' . . i O n * t ' i t t . " ' } u - . ' i O i ' i ' J A : • :> " n ' ..• . * • _ > ' *
For the telecommunications industry we expect to find very sparse networks in the
1970s and early 1980s at a time when competition was relatively low and
technological progress was not very fast. During these periods the number of cross
border alliances is limited due to the inward direction of the (national) companies.
In the third period deregulatory and liberalising actions have led to increased
international competition, rapid technological progress and the need to access other
markets. Therefore we expect to find an increase in the number and international
orientation of strategic technology alliances during this period. ' : . '.•••?•-•
Hypothesis 17 : Cooperative nercforfcs in the fefecommunications sector are very sparse
during fne/irst and second period and intemafiona/ /infcs are a/most comp/ete/y absent, /n
t/je most recent period we^ind a /arge increase in bot/i t/ze number o/ai/iances as u;e/Z as in
termso/fneirinfernationa/orientation. • •• ' Sv.7; • ;u^.f -V" ^
7.2. Research Methodology and Data ' " TT i * <* b; ^ »w •« .K ^
In order to test the hypotheses that are put forward in the previous section we will
have to examine both the evolution of the overall number of IT alliances and the
evolution of these alliances within each specific IT sector. The next section is
therefore concerned with an empirical analysis of historical patterns of strategic
technology alliances over time. On the basis of time-series data on the growth of
newly established alliances we will be able to validate or reject hypothesis 10.
Hypothesis 11 will be dealt with in section 3 which analyzes the relative changes in
the equity versus non-equity ratio of cooperative agreements ever since 1980. After
we assessed the major trends in the number and forms of alliances we will turn to
the underlying rationales for strategic partnering. We will focus more in particular
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to those rationales that are important for companies participating in high
technology industries. From an empirical perspective we will try to validate
hypothesis 12 by looking at the relative importance of the different rationales
during the 1980s. After we established some basic understanding of historical
trends in strategic technology alliances we will try to identify the basic networks of
strategic alliances and their development over time. The structure of the networks
in each IT sector and the positions of the major actors in these networks are
analyzed by means of a statistical technique that is known as network analysis.
Network analysis tries to capture the social structure of a network by focusing on
the role and structure of the relationships among the various actors. Network
analysis treats relationships between organizations not as isolated links but as part
of a larger social structure. In this chapter we will consider networks of alliances
from two distinct levels of analysis. We will start with a description of the basic
characteristics of the overall network and will then proceed with an examination of
the role and importance of the individual players in the network. This enables us to
reject or validate our 'generic' as well as our more sector specific hypotheses
(hypotheses 14-17).
The data presented in this chapter are based on the MERIT-CATI database
(see also Appendix II). In this chapter we study over 2200 strategic technology
alliances that are related to either computers, telecom, semiconductors or
software". Alliances in the field of software account for 32% of total IT alliances.
Semiconductors account for 26%, whereas cooperation in telecommunications and
semiconductors account for 25% and 17% respectively (see figure 25).
As in the previous chapter the expression interfirm cooperation is used to
refer to those cooperative agreements between partners that are not connected
through (majority) ownership. Although cooperative agreements can take
numerous forms such as marketing, production and research agreements we will
limit our analysis to technology inclined agreements. Before 1975 this type of
agreement was virtually unknown (Hladik, 1985). In the 1980s however several
authors started to report a strong and steady increase in the number of strategic
technology alliances (Hagedoom and Schakenraad, 1990, Herger and Morris, 1988).
In order to safeguard the strategic element in our sample we will study only those
alliances that are undertaken for strategic reasons. As in chapter six we will refer to
alliances as being strategic if they "...can reasonably be assumed to effect the long-
term product market positioning of at least one partner". Because alliances between
government or academic institutions and private companies are often undertaken
Because of our focus on the 'core' sectors of the Information Technology industry we did not include industrial
automation in our study. v • ' ' •*•"•• '
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for different reasons than the alliances between two or more private companies (see
e.g. Haklish, 1986), we will restrict our attention to those alliances that are
established between private companies. For the same reason we do not pay
attention to government initiated or EC-wide R&D cost-sharing programs such as
ESPRIT, EUREKA or JESSI.
j - ' s j . - •• - • . : . . ! . • < • • • - . • - • ' : ' - t T < • • : : ' . , • ! • ; . • . : : « ; •
Computer
17%
' ! • • ' • ' ' -
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FIGURE 25 Number o/cooperaf ice tec/i«o/ogy a^reemenis as a percentage o/fofaZ 7T agreemen/s.
7.3. Historical Patterns of Cooperative Agreements in Major IT Sectors
In order to assess the importance and magnitude of strategic alliance activity we
calculated the number of newly established strategic technology alliances as they
appear in our CATI-database. Figure 26 shows the total number of newly
established strategic technology alliances in four major IT sectors: i.e. computers,
semiconductors, telecommunications and software. All numbers are calculated as
three year moving averages in order to smoothen yearly fluctuations that might
attract too much attention away from the overall trend.
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FIGURE 26 Number o/neu>/y esfaft/is/ied strategic fecftno/ogy a/(iances in JT sectors.
77iree year mowing flDerages, 2973-1992.
During the first half of the 1970s cooperative activity remained at a rather modest
level in the information technology industry. During the second half of the 1970s,
as companies were slowly becoming more aware of the advantages associated with
the use of strategic alliances, the number of newly established alliances started to
increase gradually'*. It was however not until the late 1970s that the rise in the
number of alliances really took off. Apart from a short period of stabilization in the
mid 1980s growth persisted until the end of the decade. The overall increase in
alliance activity in the IT sector during the 1980s coincides with a period of
structural and technological turbulence in all the IT sectors under study. During
this period both production and R&D costs have been rising rapidly whereas
ongoing international-ization tendencies have increased the 'global' character of the
industry"". All these factors seem to have increased the need to establish strategic
alliances. The observed pattern of growth closely resembles our expectation that
This so-called 'imitation effect' is dealt with more extensively in Hagedoom (1992)
100
see chapter 8 for a more detailed analysis of the globalization process.
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was put forward in hypothesis 10 with the exception that at the end of the decade
the growth rate in the number of newly established alliances seems to level off. A
closer look at the sectoral data (figure 27) reveals that this pattern of slower growth
started already in the mid 1980s in all IT sectors but software. An explanation for
this slower growth rate can be found in difficulties associated with the
management and control of strategic alliances. As companies become more aware
of the risks and dangers of cooperation, they tend to become more careful in
choosing strategic alliances as their most preferred contractual form (Hagedoorn,
1993). Figure 27 shows the evolution of the number of newly established strategic
technology alliances in the different sub-fields of the information technology
industry. We can see that despite a decreasing number of alliances during the mid
1980s the computer industry is characterized by a slow but steady increase in the
number of alliances over time. After the mid 1980s growth in the number of newly
established alliances takes off again temporarily during the late 1980s before a
renewed slow down takes place during the early 1990. The same pattern of slower
growth during the mid 1980s is also found in the semiconductor industry. Whereas
the computer industry was characterized by an upheaval in the late 1980s, in the
semiconductor market the growth in the number of alliances does not take off
again until the 1990s. In telecommunications we find a steady increase in the
number of alliances until the late 1980s. After 1988 the number of newly
established alliances starts to decline until the 1992 when the number of
telecommunication alliances increases again. The remarkable growth in software
alliances during the 1980s can be ascribed to the mediating role of software in the
convergence of information technologies. The pervasive and systemic nature of
software urges a large number of hardware producers to establish strategic
technology alliances with leading software companies. These results indicate that,
despite the pattern of strong growth in the early 1980s that is present in all sectors
and a slowdown in the number of alliances durin g the early 1990s, there are major
sectoral differences in terms of the number of alliances as well as in their pattern of
evolution over time. Different characteristics of the individual segments seem to
have led to different patterns of growth in the number of newly established
strategic technology alliances.
: - - " - ~ * : y . ^ ' , ' . / ? . • : . . * w ' N ^ . ' • ^ -• - j • T - • ; . ' . < : .
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FIGURE 27 Number o/ new/y estoWished strategic fedmo/ogy affiances, carious sub-/ieMs.
Three year mot»m^ auerages, 2 973 - 2 992.
7.3.2. Modes o/Cooperation
Traditionally joint ventures accounted for the majority of all alliances. In a joint
venture"" partners agree to combine their skills and resources in a company that is
characterized by joint equity ownership. Joint ventures used to be established for
market entry reasons. Today, equity participation is often used in an attempt to
lower transaction costs between two related companies. Because equity
participation creates mutual dependence among the participating companies the
chances of cheating on the other partner can be reduced significantly. If one of the
partners does not behave responsible, then the whole venture suffers and equity
diminishes for all participants (Buckley and Casson, 1988). Others (Stuckey, 1983;
Davies, 1977; Teece, 1981; Hennart, 1988) have argued that equity agreements are
particularly suited to transfer 'tacit' knowledge. Tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1958)
101 R&D ventures undertaken with distinctive research programmes are labeled research corporations (Hagedoorn,
1990).
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refers to knowledge which cannot be transferred in codified form; e.g. country or
firm specific know how. If knowledge is tacit, transfer of technology is not
sufficient. As stated by Hennart (1988: 366) " Tacit knowledge is difficult to
codify, and often non-patentable. Even if patented, the patent will provide only a
small part of the information necessary to market the new product or to use the
new process. Tacit knowledge will be more efficiently transferred if the transferor
and the recipient are linked through common ownership."
Another type of equity agreement (direct investment) has also been used
extensively for the transfer of technological knowledge. In high technology
industries direct investment are often coupled with technology exchange
agreements. In turbulent industries large companies are well known to invest in
small high-tech companies in order to acquire promising new technologies. This
allows large firms to explore new fields of technology without the need to come up
with the full amount of investment that would be needed for internal development.
If the technology of the small firm becomes more important to the acquiring firm, a
takeover can be considered. Accessing technology by direct investment seems
however to be very difficult due to limited influence in the decision making
process of the other company. Therefore other modes of cooperating are often more
preferable for companies that wish to acquire technological knowledge.
Whereas equity agreements are often established in order to raise mutual
dependence or to transfer tacit knowledge, an increasing number of organizations
prefers a more flexible relationship with other organizations. The growing
importance of flexibility as an element of the overall corporate strategy is for
example noted in Schreuder and van Cayseele (1988). Schreuder and van Cayseele
concluded that flexibility contributed more to the long-term success of firms than
the existence of economies of scope. In this context we will also stress the
importance of 'strategic flexibility' as put forward by Harrigan (1985a). Strategic
flexibility refers to the ability of organizations " to reposition themselves in a
market, change their game plans, or dismantle their current strategies when the
customer they serve are no longer as attractive as they once were." (Harrigan,
1985a: 1) Especially in high technology industries that are characterized by ever
shortening technology and product life cycles, firms feel constant pressure to
remain flexible in order to respond quickly to changing market needs and to new
technological opportunities. In the previous chapters we discussed several
examples of companies that lost their dominant position because of their slow
reaction to radical technological changes (see also Cooper and Schendel, 1976;
Foster, 1986). New groups of firms were often much more able to enter a new
market riding the waves of new technologies. Non-equity agreements are used
extensively by large incumbent organizations to raise their ability to switch from
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research in one technology to another (Obleros and MacDonald, 1988).
Withdrawal, or transfer of know-how, personnel and assets is often much easier to
accomplish in those more flexible types of agreements than in agreements that
involve equity (Kreiken, 1986; Harrigan, 1988). Therefore, non-equity agreements
are often preferred above joint ventures if demand is uncertain or business risks are
high (Harrigan, 1988). Due to the globalization of markets, the increasing
complexity of technologies, rapid technological changes and the increasing costs of
R&D, firms are no longer able to monitor all the technological developments that
are important for their core markets. Cooperation enables companies to monitor
several technological developments and at the same time, let them concentrate on a
few, most promising, projects internally. If certain technologies turn out to be less
successful then cooperative agreements can be terminated with only a relatively
small loss. It must however be stressed that non-equity agreements lack some of
the benefits of joint ventures. As stated by Harrigan (1988:142), ".... owners rarely
pool their resources and efforts in cooperative agreements in the way that they do
when using joint ventures". Above we described that shorter technology and
product cycles in combination with elevating R&D and capital costs during the
1980s have increased the need for flexibility. We would therefore expect that the
boom in the number of alliances during the 1980s is likely to be due to a rise in the
number of more flexible forms of cooperation (see hypothesis 11). New more
flexible forms of strategic technology alliances seem to have taken over the
dominant role that used to be played by joint ventures and other forms of equity
agreements. Figure 28 describes the relative distribution of newly established
cooperative agreements according to their organizational form. We can see that the
number of non-equity agreements grows from 35 percent of all alliances in 1980 to
almost 80 percent of all alliances in 1992. This pattern of growth clearly confirms
our expectation about the rise of more flexible forms of organization during the
1980s and early 1990s (see hypothesis 11).
7.3.2. Rflfiowfl/es/or Sfrflfegic R&D
Viewing the upheaval in the absolute number of strategic technology alliances in
the past decades, there have to be specific advantages of those agreements over
internal development, merger or arms length transactions. Although the rationales
164 INTER-FIRM RELATIONSHIPS IN MAJOR IT NETWORKS
for cooperation are numerous"" we will restrict our attention to those rationales
that are important for firms in the information technology industry.
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FIGURE 28 Non-equity agreements as a percentage o/tota/ agreements in /n/ormafion Tedino/ogies.
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As we have shown in the previous chapters fixed costs of R&D have rocketed in
virtually all major IT sectors. The costs of developing a new computer, digital
switching equipment or microprocessor can be up to billions of dollars. The
development of every new generation of products involves a much higher amount
of capital, whereas, due to shrinking life cycles, costs are much more difficult to
recoup within such a short time period. It is obvious that, with the exception of
some very large multinational firms (e.g. IBM, Fujitsu, AT&T), it is very difficult to
finance such projects by a single organization. Even for the largest companies, the
risk of failure involved in those capital intensive projects becomes too high to be
accepted. Therefore sharing capital investments among companies can be a very
attractive option to companies. Cooperation can however also be used to meet
economies of scale in production and R&D. It is often more efficient to use one
See Hagedoom (1993a) for a complete overview of motives for strategic R&D alliances.
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R&D facility instead of separate facilities. By integrating previously separate
activities, cooperative agreements raise the total volume of activities and therefore
significant scale advantages can be reaped.
A specific category of costs that can be reduced by cooperative agreements
are transaction costs that arise by contractual agreements among interacting
organizations. It is often argued that, compared to arm's length transactions,
cooperative agreements ease transactional and contractual difficulties (Williamson,
1979, 1985; Hennart, 1988; Jarillo, 1988). Williamson as the most well-known
contributor to transaction cost economics argued that mixed modes of governance
(cooperative agreements) are preferred if asset specificity is intermediate. The
degree of asset specificity is closely linked to the degree in which specific
investments have been made. According to Williamson (1985: 54) ".... specialized
assets cannot be redeployed without sacrifice of productive value if contracts
should be interrupted or prematurely terminated". The degree of redeployment of
assets has a strong impact on the choice of contractual modes (Klein and Leffler,
1981; Williamson, 1985; Hennart, 1988). If specialized investments are incurred,
companies become increasingly dependent on each other. Standard market
contracts could then well lead to very high contractual costs in order to prevent so-
called 'hold-up' situations in which, one party could threaten to withdraw unless
the contract is revised in a profitable way for this party (Groenewegen, 1989;
Williamson, 1979, 1985). The threat of 'hold up' situations becomes higher when
transactions are recurrent. Under these conditions, the costs of setting up a bilateral
governance structure (cooperative agreement) may well be able to offset the costs
involved in spot market contracting. However, under conditions of very high asset
specificity, unified governance structures are often more efficient.
Apart from a reduction in transaction costs, cooperative agreements can also
be used to reduce risk. Teaming up with other partners significantly reduces the
investments in a specific R&D project. As in the case of stock-markets, risk can be
reduced by spreading investments over a large portfolio of R&D projects. Teaming
up with a competent partner can also be used to reduce the risk of bringing a non-
state-of-the-art product to the market. The likelihood of success for a new
innovation can often be enhanced tremendously by reducing the time to market. In
markets such as semiconductors where prices sometimes decline by more than 30%
a year, it is obvious that a reduction in the lead time of a new product can bring
about significant rewards to the companies involved. ;, ,K-';\. ;.--^,^,^-' "''-'
In the introduction we described that traditionally cooperative agreements
were undertaken to achieve access to foreign markets or to bypass government
regulations. Today this rational still holds for a number of markets such as China,
Japan, several Less Developed Countries (LDCs) as well as in regulated
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telecommunication markets. Access reasons can also be of importance in another
context, in terms of access to the technological competencies of other companies.
Because of the globalization of markets, the increasing complexity of technological
development, rapid technological changes and the increasing costs of R&D, firms
are no longer able to monitor all the technological developments that are important
for their core markets. Cooperation enables companies to monitor several
technological developments and at the same time, let them concentrate on a few,
most promising, projects internally. If certain technologies turn out to be less
successful then cooperative agreements can be terminated with only a relatively
small loss. Apart from monitoring purposes, the combination of asymmetric skills
and knowledge of two different companies can be extremely beneficial to both
companies. Synergy effects that arise from technological complementarities among
organizations often create win-win situations for all the companies involved.
It is obvious that there are major differences in the relative importance
among the various motives. Data from the MERIT-CATI data bank enables us to
look at the importance of the various motives over time (figure 29). Again all
numbers are calculated as three year moving averages in order to smoothen yearly
fluctuations that might attract too much attention away from the overall trend.
80 81
/^-Costs/Risks -»-Tech. complementarity -t-Lead times ••• Basic research"
l*»-Market structure -^-Monitoring •ft- Entry
FIGURE 29 Distribution o/ motiiws ybr strategic tec/i«o/ogy a//iances as a percentage o/ t/ie tote/ number
o/motives, 1980-J989. Three year moping averages. <
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In the first section we argue that although the traditional rationale for the
establishment of strategic alliances (market access) is still evident its importance
decreases over the 1980s in favour of other rationales such as a reduction in lead
times, technological complementarity and a reduction of the costs of research and
development. Figure 29 shows that indeed the relative share of the market entry
motive has dropped about 10% from 25% in 1980 towards 15% in the late 1980s.
Technological complementarity and the reduction of lead times stand out as the
single most important motives during the 1980s. The importance of these rationales
is not surprising given the increasing complexity of technologies and the
importance of steep learning curves in all sectors of the industry. Technological
monitoring and the ability to influence market structures seems to have become
more important during the 1980s. The monitoring aspect of strategic technology
alliances has become more important because declining opportunities in the
current paradigm are urging firms to explore new technological opportunities in
the market whereas the rapid maturation of virtually all the major IT sectors has
increased the need to influence market structures. The joint undertaking of basic
research and the reduction of costs and risks seem to be less important rationales to
undertake strategic technology alliances.
7.3.3. Dangers o/Cooperafz'o« . :•-.. ,,/.
Although the description of the various motives might suggest win-win situations
for all the companies involved in cooperative agreements, mortality rates of
cooperative agreements have always been extremely high (Business Week, 1986;
Kogut, 1988). Studies by consulting firms such as McKinsey and Coopers and
Lybrand have shown a 70% failure rate for joint ventures (Business Week, 1986).
Reasons for these extremely high failure rates have always remained rather vague.
It is often argued that firms enter cooperative agreements with 'hidden agendas'
(Haklish, 1979; Hamel et al., 1986; Hagedoorn, 1990). Firms that enter cooperative
agreements with 'hidden agendas' do not participate in the venture for the sake of
both partners. Instead they have the incentive to absorb the other partner's
knowledge, skills and sometimes even its assets. Once a party is able to absorb the
other partner's skills or knowledge, the coalition is likely to fail. From a transaction
cost perspective (Williamson, 1985,1990) it is argued that cost of cooperation rises
if so-called 'hold-up' situations occur. One partner may be capable of capturing a
large proportion of the profits, because it has a superior bargaining position
compared to the other partner that has made some irreversible investments in the
coalition (Porter, 1986). In that context Porter and Fuller (1986: 329) state that "....
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coalitions designed to gain the benefits of scale or learning in performing an
activity have a more enduring purpose". Moreover they assert that ".... the stability
of coalitions rises when partners make balanced or complementary contributions in
form that are not one-time or self-liquidating". These observations are confirmed
by the results of an analysis of the stability of joint ventures by Kogut (1989). Kogut
found that when companies were involved in more than one of alliance with the
same partner, the stability of all those alliances was raised significantly"". Another
threat to cooperating companies is concerned with the danger of creating a
potential competitor, or strengthening an existing competitor through cooperation.
From these examples it might be clear that cooperation cannot be seen as a
'panacea' for all problems (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1990). A firm should
therefore always assess the particular advantages of cooperation against the
advantages of other forms of organizations. If a company decides that cooperation
is the most preferred option then it should be careful in choosing its partners and to
think about the content of the alliance and the contributions of each partner"*.
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After having identified the basic trends in technology partnering we will now turn
to the evolution of cooperative networks. Our main goal in this section is to study
the changes in the overall structures of the networks over time and to identify the
focal players in the cooperative networks of the various sub-fields. This enables us
to evaluate five hypotheses that are related to the structural differences among the
various IT sectors and the possible reflection of these strategies in the networks of
alliances.
Today, sophisticated statistical software packages (e.g. UCINET) and
powerful micro computers allow us to reveal particular characteristics of a network
that were impossible to detect in the past. Although the basic underpinnings of
network analysis have been around ever since the Second World War (See e.g.
Bavelas, 1948) recent advancements in graph theory and computer technology have
brought about major changes in the use of network analysis as an analytic tool. The
use of network analysis as a tool to analyze complex social systems was introduced
in the 1970s (see e.g. Burt, 1976, Freeman, 1979) and further developed in the 1980s
(see e.g. Bonacich, 1987). As argued by Nohria (1992: 2) "... network analysis has
Kogut (1989) also found that R&D ventures were significantly more stable than other ventures.
*°* Partner selection seems crucial for the stability of new ventures (see e.g. Geringer, 1991; Hamel, 1991).
CHAPTER 7 169
grown from the esoteric interest of a few mathematically inclined sociologists to a
legitimate mainstream perspective." Today network analysis can be used to
analyze complex flows of information. A simultaneous analysis of all the
relationships between individual organizations may result in the description of a
social system that closely resembles the structure of a specific organizational field
(Barley et al. 1992).
For a graphical representation of networks we make use of a statistical
technique that is known as non-metric Multidimensional Scaling (MDS).
Multidimensional scaling is a data-reduction procedure comparable to principal
component analysis and other factor analytical methods. One of the main
advantages of MDS is that usually, but not necessarily, MDS can fit an appropriate
model in fewer dimensions than can factor analytic methods. This increases the
possibility of easy interpretable two-dimensional pictures. MDS offers scaling of
similarity data into points lying in an X-dimensional space. The purpose of this
method is to provide coordinates for these points in such a way that distances
between pairs of points fits as closely as possible to the observed similarities. In
order to facilitate a better understanding of the graphs we only include the most
active cooperating companies in our plots. MDS plots are presented for the periods,
1970-1977, 1978-1985, 1986-1993. A three period perspective allows us to add a
dynamic perspective to the analysis of the networks. We focus on the parent
company level in the sense that we assign all the agreements of subsidiaries to the
parent company. As a representation of the links between the various companies
we draw lines between the cooperating companies. We use lines of different styles
and thickness in order to account for the number of agreements between the
companies. Dotted lines represent one alliance whereas solid lines indicate 2 or 3
alliances. Fat solid lines indicate more than four alliances.
7.4.1. CentraZiry Measures
The importance of particular players in a network can be measured by their degree
of centrality. Centrality in a network context refers to the importance of a specific
organization for the overall structure of a network. Centrality in information
networks was first introduced by Bavelas in 1948 to assess the relationship between
centrality and power within networks (Freeman, 1979). Advances in graph theory
in later years have significantly broadened the use of centrality measures as a tool
to assess the importance of a specific point (or actor) in a network. The basic source
of information for all the centrality measures discussed in this chapter is the
adjacency matrix. An adjacency matrix is a matrix in which the cells contain the
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number of direct links between the various companies. The cell value a^  is therefore
equal to the number of ties between company i and company j . In this chapter we
will use three basic measures of centrality as put forward by Freeman (1979):
degree centrality (C^), betweenness centrality (Cg) and closeness centrality (Cc)'°*.
The most straightforward measure of centrality is the so-called degree
centrality (Cp). Degree centrality is measured by summing the total number of
actors to which a specific player is adjacent in the matrix. The degree of an actor is
therefore equal to the total number of direct links of a particular actor and all the
other actors. Actors that are represented by a high degree of point centrality are
said to be in 'the thick of things' (Freeman, 1979: 219). Such companies share the
ability to access a large stock of potential information sources. They can be referred
to as central sources of information, at least in terms of the number of other players
they are in contact with. On the other hand companies that are characterized by a
low degree of point centrality are somewhat restricted in terms of their potential
outside sources of information.
C,,
EQUATION 1 Freeman's (1979) degree cenira/ity measure.
.. a(P,P,,.)=l i/P, and P* are connected direcf/y, and Oofneroise.
The second centrality measure that was put forward by Freeman is the so-called
betweenness centrality (Cg). Betweenness refers to the number of times an actor is
located on the shortest geodesic path between two other actors. The expression
geodesic path is used to denote the shortest path between two points in the
network. If a certain actor is directly linked to two other actors who are not directly
linked to each other, then the first actor is said to be 'between' the other actors.
Freeman (1977) has shown that the maximum value of Cg is achieved by the central
player in a star-shaped network. In a star-shaped network all the organizations are
linked directly only to the most central player. The central player in a star-shaped
network is located on the shortest geodesic path between all the other
organizations. In an information network a company that has a high degree of
betweenness centrality has a potential to control the flows of information between
those other companies (Freeman, 1979; Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982). In this chapter
"* We decided to focus on three centrality measures instead of one because each measure provides us
with additional (complementary) information.
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we will therefore use Cg as an indicator of the ability to control flows of
information within a network. «*, fw.s»3«*< /^is/^ " «**?*•*«*!f* i^litfrf4: »v
EQUATION 2 Betoeenness centra/ify.
N represents the number 0/points in the graph, g,, represents t/ie number o/geodesic paths
linking P, and P, that contain Pj.
Freeman's third conception of centrality is associated with the distance between the
location of a certain player and the location of the other players in a graph. If a
company is centrally located in the graph, which means that it is close to most of
the other players in that same graph, then it is able to avoid the control power of
others (Freeman, 1979). A centrally positioned company is not dependent on other
companies for its information flow with other companies in the network. The flow
of information between such central companies can be direct instead of having to
go via an intermediator. The degree to which a company is close to other
companies can be measured by means of counting the geodesic distances from the
location of that particular company to the location of all the other companies in the
graph. Low degrees of closeness centralities are therefore associated with the most
central players whereas high degrees of closeness centralities (larger distances) are
associated with more peripheral players'"*. . , . -. , •!,•
(p,)-(n-l)/£d (P,,P.)
EQUATION3 C/osenesscenfra/ify.
In this chapter we will analyze networks of alliances on two distinct levels. The
first level of analysis is concerned with the characteristics of the overall networks
whereas the second level deals with differences in centralities among the various
focal players in the network. First we will describe the basic characteristics of the
overall network. We decided to focus on mean centrality and density measures in
Because we make use of a relative Closeness centrality measure, the most central players have the
highest closeness degrees. • . .. ..,,. ,;
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order to evaluate changes in the intensity of alliances between focal firms and to
discuss the average centralities that are associated with those companies. Table 9
shows the basic changes in centrality during the evolution of the various networks.
TABLE 9 /4:>erage nefuwJfc densities, degree centra/ify and fcefiueenness cenfra/ify measures
40 leading companies, 1970-3993.
Computers Semiconductors ;.'* Telecom
70-77 78-85 86-93 70-77 78-85 86-93 70-77 78-85 86-93
Density 0.003 0.132 0.2 •• 0.002 0.181 0.493 0.002 0.214 0.306
Degree 2 6.3 10.7 1.87 10.7 23.6 3.76 9.3 19.6
Between0.3 3 4.7 , . . 0.29 3.1 9 ; , .' 2.48 3.9 10.4
Network densities are calculated by dividing the number of existing alliances
among actors in the network by the total number of possible links between those
actors. Because network densities and mean centrality measures are highly
influenced by the total number of actors in a network we have normalized the
various measures by looking at the alliances of the leading 40 companies in each
period'^. The network densities as displayed in table 9 show that there is a strong
increase in network density in all sub-sectors under study. The same data shows
that although in the period 1970-1977 networks were extremely sparse, the period
1978-85 was characterized by a strong growth in the density of all networks under
study. This growth continued during the most recent period. Whereas network
density remained rather modest in the computer industry, the semiconductor
network has become extremely dense during the last period. The relatively low
density that is found in the computer industry can be due to the fact that R&D costs
in computers are relatively low compared to the huge outlays that are needed to
develop a new generation of micro-chip or digital switching equipment. The
pattern of increased density is confirmed by centrality measures that are related to
the number of direct links (Degree centrality) and in terms of the control power of
"" It is well known that the density of a network decreases exponentially by an increasing number of nodes (Barley
et al. 1992).
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the leading companies (nBetween). Both measures have gone up consistently
during the past 24 years. In the field of semiconductors the number of alliances of
leading companies have gone up from an average of 1.87 in the first period to 23.6
in the last period. In the telecommunications industry the average number of
alliances has gone up from 3.76 in the first period to 19.6 in the last. The growth in
the computer industry has been somewhat slower. These figures confirm
hypothesis 13 that the trend in the number of alliances is not only due to the
entrance of new firms into the networks but also for a considerable part to the
increasing number of alliances that are established by individual firms. The
betweenness measure indicates that today, firms not only have an increasing
number of direct links but that they also have a vast amount of power to control
flows of information between other companies. Again the increase in the computer
industry has been relatively modest compared to the increase in the other sectors.
Leading companies in the telecommunication industry seem to have the largest
ability to control flows of information between other companies.
7.4.2. Netoorfa o/./4/Ziances in t/je Computer Jndwsrry
Figure 30 provides us with a graphical representation of the strategic technology
alliances in the computer industry in the period 1970-1977. This period started with
the invention of the first microprocessor by Intel in 1971 (see chapter 5) and would
soon be characterized by the emergence of new types of computers such as micro-,
mini- and supercomputers. At that time the advantages of using strategic alliances
were relatively unknown to the business community. The new types of small
computers that were brought to the market at that time did not require the amount
of extensive investments that were needed to develop new generations of
mainframe computers. We would expect to find a relatively sparse network in
which traditional mainframe manufacturers are dominant. It is therefore not
surprising that the MDS plot (figure 30) shows a relatively sparse network that
involves 28 firms of which the vast majority are traditional mainframe suppliers™.
At the left hand side we can see one rather dense cluster involving a number of
major European and US companies which are all centred around the three focal
players ICL, Bull and Siemens. A second mixed cluster of US and Japanese
companies is located on the right hand side. This cluster is basically centred around
the Japanese giant Mitsubishi. We also observe a number of one-on-one links
The only links that can be associated with micro- or mini computers are the alliances between United
Technologies and DEC and between Tandy and Commodore.
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between either two Japanese or two US companies. An interesting link is the
alliance between IBM and Amdahl. IBM was forced into this agreement by the
threat of an anti-trust suit. It was forced to cross-license nearly all its patents with
its former employee Gene Amdahl. This enabled Amdahl to develop very cheap
IBM compatible mainframe computers which became an instant success. Cross-
border alliances are relatively rare at that time. Japanese-European alliances are
even completely absent during this time period.
( /'/HONEYWELL''
AjJ"BULL4 '
^S£M£NS*\
^MXOORF
^AMDAHL
SUMITOMO)
TOSHIBA^
lUN-TECHN BURROUGHi
V_DEC TATA _ /
TANDY N,
COMMODORE
DKB \
UTACH''
PL-SYST~^
FUYO—^ \
\ ^ MITSUI -)
FIGURE 30 MiancM in f*e computer iWuj/ry f/970-7977^
The results of the network analysis (table 10) reveal the dominance of European
firms in the early computer industry network. According to the number of
alliances, four out of six leading companies are based in Europe. The same
centrality measures also show that the companies in the first cluster are more
centrally located than other firms in the network. Even Mitsubishi which is by far
the most central player in the second cluster with 4 alliances has a closeness value
that is well below that of all the firms in the first cluster. It does not even come
close to the value of a company like NCR which has only two alliances. Three
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companies stand out as intermediaries of information flows: ICL, Bull and
Mitsubishi. They are found to be particularly active in linking other European
companies to their US counterparts. Mitsubishi plays a similar intermediating role
between US and Japanese companies.
TABLE 10 Netoorfc cenfra/ify measures m rte computer indusfry, 3970-1977
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
ICL
CII
SIEMENS
MITSUB.
CDC
AEG
PHILIPS
5
5
4
4
3
3
2
AMDAHL2
FUJITSU
SPERRY
2
2
HONEYW2
NCR
MITSUI
BULL
2
2
1
4.9
4.9
4.9
4.1
4.9
4.9
4.8
3.8
3.8
4.1
4.9
4.9
4.1
4.8
16
3
3
5
12
0
0
1
1
0
7
0
0
0
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
OKI
IPL-SYST
NIXDORF
HITACHI
IBM
ASAHI
TOSHIBA
RADIO-S
UN-TECH
COMMOD
DEC
BURROU
TATA
NEC
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Q
4.1
4.1
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.7
C
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Turning to the next period (1978-1985) we find a somewhat different pattern (see
figure 31). The multitude of lines that connect virtually all the companies in the
network illustrate the increased density of the computer network in the period
1978-1985 as compared to the previous period. Network density increased from
0.003 in the first period to 0.132 in the second (see table 11). One-on-one links
became very rare in this time period. Almost all the major firms are connected to at
least two other partners. This is illustrative for the growth in the number of
alliances during that time period. In such closed system were virtually all the
players are connected to each other differences in centrality among the various
companies are relatively low. There is only a 0.13 difference in the degree of
closeness among the forty leading companies. Very remarkable in that respect is
the relatively low closeness degree of industry leader IBM. Of the leading forty
companies only Xerox has a lower closeness degree. This means that in spite of its
dominant market position IBM can still be regarded as a peripheral firm in terms of
its degree of closeness centrality. Although the early domination of European firms
in the network decreased rapidly, a European company (Olivetti) still remains the
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most active networking company in terms of the number of alliances (see table 11).
Olivetti has a degree centrality that is more than 9 points above the degree of the
second most cooperating company (DKB). Olivetti is not only the most important
player in terms of the total number of links but also in terms of closeness centrality
and information betweenness. Only two firms (Sumitomo and Hitachi) have a
similar degree of centrality. In terms of information betweenness other firms such
as CDC and the Japanese firms DKB, Sumitomo and Hitachi play an important
role.
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FIGURE 31 i4Htonc« in the computer industry (1978-1985) ' •'
. ,ff
Japanese firms who played a relatively modest role in the first period have taken 7
out of 15 leading positions in the second period. This increase is especially due to a
rapid growth in the number of US-Japanese alliances. The increased Japanese
involvement in the network coincides with the Japanese invasion of the world
markets during the late 1970s and early 1980s (see hypothesis 14). At that time
Japanese companies primarily entered into alliances with technological competent
partners in the US in order to absorb their technological knowledge and for market
entry reasons. European firms seem to be less attractive to Japanese companies,
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probably because of their relatively low degree of technological sophistication. In
spite of the still relatively low number of Japanese-European alliances, we find a
rapid increase in the number of international alliances. In the first period the
alliances between organizations from different Triad-regions accounted for a mere
23.6% of all alliances. In the second period their number had increased to 53.1%.
This means that more than half of all alliances in the computer industry in the
period 1978-1985 were undertaken between companies from different Triad-
regions. This illustrates very clearly the internationalization tendencies during the
early 1980s and the use of alliances as a tool to deal with the internationalization
phenomenon (see also chapter 8).
TABLE 11 Netoorfc cenfra/ity measures in the computer industry, 1978-1985
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
OLIVETTI
DKB
CDC
SUMITOM
SPERRY
IBM
BURROU
MATSUSH
FUYO
BULL
HITACHI
MTTSUBIS
TOSHIBA
HONEYW
SIEMENS
BASF
AMDAHL
STRATUS
PHILIPS
NCR
CD
28
18
15
13
13
11
10
10
8
8
7
7
7
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
3.24
3.23
3.21
3.23
3.18
3.13
3.22
3.21
3.22
3.20
3.24
3.18
3.16
3.21
3.20
3.19
3.19
3.20
3.19
3.18
1314
699
530
763
214
285
359
221
206
233
557
104
33
100
158
169
39
39
115
38
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
CONVERG
ALPS
TRILOGY
AT&T
NIXDORF
COMPCO
STC
H-P
NETFRAM
THOMSO
CIPHER
CENTRON
ACORN
SIGNAL
MITSUI
SONY
MICROSFT
XEROX
CORONA
APOLLO
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
Or
3.18
3.18
3.17
3.17
3.16
3.16
3.19
3.19
3.18
3.18
3.17
3.16
3.16
3.16
3.15
3.15
3.15
3.11
3.17
3.13
c.
19
0
50
25
231
0
82
20 •
111
5
84
16
0
0
0
0
0
80
0
78
Figure 32 shows the network of strategic technology alliances in the most recent
period (1986-1993).
w ,
: • •• i
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FIGURE 32 /4//wnces m tte computer industry (2986-1993)
The increase in network density as observed in the second period continues in the
most recent period (1986-1993). Network density increased from 0.132 in the
second period to 0.200 in the last period. The network in this period is dominated
by four major US companies: Sun Microsystems, Apple, IBM and Digital
Equipment (DEC). This is consistent with the market dominance of US companies
in the computer industry. The US domination of the network becomes evident by
the finding that US firms are involved in more than 80% of all the alliances during
the period 1986-1993. The expected domination of the network by Japanese firms
(see hypothesis 14) can therefore not be found in this industry. Shifts in the leading
positions since the previous period were very high (see table 12). Only two
companies (Bull and IBM) that were among the leading companies in the second
period managed to remain in the top 10 of the leading companies in the computer
industry network in the third period. Bull even managed to remain in the top ten
for three periods in a row which indicates a remarkable stability in its alliance
strategy. Besides a peripheral cluster that involves Magna, Textronics, Photonics,
Zenith Data Systems and Planar centrality among participants is equally
distributed. Differences in the normalized degree centralities have also been
reduced since the previous period. This means that unlike our assumption in
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hypothesis 15 networks of strategic partnering cannot be seen as oligopolistic
networks in which a select group of firms sign cartel-like agreements among each
other. In terms of the mediation of information flows supercomputer producer
Cray plays a highly influential role. Other important mediators include Apple,
Sony and again Groupe Bull.
TABLE 12 NeftrorJ: cenfraWy measures in Wie computer industry, 1986-1993
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
SUN-MICR
APPLE
IBM
DEC
PHILIPS
SONY
H-P
THOMSO
TOSHIBA
INTEL
OLIVETTI
BULL
COMPAQ
SUMITOM
SIEMENS
DKB
KODAK
CDC
SAMSUNG
TEKTRON
29
28
25
21
20
17
17
16
15
14
13
13
12
12
11
11
10
9
9
9
Cc
1.39
1.39
1.39
1.39
1.37
1.38
1.38
1.38
1.39
1.38
1.39
1.38
1.39
1.37
1.38
1.37
1.38
1.38
1.38
0.46
CB
96
2257
232
527
0
2072
0
0
0
0
0
2170
0
0
591
0
1260
796
72
0
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
C
CRAY
MICROSFT
SEQUENT
HITACHI
TI
MATSUSHT
OIS
MAGNA
TEXTRON
PHOTONIC
PLANAR
ELEC-PLA
CONVEX
SIUCONG
HYUNDAI
MOTOROL
SEQUOIA
ZENITH
NOVELL
UNSISYS
8
8
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
Q
1.38
1.38
1.38
1.37
1.37
1.38
0.46
0.46
0.46
0.46
0.46
0.46
1.38
1.38
1.37
1.37
1.37
0.45
1.37
1.36
c.
3411
985
386
0
0
1100
0
0
0
0
0
0
1271
118
0
0
0
0
385
0
7.4.3. Netoorfcs o/i4//ifl«ces in SemicoMdwcfors ' • ' • • ' " • • • " * • " ' " ' -
Figure 33 shows the network of alliances in the period 1970-1977 in the
semiconductor industry. Whereas the first period of the computer industry was
characterized by a large number of one-on-one links and three clusters, the
network in the semiconductor industry can be described as a chain-linked network.
In this network almost all firms are linked to each other in a direct or indirect way.
There is only one one-on-one link (between Allied Corporation and the Radio
Corporation of America).
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Schlumberger seems to play a central role both in terms of its direct links (C^), its
closeness centrality (C )^ as well as a mediator of information flows (See table 13).
There are large differences between companies in terms of degree centrality,
closeness and betweenness during this period (table 13). As we focus on the
distribution of alliances among countries we can find only two types of alliances:
US-European and intra-US alliances. As described in chapter five the Japanese
involvement in the global semiconductor marketplace started in the mid 1970s. It is
therefore not surprising that in the period 1970-1977 not a single Japanese firm is
involved in the network (see hypothesis 14). Of all the European members of the
network not a single European firm is directly linked to another European
company. As discussed in chapter five European firms are very similar to each
other in terms of their technological skills and resources. It seems therefore likely
that European firms seek for other technological competencies and technological
complementarities from their US competitors instead of turning to other European
companies.
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TABLE13 NetoorJfc centra/ity measures m the semiconductor industry, 3970-2977 , " - / ' 7 ' ,:,s1.t
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
SCHLUM
UN-TECH
HONEYW
SIEMENS
MOTOROL
EXXON
AMD
PHILIPS
Co
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
Cc
20.2
19.2
17.7
15.5
18.3
17.3
13.9
18.8
c.
59
36
23
12
22
0
0
30 -<
9
10
11
12
13
14
, • 1 5
16
INTEL
TI
MICRO-CE
ROCKWEL
UNITROD
NAT-SEMI
RCA
ALLIED
Co
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
Cc
17.2
16.4
17.5
15.6
15.6
14.6
6.2
6.2
c.
22
12
0
0
0
0
0
0
Figure 34 reveals a closely interlinked dense network of alliances in the
semiconductor industry during the period 1978-1985. The network density
increased from 0.002 in the first period to 0.181 in the second"". In spite of their
market dominance in the semiconductor market, US companies have shown a
relatively low interest in strategic partnering during this period. Japanese
companies on the other hand were completely absent in the first period but are
now represented by 4 companies in the top 10 of leading networking companies:
i.e. Somitomo, DKB, Toshiba and Mitsubishi. The Japanese involvement in the
network again clearly reflects the growing importance of Japanese firms in the
world markets at that time (see hypothesis 14). In spite of their relatively high
number of alliances (CQ) Japanese firms can be found somewhat in the periphery of
the network but with strong links to technologically leading US companies.
European firms are represented in the top 10 by German Siemens, Dutch Philips
and Thomson from France. The US is represented in the top ten by its two leading
microprocessor companies Intel and Motorola. More noticeable is the presence of
Exxon in the top 10 of most cooperating companies in the field of semiconductors.
It is however not as remarkable as it seems knowing that Exxon was active in the IT
market through Exxon office systems and through its subsidiary Zilog"". There are
no major differences in degree centralities among the 40 most cooperating
companies. Less central firms are located in the left hand side cluster involving
109 This degree of network density can be compared to the density in the computer industry during
the last period.
noZilog became independent again in 1989.
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Telfin, CTNE, Advent, Brown Bovery, Saabscan and Olivetti or in the periphery;
i.e. Exxon, Schlumberger, Lucky Goldstar, NCR, Gould and Ferranti.
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TABLE 14 NeftiwJfc centra/ify measures in fhe semiconductor industry, 1978-1985
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
INTEL
SIEMENS
PHILIPS
MOTOROL
THOMSON
SUMITOM
DKB
TOSHIBA
MITSUBIS
EXXON
NAT-SEMI
AMD
IRI
TI
OLIVETTI
HITACHI
PLESSEY
IBM
UN-TECH
CTNE
Co
33
29
23
23
21
20
18
18
14
14
13
12
11
10
10
9
9
9
8
8
Cc
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
CB
1725
1366
948
811
693
733
1178
472
490
349
750
99
317
702
248
427
143
62
59
56
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
ROCKWEL
SCHLUMB
ST-MICRO
ADVENT
TELFIN
BROWNB
SAABSCA
CGE
GE
LUCKY-G
WESTINGH
NTT
MATRA-H
GOULD
FERRANTI
NCR
SPERRY
RICOH
HONEYW
VLSI
Co
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
Cc
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.3
2.3
2.3
0.6
2.4
2.3
CB "
231
370 j
231
0
o ;
0
0
227
174
64
37
23
309
166
450
132
18
5
239
114
Figure 35 shows the network of alliances in the semiconductor industry during the
period 1986-1993. It is evident from the multitude of lines in the network that this
industry features the most dense network of all industries under study. The
network density has grown from 0.181 in the second period to an impressive 0.493
in the most recent period. The top 5 firms are all major American companies that
seem eager to regain their technological and market leadership over the Japanese.
Remarkable in this respect is that pre-competitive cooperation projects such as
Sematech and US memories have not led to an increased percentage of intra-US
cooperations compared to other alliances. Intra-US cooperation even declined from
65% in the first period to 19.3% in the most recent period. Although they are still
active in the alliance network, Japanese firms have not been able to move out of
their peripheral positions into more central positions during the last period (see
hypothesis 14). Large differences in network density during this period do not
allow us to validate hypothesis 16 which assumed that there would alliances were
evenly distributed among the various companies.
*£-.•"• • ' t r * .
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TABLE 15 Network centra/ify measures m the semiconductor industry, 1986-1993
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
IBM
TI
MOTORO
INTEL
H-P
THOMSON
TOSHIBA
NAT-SEMI
SIEMENS
FUYO
AT&T
DEC
HITACHI
PHILIPS
AMD
MITSUBIS
DKB
HARRIS
APPLE
MATSUSH
CD
62
61
58
56
45
40
40
36
35
32
30
29
29
27
27
25
23
21
19
18
Q
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
c.
2219
3598
2616
3089
1423
2265
1160
692
1360
1329
1860
884
201
1816
423
1080
1001
362
671
852
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
SUMTTOM
AMD
GE
SUN-MICR
SAMSUNG
CDC
SONY
GENINST
OLIVETTI
LSILOGIC
MIPS-CS
MICRON-T
BULL
VLSI
TOYOTA
HYUNDAI
PRIME
GM
CONVEX
TADPOLE
CD
18
17
17
15
14
14
13
13
12
12
12
11
10
8
8
8
8
7
7
6
Q
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.4
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.4
3.4
3.4
3.4
3.5
c»
509
548
53
1149
670
82
232
0
1382
445
436
118
65
536
8
601
187
0
0
0
CHAPTER 7 185
7.4.4. Netoorfcs o/zl/Ziances in
Figure 36 illustrates the network of alliances in the telecommunications sector
during the period 1970-77. In this network we can find three major clusters. The
first cluster on the left hand side is a very dense European dominated cluster which
is centred around Plessey, GEC, BT and STC. The second cluster is a purely US
cluster involving a number of non-telecommunications companies; i.e. Xerox, DEC
and Intel. The last cluster is a mixed cluster in terms of home-countries involving
DKB, American Telecom and Telephone. , , _ __,.„,,
; - •
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FIGURE 36 ^//wnces in tfze fe/ecommMmcafions indusfry (2970-1977;.
The results of the network analysis that are presented in table 16 reveal that the
leading 4 companies in terms of their number of alliances are all European
companies. Again we note the relative absence of Japanese companies in the first
period. The only Japanese firm that was involved in the telecommunications
network at that time was DKB. The closeness centrality indicator reveals that there
are major differences in centrality among the organizations. The firms that can be
found in the first European dominated cluster are the most central companies in
the network, whereas the one-on-one linked firms Pirelli, IRI, Turktel and NT are
the least central players. In terms of betweenness centrality two firms stand out; i.e.
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GEC that connects African Telephone Cables to BT, STC and Plessey and American
telephony that performs a bridge function between DKB and Telephonay.
TABLE 16 Netoorfc cen<ra/ity measures in tfie fe/ecommumcafions industry, 1970-2977
,ft:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
GEC
BT
STC
PLESSEY
AMTELEC
XEROX
DEC
INTEL
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
Q
9
9
9
9
7.6
7.6
7.6
7.6
C.
3
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
'V':- 9
• 10
11
12
13
14
15
AFTELCA
TELEPHO
DKB
NT
PIRELU
KI
TURKTEL
Co
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Q
8.9
7.6
7.6
7.1
7.1
7.1
7.1
CB
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
As in the other sectors we are witnessing the entrance of Japanese companies into
the telecommunications network during the second period (1977-1985). Again we
can find basically three clusters (Figure 37). The first cluster on the left hand side is
dominated by the so-called baby-bells that were eager to gain more independence
from AT&T by linking up with other partners. The second cluster on the upper
right of the figure is dominated by Japanese firms that are centred around major
industry giants such as Sumitomo, Fuyo, DKB and Hitachi. The third broad cluster
features AT&T, Philips and GE as their most important players. In this cluster we
can find all the European firms and all the major US manufacturing companies
except for IBM which is located in the Japanese cluster. AT&T, the world market
leader, dominates the network in all respects.
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Except for the cluster that is centred around the baby Bells there is not much
difference in terms of closeness centrality among the various companies (table 17).
Two firms stand out in terms of their mediating role in information transfer: i.e.
AT&T and Siemens.
In the third period (1986-1993) AT&T was able to retain its dominance in
the network (see table 18). An other industry giant (IBM) even managed to
penetrate the top 5 of most active networking companies in all three sectors in the
period 1986-1993. This might be seen as an attempt to deal with the ongoing
convergence of information technologies (see chapter 6). In the most recent period
network density increased from 0.214 in the second period to 0.306. Although this
growth is considerable it still lags behind the growth in density that was
experienced in the semiconductor industry. Therefore hypothesis 17 cannot be
confirmed in this respect.
' • ? • - • •
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TABLE 17 NrtawJt cmtra/iiy measures in the telecommunications industry, 1978-1985
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
AT&T
SUMITOM
PHILIPS
IBM
FUYO
CGE
ITT
DKB
HITACHI
NTT
PLESSEY
SIEMENS
MITSUI
RACAL
GTE
OLIVETTI
MILUCON
WANG
IRI
MOTOROL
C D
25
22
15
15
15
14
13
13
13
12
12
11
11
11
10
9
9
8
8
8
Cc
3.3
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
CB
1788
739
921
872
378
626
830
429
115
397
324
1530
1530
213
271
418
50
535
398
212
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
ERICSSON
PAC-TELS
BOSCH
THOMSON
GE
SANWA
MITSUBIS
BELL-SOU
BELL-ATL
NYNEX
AMINFOR
USWEST
SW-BELL
CTNE
MITEL
TOSHIBA
MATSUSH
HAMBROS
NT
FERRANTI
c
7
7
7
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
Q
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.1
3.1
3.1
3.1
3.1
3.1
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
C
945
648
638
335
285
33
117
0
0
0
0
0
0
901
228
191
0
0
138
65
Figure 38 reveals a very similar structure to the one we found in the previous
period. Japanese companies are once again clustered in a separate cluster at the left
hand side of the figure whereas on the upper right hand side we find a cluster of
Telecom operators now featuring PTT-Telecom of the Netherlands, France
Telecom, Deutsche Bundespost and British Telecom. All the major European and
US manufacturing companies are located in the centre of the figure. Together these
firms form the core of the network. The top-10 of most cooperating companies is
still clearly dominated by European companies. Five out of the first ten companies
are based in Europe AT&T is the only telecommunications company of the US that
is represented in the top 10. This is not remarkable if one considers AT&T's
dominant position in the US market. BT seems to play a role in linking the
operators to the equipment manufacturers. Motorola can be seen to play a similar
role in terms of linking Japanese companies to the more centrally located European
and US companies. In contrast to the expected dominant positions of Japanese
firms in the network (Hypothesis 14) Japanese companies still form a very
homogenous group that are primarily cooperating with each other. The expected
growth in the number of international alliances in the most recent period
(hypothesis 17) did also not take place. There even appears to be a relative decrease
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in the number of international alliances since the second period. Whereas
international alliances accounted for 37.7% of all alliances in the second period,
their share gradually decreased to 30.8% in the most recent period.
TABLE 18 Netoorfccenfra/ify measures m the telecommunications mdusfry, 2986-2993. i;.^ .>.-!>
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
g
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
CD
AT&T
ERICSSON
SIEMENS
IBM
SUMITOM
CGE
DKB
MITSUBIS
BT
PTT-TEL
PHILIPS
NTT
CTNE
MOTOROL
DEC
FUYO
FRTELEC
NT
H-P
STC
Q
54
43
41
35
31
30
30
29
28
24
21
21
20
19
19
19
19
19
18
17
c
7.4
7.3
7.3
7.3
7.1
7.2
7.2
7.1
7.3
7.1
7.3
7.2
7.1
7.2
7.2
7.2
7.2
7.1
7.3
7.2
7130
4244
5034
2999
793
3477
2492
927
2536
1763
2383
1258
1301
2843
1786
1019
521
2014
1941
1579
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
CD
MITSUI
NOVELL
TANDEM
TELECOM
TOYOTA
NYNEX
C&W
DBP
SANWA
RACAL
NOKIA
MATRA
BOSCH
SUN-MICR
MICROSFT
INTEL
mi
SCANTEL
SOCGEN
COMPUS
Cc
17
16
15
14
14
13
13
13
13
12
12
12
12
11
10
10
10
10
9
9
CB
7
7.1
7.2
7
6.9
7.2
7.1
7
7
7.2
7.1
7.1
7
6.9
7.2
7.2
7.1
7
7
7
334
1320
2002
233
520
858
1299
93
9
1134
1352
933
1192
1555
410
340
165
0
82
0
7.5. Summary and Discussion • ,.; . •"
This chapter aimed to describe the growing importance of strategic technology
alliances in three major IT sectors. Our main goal was to broaden our basic
understanding of the patterns of evolution of strategic alliances and their related
networks. Empirically we tried to validate or reject eight hypotheses that were put
forward in the first section. Our first hypothesis in this chapter was concerned with
the expected growth in the number of alliances during the 1980s and early 1990s.
An empirical analysis that was based on the MERIT-CATI database reveals that
ever since the 1970s the number of strategic technology alliances in the field of
information technology has gone up dramatically. Before the 1970s strategic
technology alliances were virtually unknown. In the following years as companies
were slowly becoming more aware of the advantages that were associated with
such alliances the number of newly established alliances started to grow steadily.
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During the 1980s we witness an explosive growth in the number of strategic
technology alliances. This high growth rate was due to various technological and
non-technological factors such as the globalization of markets, the convergence of
IT technologies and rapid rising R&D costs in combination with shorter technology
and product cycles. Together these and other factors seem to have accelerated the
pace with which new cooperative agreements were established. At the end of the
decade the growth in the number of newly established strategic technology
alliances remains very high but seems to level off. In spite of the observed
stabilization of the number of newly established alliances in the late 1980s and
early 1990s this pattern closely resembles our expectations as put forward in
hypothesis ten. Growth rates in the individual IT sectors reveal that, apart from the
pattern of strong growth in the early 1980s that is found in all sectors and the
slowdown in the number of alliances during the early 1990s there are major
sectoral differences in both the number and evolution of newly established
alliances. Market structural and technological differences among the various
industry sectors seem to be reflected in different trends in the number of alliances
in each sector. •-.»-., . r ...'. ... :
S C A N T E L - -
- TOYOTA
SUN-MCR
/ i.-v >^ \
• ' / l ' , . — / - > • TELECOM
.... : ?••
FIGURE 38 A//ia«ces m (te (e/ecommunctations industry C1986-1993).
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After we assessed the overall growth of newly established alliances we focused on
the forms of cooperation. Although the joint venture has received by far the most
attention in the literature, other forms of cooperation such as research corporations,
joint development agreements, one-directional technology flows and technology
exchange agreements seem to play an increasingly important role. We divided the
various modes of cooperation into two broad categories: equity and non-equity
agreements. Equity agreements are known for raising the mutual dependence
among companies whereas non-equity agreements are often used to increase the
flexibility of the participating firms. An assessment of the evolution of equity
versus non-equity agreements over time has shown that the relative importance of
non-equity agreements has increased considerably as compared to equity
agreements. This is consistent with the often noted drive towards flexibility that
was put forward in hypothesis eleven. ;;fu 101 .;:.wnu::'5fiiim:Ktfr.<i'!i &H «r?v! >* -<
In the next section we describe some of the basic rationales for strategic
partnering in IT technologies. Firms in virtually all IT sectors have made use of
strategic alliances to cope with escalating R&D costs, the globalization of markets
and the need to monitor a broad range of technologies. In line with hypothesis 12
we found that the traditional rationale for the establishment of strategic alliances
(market access) has made way for new rationales such as a reduction in lead times
and technological complementarity. In spite of what was expected in this
hypothesis we did not find a significant increase in the relative importance of cost
sharing as a rationale for the creation of strategic technology alliances. It is also
stressed that cooperative agreements however do not bring about win-win
situations for all the companies involved. Failure rates of over 70% have been
reported in the literature. To raise the stability of its agreements companies should
be extremely cautious in partner selection and in deciding upon the content of the
alliance.
After having identified the basic trends in strategic technology partnering
we described the evolution of the cooperative networks by means of a statistical
tool that is appropriately known as 'network analysis'. We made use of multi-
dimensional scaling plots to display the networks graphically and employed
various centrality measures to assess the importance of the individual actors in the
network. An analysis of the overall network shows a strong increase in network
density in all IT sub-sectors under study. In line with hypothesis 13 we found that
sparse networks in the early 1970s seems to have evolved into extremely dense
networks in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The semiconductor network stands out
in that respect, whereas the computer industry shows only a relatively modest
network density in the last period. The same pattern of increased alliance activity is
found in the centrality measures that are related to the number of direct links
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(degree cenrraliry) and in the power to control flows of information between other
companies in the network (betweenness centrality).
In the last section we focused on the roles of the individual players in the
network. We tried to find out whether market structural changes are reflected in
changing positions in the networks of strategic technology alliances. One of the
major observations in this chapter was the absence of Japanese companies in the
first period and their massive entrance during the second period. This is in line
with hypothesis 14 which argues that Japanese firms become apparent in
cooperative networks during the second period. However the expectation that they
have moved into central positions by the end of the third period could not be
validated by our data. Japanese firms can still be found in the periphery of the
networks whereas US firms have been able to capture dominant positions in all
sectors but telecommunications. For the computer industry we expected to find a
structure that resembled the market structure in that industry: an oligopolistic
network which was dominated by IBM (hypothesis 15). Although IBM managed to
gain a dominant position in the most recent period the small differences in
centrality values indicate that the number of links are equally distributed among
the various companies. Therefore hypothesis 15 cannot not be validated by our
findings. Hypothesis 16 was concerned with the cooperative network of the
semiconductor industry and assumes that our analysis reveals a dense network in
which virtually all firms are connected by more or less equally distributed links. As
described above the cooperative network of the semiconductor industry stands out
in terms of density but the expected equal distribution of alliances over
participating companies cannot be found. Therefore hypothesis 16 can also not be
validated by our empirical analysis. The last hypothesis that was put forward in
this chapter (hypothesis 17) argues that cooperative networks in the
telecommunications sector will be very sparse during the first and second period.
The most recent period would however be characterized by a dense network in
terms of the number of alliances as well as in their international orientation. In
spite of the observed growth in network density from 0.214 in the second period to
0.306 in the most recent period this growth still lags behind the growth in density
that was found in the semiconductor industry. Also the expected
internationalization in terms of strategic alliances did not take place. There even
appears to be a relative decrease in the number of alliances since the second period.
Therefore hypothesis 17 cannot not be validated on the basis of our analysis.
In this chapter we were able to validate our first four hypotheses but we
were not able to confirm hypotheses 14 to 17. All the hypotheses that could not be
validated were based on the assumption that there was a strong relationship
between technological and market structural developments and the networks of
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strategic technology alliances (Casson, 1987; Chesnais, 1988; Mytelka, 1991). The
involvement of leading companies in the networks do not confirm Porter's (1990)
assumption that networking companies are basically non-leading companies that
try to catch up with the leaders. However despite the involvement of leading
companies in the network our results indicate no clear linear relationship between
market positions and positions in the network. This is in line with the findings of
Hagedoorn (1995: 10) who argued that ".... a possible interpretation of hierarchies
of strategic technology partnering as a reproduction of existing international
market hierarchies has to be rejected as too mechanistic and simplistic." Therefore
we assume that although there are a large number of indirect relationships between
industry development and networks of strategic technology alliances our results do
not indicate a linear relationship between them.
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Internationalization of Corporate Technological Activity110
The previous chapters of this thesis have shown that globalization is an important
and critical feature of today's IT markets. The telecommunications industry as well
as the semiconductor and computer sectors seem to have in common that an
increasing amount of boundary spanning competition between major multi-
national, or even globally operating companies is going on. Internationalization is
however not restricted to the largest companies but affects virtually all the
companies in these sectors. Because of the noted importance of internationalization
it seems interesting to study this phenomenon more in detail.
The so-called 'globalization' of the world economy has received widespread
interest from scholars in business as well as in economics (see e.g. Vernon, 1966,
1979; Hirschey and Caves, 1981; Pears, 1989; Bartlett et al., 1990). The expression
'globalization' is extensively used to describe the increase in the degree of which
companies establish value-added activities outside their national boundaries
(Dunning, 1988, Cantwell, 1991, OECD, 1992). Globalization is often described as a
process that will eventually lead to a single global world market in which
companies have become 'footloose' with no particular relationship to any specific
country. In such a global market large companies would have a global presence in
This chapter is partly based on
- Duysters, G. and J. Hagedoom (1994), 'Convergence and Divergence in the International Information
Technology Industry', in J. Hagedoorn (ed.), Technical Change and <he WorW Economy, Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar Publishers.
- Duysters, G. and J. Hagedoorn (1995), 'Internationalization of Corporate Technology through
Strategic Partnering: an Empirical Investigation', Research Po/icy, forthcoming. .,. .,..,. , ,
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virtually all countries (Reich, 1991)'". The globalization tendencies that are widely
portrayed and heralded in the literature (see e.g. Dunning, 1988,1993; Reich, 1991)
have however been questioned by others (see e.g. Porter, 1986, 1990; Patel and
Pavitt, 1991; Hu, 1992). The debate among scholars about the degree of
globalization and the character of the companies involved has become known as
the 'Who is US?' debate. Reich (1990, 1991) started the debate by questioning the
importance of national backgrounds for US companies. He described a process of
continuing globalization in which "... national champions everywhere are
becoming global webs with no particular connection to any single nation." (Reich,
1991: 131). Hu (1992) responded to Reich's statements about 'stateless' companies
by arguing that although companies have internationalized parts of their corporate
activities over a large number of countries, these organizations can still be regarded
as national companies with some international operations.
Because the evolution of high technology markets is central to our thesis we
will pay particular attention to the internationalization of corporate technological
activity. Our contribution to the 'Who is US' debate can be found in an empirical
analysis of the importance of national backgrounds for a number of large Multi-
National Enterprises (MNEs) in the IT sector. In the first part of this chapter we
will analyze the internationalization of R&D from a dynamic perspective of
industrial change. The main question that will be answered in this part is whether
companies are gradually becoming more international in terms of their internal
and external technology flows and the location of their R&D facilities. The second
part of this chapter addresses the question whether the internationalization process
has led to convergence among the structures and strategies of companies from
various home regions.
8.1. The Internationalization of Corporate Technological Activity
Several empirical studies have pointed out that companies are increasingly
engaged in foreign production activities (see e.g. Dunning, 1988, 1993).
Internationalization of R&D has received considerably less attention but is
expected to follow behind the establishment of production activities with a certain
time-lag (Pearce, 1989; Cantwell, 1991). In the literature on multi-national
enterprises several advantages of an international dispersed network of R&D
facilities have been reported (Granstrand et al., 1992; Miller, 1994; Pearce and
' " The foreign subsidiaries of these Multi-National Enterprises (MNEs) would then be linked through
major information networks that enable the corporate headquarters to communicate with their
subsidiaries and to maintain control at relatively low cost.
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Singh, 1992). The traditional rationale for the creation of foreign R&D facilities was
to adapt products to the local market or to satisfy host country government
regulations. By creating local R&D facilities firms can be in close contact with their
customers and major local suppliers. This enables them to respond quickly to
differences in demand among the various countries and allows them to interact
with their major local suppliers. Sometimes local R&D is a necessity to gain
government contracts in telecommunications or military equipment or to facilitate
local clinical testing as in pharmaceuticals (Granstrand et al., 1992). There are
however also a number of factors that favour the geographical centralization of
R&D facilities in the home country. The main reason to centralize R&D within the
home country is the existence of economies of scale and scope in R&D. If economies
of scale and scope exist, then one R&D facility is often more efficient than several
smaller facilities. The establishment of centralized R&D facilities near the major
production centres can also be used to improve the interaction between the
production, marketing and R&D departments. It has also been noted that
centralization of R&D aids the protection of firm specific technologies (Rugman,
1981). In the case of centralized R&D there seems to be less danger of knowledge
'leaking' to competitors (Granstrand et al., 1992).
In this chapter we will try to identify the major trends in the
internationalization of corporate technological activities over a certain time period.
Because the developments in the information technology industry are our main
research issue in this thesis we will study three major sub-fields of this industry
more in detail: i.e. telecommunications, computers and semiconductors. As
described in the previous chapters all these IT sectors are characterized by
international competition among a number of large multi-national companies. It is
even claimed that IT producing companies (in particular IBM) are leading the
internationalization process (OECD, 1992). Therefore we might argue that, if
patterns of internationalization can be found at all, they should become apparent in
a s t u d y o f t h e I T i n d u s t r y . ^ •;, . ••+,-. r - * . , - . , , ^ - , y . • . ; j ^ i j - T ; - ; u s * • : ; . ; .
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A number of recent studies suggest that multinational companies have gradually
increased their foreign R&D activities. An increase of overseas R&D has been
reported by among others Lee and Reid (1991), Reich (1991), Graves (1991) and
Miller (1994). These studies suggest that foreign R&D has grown much more
rapidly than domestic R&D expenditures. Others have reported a strong increase
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in the number of overseas R&D facilities of major multi-national companies (Peters,
1992; Pearce and Singh, 1992). In addition to innovation input statistics, measures
of innovation output have also been subject to a number of studies (Cantwell and
Hodson, 1991; Patel and Pavitt, 1991). Patel and Pavitt (1991) made use of US
patent statistics to analyze international patenting activities of large multinational
corporations. In their study they distinguished between patents taken out in the
USA by 'national' companies in each country from those taken out by foreign
subsidiaries of those same companies. Their study confirmed that although foreign
subsidiaries of multinational companies do indeed contribute significantly to
world innovative activities, this contribution was less than 10 % of world patenting
during the first half of the eighties'". Other authors (Cantwell and Hodson, 1991)
found somewhat higher shares of international patenting. They estimate the share
of US patents attributable to research in foreign locations for the world's largest
firms during the first half of the eighties at about 10%. These differences are partly
due to the fact that whereas Patel and Pavitt include small and medium sized
companies, universities and government laboratories Cantwell and Hodson
include only the largest companies. However, also their research indicates "... that
the world's largest firms witnessed a mild trend towards the internationalization of
technological activity over the 1969-1986 period ..." (Cantwell and Hodson, 1991:
137).
Following Patel and Pavitt (1991) and Cantwell and Hodson (1991) we
performed a somewhat similar analysis to detect a possible continuation of trends
in the internationalization of innovative output, measured by patents. In our
analysis we compare patenting activity in two periods, i.e. 1980-1985 and 1986-
1991. Instead of using data from the US Patent Office, as done in the studies of
Patel and Pavitt and Cantwell and Hodson, we compiled our data from the
European Patent Office (EPO). We choose to focus on EPO patents because it
seemed interesting to evaluate the internationalization tendencies from a different
(European) perspective. The EPO data set enables us to compare and extent the
findings of Patel and Pavitt and Cantwell and Hodson on US patenting activity to
our findings based on patenting activity in Europe. As with US patent data, the
EPO data allows us to differentiate between the applicant and the inventor. In our
analysis we discriminate between the total number of patents that were filed by
institutions from a specific region and the percentage of those patents that was
based on inventions from outside this specific region. We calculated the
' • ' ; • : • • ' • : - • . • - . • : • » • # ^ i f f j . ; • » > . . ; ; J % : ' | I . - - . • - . . • i ! : ; ' . . , • " • * • : . • • : • . . • . ! . - > • '
"* Only in the case of Dutch and Swiss companies does the number of patents from subsidiaries rise
to a very high proportion. This is mainly due to the existence of a few very large Dutch and Swiss
companies that have strong manufacturing and R&D assets outside their small domestic base.
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percentages for the whole population irrespective of size and institutional form.
Using the whole population of patenting organizations implies that we can expect
a lower degree of internationalization as in the case of Patel and Pavitt (1991) and
Cantwell and Hodson (1991) who focused exclusively on large organizations'".
In our analysis we compare internationalization patterns for three major
regions: Europe, Japan and the USA. Our findings on the internationalization of
R&D in information technologies, see Table 19, show that the US is leading the
internationalization process in all segments but suffered a severe drop from 8.0% in
the first period to 6.0% in the second period. Although for the US the percentage of
international patents fell in all information technology segments, this decrease can
be primarily attributed to a decrease of 5.6% in the telecommunications industry"*.
International technological activity of European institutions outside Europe
remains at 2.0% of total patents. Europe's percentage seems to rise in
telecommunications and semiconductors but decreases in dataprocessing. Japan on
the other hand shows an increase in all three segments. The major differences
between our findings and those of the other contributors can be attributed to the
fact that we aggregated our data at an European level. This implies that the
internationalization patterns for European firms found by Patel and Pavitt and
Cantwell and Hodson probably refer to intra-European internationalization. It
seems that extra-European internationalization of technological activity of
European firms is found only in a relatively small number of cases. ,..,,
* • ( •
, , . . * . . ^ - .
.«$ • • - .H . -JBS
"^ We axe aware of the fact that our findings are somewhat biased because we are not consolidating
the data to the mother firm. Research on a relatively large data set (50 companies) has however
pointed out that in virtually all cases mother firms applied for the patents that were invented by their
subsidiaries. An exception seems to be Philips were its US subsidiary tends to apply for patents
independent from its mother company. Other examples include subsidiaries that are taken over
during time. It might be argued that these companies are still operating as separate companies, at least
in terms of their R&D strategy. For a comparison of countries and changes overtime consolidation
seems to affect our results only marginally.
* This drop could well be the result of the divesture of large parts of ITT's European telecom
subsidiary to Alcatel in 1986. , , ,. . . . . . . . . . . .
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TABLE 19 Foreign subsidiary patenting as a % o/tota/ EPO patents, 1980-1985 and 1986-1991.
Source: European Patent Ojjfice
/Tfota/ n> Computers Micro si'.-.i- Te/ecom
80-85 86-91 80-85 86-91 80-85 86-91 80-85 86-91
Europe 2.0 2.0 '• 3.2 2.3 •'"'"""" ' ' 1 3 " L6 '"""*' 1.5 2.0
US 8.0 6.0 .! :• 7.2 6 . 4 ? . , . , : , . ,6.4. , . 5J. :••_,<-.> 0 • 11.7 6.1
/apan 0.4 1.4 1.0 2.1 0.1 1.3 0.5 0.8
8.3. International Strategic Technology Alliances '*' '*'
In the literature on internationalization it is sometimes suggested that strategic
alliances are essential to international corporate strategies (Ohmae, 1990; de Woot,
1990; OECD, 1992). It seems therefore interesting to consider whether the increase
in cooperative activity as reported in chapter 7 has been of a primarily international
character or whether companies are predominantly searching for partnerships with
companies from the same economic region. Table 20 shows the distribution of
strategic technology alliances within and between economic blocks in two time
periods (1978-85, 1986-93). For the total number of IT alliances the relative
importance of inter-region alliances shows a decrease from 46.2 percent in the first
period to 34.7 percent in the second period. The largest drop in inter-regional
alliances is found in the computer industry. In this industry international alliances
accounted for more than half (53.1%) of the total number of alliances in the first
period but showed a decrease to 39.8 percent in the second period. The decreases in
the relative importance of inter-regional alliances were significantly lower in other
IT sectors. Decreases in the other sectors range from 7 percent in
telecommunications to 4 percent for semiconductors. Although these decreases are
significantly smaller than the decrease in the computer industry they confirm that
alliances are not the vehicles for internationalization they were thought to be.
; T i ' . " 7 v " : . / r r ' ; . . ' " . ; ;•'. T / • ' -
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TABLE 20 Distribution o/strategic techno/ogy a//iances within and beftween economic b/octe.
percentages, 2978-85, 3986-93.
USA-EUR
USA-JAP
JAP-EUR
EUR-EUR
USA-USA
JAP-JAP
Tofa/
Tofa/
78-85
21.2
21.5
3.5
21.0
27.3
5.5
• - . • - . -
86-93
18.0
13.5
3.2
14.9
42.4
7.9
100.0 100.0
Computers
78-85 86-93
24.2
21.9
7.0
14.8
25.8
6.3
100.0
16.1
19.7 ' "
4.0
7.2
45.8
7.2 "
100.0
Te/ecom
78-85 86-93
20.5
"'•> 14.6
2.6
.., 26.5
28.5
• 7.3
100.0
22.6
5.2
3.0
22.6
35.1
11.7
100.0
Semicond.
78-85 86-93
20.7
32.9
3.2
13.1
25.7
4.5
100.0
16.4
30.5
6.1
13.8
19.3
13.8
100.0
Most of the arguments pro or contra the internationalization of corporate R&D also
bear relevance on the international partial externalization of innovative activities
through inter-firm partnerships. The bottom line of the argument would be that
there is a clear tension between international partnering benefitting from 'foreign'
capabilities and a larger degree of control through alliances that are closer to the
'domestic' span of control. We assume that joint R&D is closer to the corporate core
of most companies than the sharing of certain production facilities or the joint entry
of uncontrolled foreign markets. Therefore we can expect that the
internationalization of R&D through international strategic technology alliances
will still be at a moderate level compared to partnerships which are more directly
related to market entry arrangements and joint production. We therefore expect
strongly international oriented inter-firm alliances to be more concentrated on
commercial and production activities whereas R&D focused alliances are probably
of a less international character. ' ' - ' : ' : ' : '"* 5'1'i'v '* •-.-.•.-..
The data from the MERIT-CATI database until 1989 enables us to
differentiate between strategic technology alliances that are primarily related to
R&D and alliances that, despite their technology content, are also undertaken to
access markets or to produce or market specific products. This distinction enables
us to assess whether R&D-inclined alliances are undertaken by companies within a
certain region and whether market oriented technology alliances have a more
international character. In order to reveal patterns of internationalization we will
introduce a new measure of relative internationalization which we calculated by
setting the ratio of intra-regional partnering against the ratio for inter-regional
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partnering for each sector^ (see Table 21). This index confirms our expectation that
market oriented alliances are more international than more R&D focused alliances.
All the sectors with the exception of telecommunications show a strong decrease in
the degree of internationalisation during the second half of the 1980s. The overall
pattern therefore suggests that, despite some sector specific and/or international
irregularities, strategic partnering has become relatively more concentrated within
major regions of the Triad instead of becoming overwhelmingly international.
TABLE 21 Re/afire mteraflh'ona/izflh'on imfcr o/strategic tedino/ogy partnering m oueraW m/brmaticw
fec/mo/ogy"', computers, semiconductors and telecommunications, 1980-1984 and 1985-
1989.
Computers
Micro
Telecom
80-84
0.88
1.35
1.07
0.93
85-89
0.66
0.69
0.7
0.85
Martet
80-84
2.49
2.45
3.87
1.4
85-89
1.69
1.52
1.75
1.42
8.4. Convergence of Globally Operating Companies
After having assessed the degree of internationalization of corporate technological
activities we will proceed with another indicator of internationalization that is
related to the structure and strategies of major IT producing companies. In the past
decades many previously domestic companies have evolved into so called Multi-
National Enterprises (MNEs). These multi-national enterprises increasingly
directed their attention away from their home markets towards more
internationally oriented activities. In this section we will consider how the assumed
internationalization process has affected the companies involved. In the 'who is US'
debate as described in the introduction, Reich (1990,1991) argued that firms that
'** This relative internationalization index (RII) is calculated per sector as the relative distribution of
the inter-regional alliances (IA,) set against the number of intra-regional alliances (RAJ :
JA,
' The index for the overall information technology includes software and industrial automation.
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are operating in a global economy would have no particular relationship to any
single country. If internationalization has indeed taken place on a large scale it can
be assumed that multi-national companies are all facing the same homogenous
competitive environment irrespective of their home-countries. Many authors
(Hawley, 1968; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Dimaggio
and Powell, 1983) have argued that such a homogenous competitive environment
creates a group of homogenous companies. Those authors stress a process of
isomorphism among companies that face the same environmental conditions.
Following the lead of Hawley (1950,1968) they contend that " units subjected to
the same environmental conditions, or to environmental conditions as mediated by
a given key unit, acquire a similar form of organization" (Hawley, 1968: 334).
In organizational theory the issue of isomorphism is discussed in terms of
two fundamental forces: adaptation and selection. Adaptation takes place as firms
try to increase their fit with the environment (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence
and Lorsch, 1967), selection takes place if firms are unable to obtain the required
degree of adaptation. A better fit increases the profitability of companies and
enhances their survival chances in the long run. Less successful firms often try to
increase their fit with the environment by mimicking the structures and strategies
of their more successful competitors. Adaption to changes is however not always
possible. It is often noted that adaptation to changing environmental circumstances
is generally low, as compared to the speed of change. Under such conditions,
selection is given the time to take place. In organizational literature this relatively
slow process of adaptation is referred to as relative inertia', i.e. relative in
comparison to fast environmental changes'^. Inspired by the Darwinian conception
of 'natural selection' many authors in the population ecology tradition (Aldrich,
1979; Caroll, 1987,1988; Hannan and Freeman, 1977,1989; Singh & Lumsden, 1990)
contend that organizations that are best adapted to a specific environment survive
while other less adapted organizations die. In such a framework isomorphism
among organizations will take place because only those organizations that have a
good 'fit' with their environment will survive.
The same deterministic relationship between the environment and the organization
can be found in the so-called institutional school of thought. From an institutional
perspective isomorphism does not take place as a result of competitive pressures
but rather as a result of interactions between organizations. Institutionalists have
argued that isomorphism occurs either through coercive, mimetic or normative
mechanisms (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). Coercive isomorphism is associated
" ' Sometimes changes in the environment are so radical that adaptation to these changes is
impossible (see Hannan and Freeman, 1977).
204 INTERNATIONAUZATION OF CORPORATE TECHNOLOGICAL ACTIVITY
with legitimation and political pressures. Organizations are expected to behave
according to cultural and political standards and according to pressures from other
organizations with which they interact. Mimetic behaviour stems from
standardized reactions to challenges from an uncertain environment. In order to
reduce risk firms tend to mimic structures and strategies of successful other
organizations. Normative pressures result from an increasing professionalism
within organizations. All three forms of isomorphism are linked to the institutional
structure in which firms are embedded, f. '"i^ ••.iii-qtn"; i^?^ n*.s r -;n-
The concept of isomorphism assumes a rather deterministic relationship
between the environment and the individual organization in the sense that
organizations are strictly contingent on their environment. Although this might
hold for a number of small organizations, advocates of resource dependence and
strategic choice (Child, 1972; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) have, in our
opinion, appropriately argued that it would be very unrealistic to view powerful
multi-national enterprises as such. In line with, for instance, oligopoly theory in
economics large multi-national enterprises do not have to be considered as merely
passive recipients of environmental pressures, but they are primarily seen as active
organizations that are well capable of influencing their own environment (Pfeffer
and Salancik, 1978). Under these conditions, variations among organizations occur
partly as a result of strategic decision making within organizations. Strategic choice
theorists argued that companies can change their structures and strategies
according to their own perception of the environment. Child (1972) for example,
raised three arguments against the environmental deterministic view of ecological
and institutional theorists. First, he argued that top management has a considerable
autonomy in the organisational decision making process. They can choose from a
large number of options regarding their response to environmental pressures. The
second argument claims that organizations are often able to influence or modify
their environment. The third argument stresses that environmental demands are
not always very clear and that organizational decision makers often interpret these
demands differently. This may lead to different reactions to the same
environmental demands. It is clear that strategic choice theorists have a completely
different view on the relationship between organizations and their environments
than their more deterministic counterparts.
In this chapter we contend that multi-national enterprises are neither perfect
adapters nor completely contingent on their environment. The attention in the
present contribution for the international context of the competitive environment of
firms not only reflects the growing importance of the internationalization of firms
itself, it also intends to contribute to the 'imprintment' line of theory. Stinchcombe
(1965) argued that social, cultural, technological and competitive conditions under
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which a company is established will have a continuing effect on an organization's
strategy and structure. Although the imprintment hypothesis is discussed
elaborately in the literature (see e.g. Aldrich, 1979; Hannan and Freeman, 1977,
1984, and 1989; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983) there is, to the best of our knowledge, no
empirical research on, for instance, the continuing effects of the domestic
background of companies on their behaviour and organization in an international
competitive environment. ->3?.j <&r .T «viEn: 'ru-'i rnr-?" »>1AI
The main goal of the second part of this chapter is to assess whether w e are
still able to dist inguish among companies according to their region of origin
despite the reported internationalization of the world economy. We will try to
establish whether and to wha t degree companies from each of the major economic
regions have converged or diverged in terms of their strategies and structures. The
IT markets that are studied in this thesis are generally referred to as 'global'
markets in which companies compete on a world-scale level. According to Porter
(1986) such global markets are characterized by similar demand-structures and
similar product specifications. If isomorphism takes place then we would expect
that such homogenous market leads to an increasing number of similar
organizations. Two factors are in particular able to influence our findings. The first
factor could be the lack of a sufficient scale of internationalization. If the degree of
internationalization is too low then the condition of a homogenous environment is
not met. In that case we would expect to find companies that can still be
distinguished in terms of their country of origin. The second factor is the degree of
relative inertia that is faced by the major companies. If inertial forces are very
strong as suggested by Stinchcombe's (1965) " imprintment" line of theory, then
firms are still basically influenced by the social, cultural, technological and
competitive conditions under which a company is established; i.e. these conditions
have become imprinted in their organizational structure (Boeker, 1988)"*.
Patterns of isomorphism are analyzed in the same three sectors of the
information technology industry that are studied in the previous chapters. In this
chapter we will s tudy the structures and strategies of the leading companies of
each particular sector. 40 multi-national enterprises are analyzed in the computer
industry. Of these 40 companies, 22 are based in the US, 6 companies are European
and 11 companies possess the Japanese nationality and 1 company falls in the
category 'others'. The populat ion of the telecommunications industry consists of 5
US companies, 12 European companies, 7 Japanese based companies and 1
118
These arguments are in line with the ideas of Hu (192) and Porter (1986,1990) who argue that in
spite of their international activities, multinational enterprises can often still be identified by their
national backgrounds. ^ .'pv v^*^.-!/: »^ :: .•
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'miscellaneous' company. Our last sector, the semiconductor industry has a
population of 20 companies of which 1 company falls in the category 'others', 6
companies are based in the US, 3 companies are based in Europe and 10 companies
are Japanese (Table 22). For the analysis of differences or similarities among
companies from different home regions we applied a number of statistical
techniques such as discriminant function analysis and analysis of variance
(ANOVA). Discriminant function analysis is used to find out which set of
predictors can most clearly distinguishes between groups of companies that are
combined in terms of their region of origin. In contrast to regression analysis where
the dependent variable is continuous, discriminant function analysis can be used to
deal with categorical dependent variables. This allows us to differentiate among
the various regions by means of a discriminant function which derives the
maximum discrimination among the various regions using the country of origin of
firms (COUNTRY) as a categorical, dependent variable"'. ANOVA is used to
generate additional information that can be used to determine which regions differ
significantly on the various structural and strategic variables.
For our analysis we make use of a broad set of structural and strategic
variables. Measures of size and diversification are used as indicators of the
structure of organizations whereas three basic technology indicators are used to
measure the technology strategies of organizations'^.
Size of companies is measured by taking the average of corporate revenues
that companies realized during the period 1986 -1990. We have chosen revenues as
an indicator instead of the more frequently applied employment indicator to
account for quasi-integration. It is well-known that Japanese companies have fewer
employees than their US and European competitors due to the Japanese lean
production practice and sophisticated customer - supplier networks. However,
their size in terms of revenues, which roughly equals turnover, is in our opinion a
better indicator of their economic magnitude in comparison with companies from
other regions. Differences in size between European, Japanese and US companies
are analyzed by means of two specific indicators. The first indicator consists of the
average total revenues of companies for the yearly average of the period 1986 -
1990 (SIZE). The second indicator of size (DPSIZE) is related to the dataprocessing
activities of these companies, i.e. their average dataprocessing revenues during the
same period.
" ' The weights of the discriminant function are estimated in order to obtain the largest discriminatirig
power between the various countries.
'*° All the data that is used in this chapter is based on the MERIT-CATI database (see appendix 1).
CHAPTER8 207
TABLE 22 Companies in fne population o/dataprocessing, telecommunications, and semiconductor industries.
' ' " • ' Dataprocessing Telecom Semiconductors
USA
Europe . _.„ .
n : Apple
AT&T
CDC
Compaq
Data General
:V- DEC
Memorext
Motorola
NCR
Seagate
Storage
Tandy
TI
Unisys
Wang
Xerox
Bull
Mannesmann
Nokia
Olivetti
/sir;:;;
Siemens
J a p a n ^ , ; . . , ; :
f .-•• . '
• j < "•••- ' • •
Amdahl
Canon
Fujitsu
Hitachi
Matsushita
Mitsubishi
NEC
NTT "-•"
OKI
Ricoh
Toshiba
AT&T »«-«*
GTE
IBM
Motorola
Rockwell
fjB AMD
AT&T
Intel
Motorola
Nat.Sem.
s-jji v.'i*- Su *;<:,ore:
.. p.^, .., . . . . ,„ . , , ^.,,
Alcatel
Ascom
Bosch
Ericsson
GEC
Matra
Nokia
Philips
Racal
Sagem
Siemens
STC
Fujitsu
Hitachi
Matsushita
Mitsubishi
NEC
OKI
Ricoh
Toshiba
Philips
'•'••'•''* S i e m e n s
.: •..-, ,, SGS-Thomson
, • - • » • ; , v ^ • - . < ; • . • , • • i - . • • ; - . . • • . . , . .
. •• • , . . . . . . . , i !
' ' ' • ' ' ' • ' • ' " ' { ' " ' • ' •
• . 1 • • • - • . . ' • • f .
• - • • • ' , • " ! ' . - . * •
Fujitsu
Hitachi
Masushita
Mitsubishi
NEC
.«•. , , , . j . OKI
" Sanyo
v : / ' m i S h a r p -•'•• •'
Sony , ,
Toshiba "
Others NT Samsung
l7*i — ili i^Vj'j. •:•:"•.-•,
« • * . < • b • » • ' , ! '•
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Diversification is first measured as the average number of information technology
segments from a total of twenty segments in which companies were engaged
during 1989. The degree of specialization is a different measure indicating the
share of dataprocessing sales in total corporate sales during the period 1986 -1989.
These two variables suggest an inverse relation which, although plausible, is not
logically binding because the statistical basis of both measures is quite different.
We have combined our findings on diversification and specialization in one
measure, i.e. the overall degree of diversification. Factor analysis, in particular
principal component analysis, is applied to reduce our data set to arrive at one
composite variable (DIV). Principal component analysis provides us with a tool to
generate a single composite variable from several variables by reducing the data by
means of the factor scores that are produced in the initial analysis, see Hagedoom
(1989). - S • • • • -• , ' • • • • • . : - - > ? . * * . • ! ?
The technology strategy variable (TECH) is based on a number of innovation
and technology related indicators. The absolute innovative strength of companies is
indicated by their number of sector relevant US patents, granted in the period 1980
-1988. We have taken US patents because we expect the US market to be the most
advanced in terms of the combination of competition, openness and technological
sophistication, in particular in information technology. The absolute number of
patents granted was taken to have at least one indicator of absolute strength next to
a number of more relative indicators. Also, we found that the correlation between
R&D intensity, alliance related variables and patenting intensity is extremely weak,
whereas the correlation with the absolute number of patents is significant. The
other, more relative, indicator of innovative capabilities that we apply is the R&D
intensity of firms, i.e. their total R&D expenditures as a percentage of total
corporate sales during the period 1986 - 1990. Apart from these two 'standard'
innovation strategy indicators we will also look at two measures that are related to
strategic technology partnering behaviour of firms during the eighties. One of these
indicators is the so called T-M ratio which indicates if the strategic technology
alliances of companies made in the period 1980-1989 are primarily related to R&D
or whether these alliances are more closely related to marketing and market entry
activities. We have included this indicator because Hagedoom and Schakenraad
(1994) found that in particular in information technology R&D inclined strategic
linkages are associated with improved economic performance. The other
partnering related indicator is the generation-to-attraction ratio which indicates the
degree to which the strategic partnerships of companies generate technology to
their partners or absorb technology from them. We assume that the more a
company generates technology to its partners the stronger the technological
position of this company. We have standardized both these ratio's at a logm scale.
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Technology-to-market ratio's between 0 and +1 indicate an R&D inclination of the
alliances of companies, scores between 0 and -1 refer to a stronger market
orientation of the alliances made by companies. Generation-to-attraction ratio's
between 0 and +1 indicate a technology generating effect through the alliances of
companies, scores between 0 and -1 show an absorbtion tendency in the alliances of
companies. In order to construct a combined indicator of strategic technology
partnering behaviour of companies we applied principal component analysis in a
similar way as for the measure of overall diversification.
The overall indicator of technology strategy (TECH) consists of the combined
variables for patenting, R&D intensity, and technology partnering by means of
factor analysis.
8.5. Empirical Patterns of Convergence in Information Technologies •'•/•"• • '
As described in the previous section the variables for the characteristics of
companies operating in the three sub-fields of information technology are:
diversification patterns (DIV), technology strategy (TECH), overall size (SIZE), and
size in the sub-field of information technology (DPSIZE, TELSIZE, SEMSIZE). To
determine the most distinguishing variables, we start our examination of
companies in the dataprocessing industry with an evaluation of the Wilks' Lambda
and F values of the various variables see Table 23. The Wilks' Lambda statistic is
concerned with the ratio between the within group variance and the total variance.
A ratio close to 1 points at an equality of group means, whereas lower values are
associated with large differences between the various group means. For each
variable the F-ratios are calculated in order to test the hypothesis that all group
means are equal. The results for the dataprocessing industry indicate a strong
rejection of this hypothesis in the case of the diversification (sign. 0.0006) and size
(sign. 0.0085) variables. The remaining two variables, TECH and DPSIZE, show
relatively high Wilks' Lambda values and low significance levels; therefore, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the group means for these two variables are equal.
' . ' J ' . ' -:.1.V.« . i.; ^ .T,",': •« if
DIV
TECH
SIZE
DPSIZE
.66225
.94071
.76746
.99175
9.180
1.134
5.454
.1498
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TABLE23 Wilts' LwiMa flf-sf atisfic) and unrtwuite F-rah'o iw'Wi 2 and 36 degrees o//reedom, da(aprocessm£.
Variable Wilks' Lambda F Significance
.0006
.3328
.0085
.8614
In order to achieve a better understanding of the two variables that most clearly
distinguish between the major regions, we performed a one way' ANOVA to
measure whether group means differ significantly from each other. As our study
refers to three groups (regions) a 'normal' T-test study, which is only capable of
dealing with two groups, could not be performed. In addition to the ANOVA we
apply the so called Scheffe test because the size of groups is not equal. The Scheffe
test makes use of the differences between means to calculate an F ratio. This
enables us to calculate which groups differ significantly from each other with
respect to a particular variable.
The first ANOVA table (Table 24) shows that the mean values of the variables
measuring diversification for US dataprocessing companies differ significantly
from European companies, as well as from Japanese companies. The second
ANOVA table (Table 25) clearly indicates that US firms differ significantly from
their Japanese competitors with respect to their overall size.
After we evaluated the discriminatory power of separate variables we continue
with the assessment of the overall discriminatory power of the total set of variables.
We will consider the 'goodness' of the discriminant functions as is reflected in
various indicators presented in Table 26. The first indicator is the eigenvalue which
represents the relationship of the between group and the within group sum of
squares. Higher eigenvalues can be associated with more discriminating functions.
In this case the functions seems to have considerable discriminating power. Other
important statistics include Corr (canonical correlation) which represents the
proportion of total variance which is accounted for by differences among regions.
A chi square value of 19.621 and a corresponding significance of 0.0119 implies that
the hypothesis, that the mean scores on the various variables for different regions
a r e e q u a l , c a n b e r e j e c t e d . ; r - , - ,v ^ i t ; ^ r s ^ w ^ , r t ;< f . t , n ^ i « : -. *. •; ,.-.•» ••<-,.•,• ...
- ' ' " ' • • • • • ; : ; . . • . • ; c v - •• ; ; > • : ; . • .•, , - i . " t ; i » : " H ' • > ; ' : . ' • • ' ••. v > ••" _ . - -
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TABLE 24 One uwy una/ysis o/coriance in dicersi/ication, dataprocessing
-...**i?^}-W>i--fi)-v^ vi»;>- U E J
A r p "
Mean . Group . j . . / . ,
-.5079
.4915
.7414
USA
Europe
Japan
* Denotes pairs of groups significantly different at the .05 level
TABLE 25 One way ami/ysis o/uariance in o^era// size, dataprocessing.
u
sA
E
u
r
J
a
P
Mean Group
15.1958 USA
16.2576 Europe
16.4720 Japan
* Denotes pairs of groups significantly different at the .05 level
TABLE 26 Canonical discriminant functions, dataprocessing.
Pet of Cum Canonical After Wilks'
Fen Eigenvalue Variance Pet Corr Fen Lambda Chisquare DF Sig
::• •••;.•:• . - ;a; : ^ ' : ? y = . - u - . ^ t - 0 .5662 19.621 8 .0119
1* .5539 80.23 80.23 .5970 : 1 .8799 4.415 3 .2200
2* .1365 19.77 100.00 .3466 :
* morJ: the 2 canonica/discnmmanf functions remaining in fhe ana/ysis • • ...: . , .•
The effectiveness of the discriminant functions is measured by classifying all cases
according to their scores on the combined discriminant functions. Whereas the
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prior probability of classification is 33.33%, the actual classification procedure
results in a correct classification of 58.97% of the cases, see Table 27. This points to
a relatively large degree of divergence among companies from various home
regions. Japanese firms seem to form the most homogeneous group with a correct
classification result of 63.6%. They are however closely followed by US and
European firms, respectively.
TABLE 27 Resu/ts o/fte discriminant analysis/or dataprocessing companies. /.<r •
Actual Group
USA
Europe •
Japan
Ungrouped
No. of
Cases
,. 22
- , - . • • . • • • • • ; • . - s : - i : • • • : •
I t
1 " • • • " - " • •
Predicted Group Membership
USA Europe
13
59.1%
16.7%
1
9.1%
• 1 " " ' "'"
100.0%
3
13.6%
50.0%
3
27.3%
0
0%
Japan
6
27.3% , ,
33.3% , ;
7
63.6%
0%
We will follow similar statistical procedures for the international telecommuni-
cations industry. The evaluation of the Wilks' Lambda and F values of the various
variables in table 28 leads to the rejection of the hypothesis that all group means are
equal in the case of total size (sign. 0.0534). All the other variables show relatively
high Wilks' Lambda values and low significance levels. Additional ANOVA
indicates that no groups were found to be significantly different from each other in
terms of their size.
The 'goodness' of the discriminant functions which is reflected in the
canonical discriminant functions is not very satisfying. A chi square value of 9.876
which corresponds with a significance of 0.2739 indicates that the hypothesis that
the mean scores on the various variables for different regions are equal cannot be
rejected, see table 29.
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TABLE28 Wiflts' Lambda (Lf-stofisfic; and umixjriate F-rafio u>ifh 2 and 23 degrees o//reedom.
Variable Wilks' Lambda F Significance
DIV
TECH
SIZE
TELSIZE
.86703
.87885 •"•
.75645
.93246
1.610
" 1.447
3.381
.7605
. 2 2 3 5 *"••'
.2577
.0534
.4799
TABLE 29 Cflnonica/ discriminant/unctons, fe/ecommum'cafions.
Pet of
Fen Eigenvalue Var
1* .4610 77.24
2* .1358 22.76
Cum
Pet
77.24
100.00
Canonical
Corr
.5617
.3458
Fen
.•0
After Wilks'
Lambda
.6026
.8804
Chisquare
9.876
2.483
DF
8
3
Sig
.2739
.4783
* marfcfne 2 canom'caZ discriminant/unctions remaining in fneana/ysis ' ' •
Table 30 gives the results of the discriminant analysis for telecommunications
companies for which, somewhat surprisingly, 62.5% of the cases are correctly
classified. This percentage of correctly categorised firms indicates that the
classification results are better than expected on the basis of the canonical
discriminant functions. The classification procedure even managed to classify 75%
of the European companies correctly. This result points to a relatively
homogeneous group of European companies. The results for the Japanese firms on
the other hand indicate a relatively large degree of heterogeneity among Japanese
telecommunication equipment manufacturers. ...,.,,., _,^ ...»^ .,^ _ ......... .... „.,,„.„....
214 INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CORPORATE TECHNOLOGICAL ACTIVITY
Table 30 Results of the discriminant analysis for telecommunications companies
Actual Group
USA
Europe
Japan
Ungrouped
No. of
Cases
5
12
7
1
Predicted Group Membership ' -
USA Europe Japan
3
60.0%
1
8.3%
1
14.3%
1
100.0%
1
20.0%
9
75.0%
3
42.9%
0
0%
1
20.0%
2
16.7%
3
42.9%
0
0%
Finally in the following tables we present the analysis of the situation in the
population of semiconductor firms. Table 31 indicates that for two variables related
to the semiconductor companies we can reject the hypothesis that all their group
means are equal. These variables are diversification (sign. 0.0107) and technological
strength (sign. 0.0120), others show higher Wilks' Lambda values and lower
significance levels.
TABLE 31 Wiflts' Lambda CU-startstid ond umwinafe F-rufio uritft 2 and 16 degrees o//reedom
Variable Wilks' Lambda F Significance
DIV
TECH
SIZE
SEMSIZE
.56722
.57537
.76751
.90796
6.104
5.904
2.423
.8110
.0107
.0120
.1204
.4619
Analyses of variance, see Tables 32 and 33, indicate some major differences
between Japanese firms and other groups of companies. Table 32 shows that with
respect to the variable diversification Japan differs significantly from the USA. In
table 33 we see that Japanese companies also differ from both their European and
their US competitors on technological strength.
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TABLE 32 One a>ay analysis o/pariance in dioersi/icafion, semiconductors.
Mean
-.9822
.1764
.4563
Group
USA
Europe
Japan
U
S
A
E
u
r
•v.{!r.
J ,
a
P
*
* Denotes pairs of groups significantly different at the .05 level : >*••; - :„; 4,, , ; ,^;,^.; „.,
TABLE 33 One way anaiysis o/uariance in tec/ino/o^ica/ strength, semiconductors.
Mean Group
-.5909 USA
.9492 Europe
-.5241 Japan
U E J
S u a
A r p
* Denotes pairs of groups significantly different at the .05 level
The 'goodness' of the discriminant functions is reflected in table 34. A chi square
value of 27.064 which corresponds with a significance of 0.0007 for the first
function and a chi square value of 7.029 with a corresponding significance level of
0.0710 for the second function indicate that the hypothesis of the uniformity of
mean scores on the various variables between different regions can be strongly
rejected. - , ' '•'•'. / • . ' ; •
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TABLE 34 Canom'ca/ discriminant /i/ndions, semicomiucfors.
Fen
1*
2*
Pet of Cum Canonical After
Eigenval Var Pet Corr Fen
0
2.9818 82.70 82.70 .8654 1
.6238 17.30 100.0 .6198
Wilks' '
Lambda
.1547
.6158
Chisquare
27.064
7.029
- -
DFSig
8 .0007
3 .0710
* marks the 2 canonical discriminant functions remaining in the analysis . -!
The, by now familiar, classification procedure, see Table 35, demonstrates that a
total number of 89.47% of cases are correctly classified. This clearly indicates that in
the international semiconductor industry a substantial amount of inter-regional
discriminating power of the variables exists. Especially striking is the result for
Japanese companies were all the companies were classified correctly.
TABLE 35 Resu/tso/the discriminant ana/ysis/br semiconductor companies. *
No. o/ Predicted Group Membership
/4cfua/ Group Cases LfS/4 Europe
US/1 6 5 1 0
83.3% 16.7% 0 % •'••••-
Europe 3 1 2 0
33.3% 66.7% 0%
/span 10 0 0 10
0% 0% 100.0%
Lfngrouped ' ' *"'" ' ' ' V '***• '"'-^•'"*"'*])••••• "''''•'•'''''^' { p • •''•i-i;' '.st:•"' " J - ?o
• • • - . ^--' . •' •••••••.! '• f ; - . i ^ e ^ j - . i j * ^ -I'.-v s i . f l * c : n - ? c . j 1 0 0 . 0 %
8.6. Discussion and Conclusions
In this chapter we discussed the internationalization of corporate technological
activities and the possible convergence of globally operating companies. The first
part of this chapter explored the empirical question of whether we can find
increasing patterns of internationalization of corporate technological activity in the
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IT industry. In the second part which can be seen as a contribution to the so-called
'Who is US ?' debate we discussed the importance of national backgrounds for
major internationally operating companies.
Our analysis of the internationalization trends in the IT industry reveals that
there seems to be no sudden explosion of globalization in terms of innovative
activity. Our findings suggests that if internationalization takes place at all we can
only detect a moderate trend towards internationalization of technology during the
1980s and early 1990s. The majority of the companies in the IT sector appear to rely
extensively on their home country with respect to their innovative activities. EPO
patent statistics have shown that only a small degree of corporate technological
activity takes place outside the home country. Additional research on strategic
alliances shows that despite a rapid increase in the total number of strategic
technology alliances during the 1980s, those alliances have become relatively more
concentrated within major economic regions instead of becoming overwhelmingly
global. A related analysis shows that there are major differences between alliances
that are undertaken for market-related purposes and those that have a more
technological oriented content. Market-related alliances seem to be much more
international in focus than R&D-oriented alliances. All these results indicate that
apparently the IT industry which is often referred to as being 'globalized' is found
to be not very internationalized in terms of its technological activities.
After having assessed the degree of internationalization of corporate
technological activity we considered the impact of a possible internationalization
on the strategies and structures of the companies involved. Our findings suggest
that patterns of isomorphism have not yet become apparent in the sense that they
have led companies to acquire one identical or largely identical form of
organization. Despite their international orientation companies in all three sectors
can still be recognized in terms of their region of origin if one considers their
strategies and structures. •••-..-:.-•: ;, • ; r , . ; , : ; . * r T ^ I S V ' - U I ; l i > - • •-:• -•
In the statistical analysis of major differences between companies from each of
the three economic regions we found that only two factors have a significant effect
on the international differentiation of the dataprocessing industry. These factors are
the degree of corporate diversification and the size of companies. In particular US
companies are significantly smaller than their Japanese competitors, and they are
also less diversified than both European and Japanese dataprocessing firms. In
other words, at the level of multivariate analysis European, Japanese and US
companies are not significantly different if we consider their technological
capabilities and their size in dataprocessing. Our results also suggest that although
there is some convergence, the majority of firms still have a number of
characteristics that put them in certain 'national' groups. This holds in particular for
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Japanese and US companies. Half of the European dataprocessing companies are
on the other hand are clearly less identifiable as such. Turning to the
telecommunications industry we found that size is the only factor differentiating
between companies from each of the three regions, although the effect is not
significant for national groups as a whole. The degree of diversification, the
technological capabilities, and the size of companies' activities in telecommun-
ications do not differentiate between firms from Europe, Japan, or the USA.
However, the combined effect of some characteristics show that there is still some
divergence in the international telecommunications industry, in particular with
respect to the differences between US and European companies, whereas the group
Japanese telecommunications manufacturers appear to be quite diverse.
The third sub-sector of information technology, i.e. the international
semiconductor industry, generates somewhat different results. It is shown that
Japanese firms differ significantly from their US competitors in terms of
diversification and from both European and US firms in terms of their technology
strategies. The classification procedure demonstrates that almost 90% of the cases
are correctly classified. This indicates that in the international semiconductor
industry a substantial amount of inter-regional discriminating power of the
variables exists. Especially Japanese companies seem to form a very homogeneous
group of companies. For dataprocessing and telecommunications we found a larger
percentage of companies that are not clearly identifiable as belonging to one
particular region. Although this indicates less divergence as in the case of
semiconductors also in these two sectors the distribution is skewed and therefore
convergence remains rather small.
Our results therefore suggest that either internationalization tendencies have not
been strong enough to generate clear patterns of isomorphism or that imprintment
forces have restricted companies from taking on 'global' structures and strategies.
Firms seem to be still basically influenced by the social, cultural, technological and
competitive conditions under which they are established. The main conclusion of
this contribution therefore seems to be that, despite all the attention given to the
subject, internationalization of innovation, although by no means insignificant,
appears still less important than expected both in terms of actual
internationalization trends as well as in terms of the globalization of companies
themselves.
9
Summary and Conclusions
This thesis concerns the evolution of complex industrial systems over time, more in
particular it focuses on the development of three major information technology
sectors: i.e. computers, telecommunications and semiconductors. Whereas
traditional theories of organization and economics are often concerned with static,
cross-sectional analyses we put forward an integrated evolutionary framework
which is inherently dynamic. We argue that the use of such a framework
considerably improves our understanding of the evolution of complex industrial
systems. Our integrated framework is based on two distinct but related biological
inspired schools of thought. For the study of the evolution of market structures and
the importance of particular organizational types under different environmental
circumstances we make use of ideas derived from organizational ecology theories,
whereas for the study of technological change we build on the elaborated
framework developed by evolutionary economists. Although ecological and
evolutionary approaches form the core of our framework we combine biology-
inspired concepts with ideas from strategic management, organization theory,
industrial economics, new institutionalism and international business studies.
Following evolutionary theorists we argue that technological change is
gradual and that superior firms and technologies are rewarded by the 'selection'
environment. In the initial phase of the industry life cycle technological change is
expected to be radical and uncertainty is high. During time a product or technology
is likely to arise which stands out above all other products or technologies. These
so-called 'basic designs' serve as a sort of 'technological guideposts' for further
developments in the technology. Once a basic design is established technological
progress tends to follow consistent paths or trajectories. The cumulative character
of technological progress facilitates a rapid expansion of the boundaries of the
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technology until the natural limits of the technology are approached and
technological progress slows down. At that time decreasing returns from
investment in research and development induce firms to redirect their focus
towards other technological paths. • : .
Supply side developments in the industry are described on the basis of five
different organizational types. In the early stages of a high technology industry
when both market and technological uncertainty are high, first mover firms are
said to have a considerable advantage in the preemption of new market
opportunities. These so-called r-type firms are generally characterized by small
and fast to build organizational structures which enable them to move quickly into
new resource spaces. After some time, the establishment of a technological regime
initiates a period of more stable technological development. Efficiency then
replaces innovativeness as the most important element in a firm's competitive
strategy. At that time so-called K-generalist enter the market. K-generalists rely on
efficient rigid organizational structures and tend to emphasize efficiency and
accountability. When the natural limits of the current paradigm are approached
and a stabilization of the industry takes place, another type of firms, so-called K-
specialists start to outcompete their generalist rivals. Ultimately the market growth
starts to decline and new opportunities in other technological directions are likely
to emerge. At that time a new life cycle might be initiated and r-type firms are once
again expected to be the first to invade the new market. " ' **"*•'-.•"=••*< : »i
On the basis of this pattern of market and technological evolution we came
up with 7 basic hypotheses. These hypotheses are empirically evaluated under
three completely different industry settings. First we studied one of the most
dynamic industry sectors of all times, namely the international computer industry.
We examined the history of the computer industry ever since its creation up to
recent developments in the market. The computer industry has always been
characterized by intense international competition and rapid technological
progress. Then we proceeded with a market that in contrast to the computer
industry for a long time has been characterized by the absense of competition in its
market, namely the telecommunications industry. The telecommunications
industry has always been characterize by domestic internally directed markets in
which one main supplier occupied a monopolistic position. At first this
monopolistic market structure was due to the dominance of a single patent, later
regulatory forces reinforced the monopoly position of the dominant firm. Only
recently liberalisation and deregulatory actions have paved the way for more
(international) competition in the market. After we evaluated our framework under
such diverse industry conditions we focused on the semiconductor industry. We
choose to study this industry because it is characterized by strong forces of creative
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destruction that take place after the establishment of a new technological regime.
Therefore, market structures have changed substantially over time. In the most
recent period a battle for market dominance takes place between Japanese firms
that dominate the memory market and US companies that occupy superior
positions in the important micro-processor market. Given the large differences
among the various sectors it is very interesting to compare the effectiveness of our
integrated framework under such diverse conditions. Table 36 shows the findings
of our evaluation of the seven basic hypotheses as put forward in the second
chapter.
TABLE 36 Con^wwhon or re/ertion o/fhe sewn fcasic ftypoftees/br three dij^erent industry settings.
Industry
Computers
Te/ecom
Semiconductors
2
/
-
-
2
V
-
Hypotheses
3
V
V
V
4
V
V
V"
5
/
V
/
6
V
/
V"
7
*
/
/
rff'•'*'.'.
/ " hypothes i s con / i rmed • ' . . - . - • ' - - r : • <»t' ; • •••VK .-.•. ; . i .: .- . n i , « > . - , , , , , , . v :
hypothesis not confirmed . ,, . . . , „ . . .
* hypothesis not era/ua/ed
Our first hypothesis was based on the assumption that new markets are created by
radical technological innovations. At the time of founding, a new market is often
characterized by substantial uncertainty about the technological feasibility of the
innovation and its potential market size. Therefore commercial firms and potential
investors are often very sceptic about entering the newly born market. Because of
the absence of a commercial market and because technological developments are
often dependent on the underlying scientific knowledge base we hypothesize that
universities and government institutions are the main incubators of radically new
technologies. Our analyses show that this hypothesis can only be confirmed in the
computer industry. In the United States universities carried out large government
sponsored projects whereas in Germany and Britain a large number of government
institutions were trying to develop computers for wartime applications. In the
telecommunications industry government institutions and universities played a
more modest role. Especially Schumpeterian entrepreneurs such as Cooke and
Wheatherstone and Samual Morse in the telegraph market and Graham Bell and
Elisha Gray in the telephone market played a much more important role. The
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importance of these entrepreneurs in the first stage of the telecommunications
industry was possible because their early devices were relatively simple and easy
to build. Neither sophisticated materials, expensive equipment nor thorough
scientific knowledge was needed to build the early telecommunication devices. In
the semiconductor industry government purchasement and support played a vital
role in the establishment of the early market but universities and government
institutions played only a minor role. The great majority of developments in the
early semiconductor market came from the efforts of a single firm: American
Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T). AT&T was extremely interested in the
development of semiconductor devices for use in its switching and transmission
equipment. Our analysis therefore indicates that the role of incubators can be
played by a variety of organizations depending on the complexity of the early
devices, the role of scientific knowledge and the potential value of a new device for
commercial organizations.
Our second hypothesis argues that a newly emerging high technology
market is likely to be explored by r-specialist organizations that pursue offensive
innovation strategies. This hypothesis is among others based on the classic
argument given by Arrow (1962a) that a new entrant benefits more from a new
innovation than incumbent organizations because for incumbent organizations
innovations may cannibalize profits from other products. Therefore, the impetus to
move into a new market is correspondingly higher for new organizations. Because
innovative features are often more important than price during this stage of
development, firms are expected to focus on technological leadership in the
market. Our second hypothesis was confirmed in all sectors but the semiconductor
industry, where it could only be confirmed for the US market and not for Europe
and Japan. In the computer industry the major university institutes spun-off a large
number of new enterprises that used offensive innovative strategies in order to
satisfice military demand for highly innovative products. In the
telecommunications industry early customers primarily consisted of stock brokers,
newspaper agencies, railroad owners and the state. This group of customers was
well prepared to pay premium prices for increased quality of the services and for a
larger distance that could be achieved by the telecommunication services. In the
early telecommunications industry new organizations did not spin-off from the
major universities but were created by the same entrepreneurs that invented the
first telecommunication devices. The importance of innovative new companies was
also found in the early US semiconductor industry where small new organizations
managed to drive all the major vacuum tube producing companies out of the
market. A somewhat different pattern was found in the case of Europe and Japan
where the low mobility of engineers and the lack of sufficient venture capital
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inhibited the entrance of small organizations into the market. Therefore hypothesis
two could only partly be confirmed in the semiconductor industry.
Our third hypothesis was concerned with the cumulative nature of
technological developments after the establishment of a technological regime. It is
argued that the market and technological uncertainty that characterizes newly born
markets gradually decreases. Through selection processes it becomes clear which
technology stands out above all other technologies. A product or technology which
is able to accumulate a critical mass of consensus may then be able to become a
'basic design' on which future research will be based. The search for radical new
technological changes is then substituted by cumulative improvements along a
specific path or trajectory (hypothesis three). This hypothesis is confirmed in all
sectors under study. Basic designs such as the von Neumann architecture
(computer industry), Morse's telegraph device, Bell's telephone
(telecommunications industry) and Texas Instrument's silicon transistor have all
served as a 'technological guidepost' for many decades.
The standardized character of technological change induces firms to redirect
their focus away from technological performance and design towards price. Under
circumstances of fierce competition large efficient organizations are often much
better placed to serve the, now price-sensitive, market than their smaller
competitors. Their advantages in terms of static economies of scope and scale
enable these firms to set prices well below those of their smaller competitors. We
therefore expect that after the establishment of a new technological regime, K-
generalists and polymorphists start to outcompete r-specialists (Hypothesis four).
This hypothesis is confirmed in all three industries under study. In the computer
industry this so-called r- to K transition was started by a wave of acquisitions in
which major r-type organizations were taken over by larger k-type organizations.
In the telecommunications industry the r- to K transition started by the gradual
transformation of the two most important r-type organizations (American Bell and
Western Union) into large K-type organizations. By taking advantage of their
patents and rights of way American Bell and Western Union were able to complete
their transformation into large well established companies. Only a few years after
the establishment of every new technological regime in the semiconductor industry
large organizations proved to be more successful in commercializing the newly
established products than smaller organizations. It must however be stressed that,
in addition to static economies of scale and scope, dynamic economies of scale such
as learning curve advantages also played a very important role in this industry.
Therefore large organizations need to combine their efficient production structures
with a high-tech orientation. Our evaluation of the evolution of the three distinct
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industrial systems therefore confirms that after the establishment of a new
technological regime, K-generalist tend to outcompete r-specialists.
Although the pattern of r- to K transition at first may take place very slowly
the rate of r- to K transition increases enormously when competitive pressures
intensify (hypothesis five). This hypothesis is based on the assumption that the
degree of selection is positively related to the degree of competition in the market.
From an organizational ecology point of view, the degree of competition is above
all dependent on the carrying capacity of a specific organizational field. As the
carrying capacity is approached and competitive forces intensify, r-type
organizations will be increasingly replaced by their K-type competitors, at least
under conditions of price-based competition. In all three studies we were able to
confirm this hypothesis. Increased competition in the computer industry enabled
the leading K-type organizations to reinforce their dominant position in the market.
In the telecommunications industry increased competition that was due to the
deregulation of the telecommunications markets has led to oligopolistic rivalry
among a small number of very large K-type organizations. In the semiconductor
industry the early dominance of r-type organizations was soon replaced by a
concentrated market structure that was dominated by only five large organizations.
Our sixth hypothesis is based on the concept of 'niche-elaboration' (Pianka,
1979) which argues that the sophistication of users and the preoccupation of large
firms with serving the overall market opens up a number of niches in which
specialized firms can gain high rewards by focusing on the specific needs of a
sophisticated customer group. We argue that whereas initially the market was not
large enough to support multiple niches, the emergence of a mass-market makes a
strategy of segmentation viable (Popper and Buskirk, 1992). Once again this
hypothesis was confirmed in all sectors. In the computer industry IBM's power to
dominate the market, high entry barriers and the emphasis on price-competition
gave smaller firms not a single opportunities to compete effectively in the
mainframe market. Therefore, small specialist firms started to focus on specific
market niches. Small specialist organizations were responsible for opening up three
very important market niches. DEC opened up the mini-computer market, whereas
Amdahl and Apple opened up the markets for supercomputers and micro-
computers respectively. In the telecommunications industry the efforts of small
specialist firms were at first not very successful. Strong government regulation
prohibited other organizations to enter AT&Ts markets. The persistent actions of
small organizations would however eventually open up markets for Customer
Premises Equipment (CPE) and the microwave services market for new
competition. Although new firms were not able to attack AT&T's dominant
position in its core markets (transmission and switching) swarms of new
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organizations have successfully entered specific market niches. In the
semiconductor industry specialist organizations opened up market niches for
application-specific memory devices, custom chips and RISC microprocessors.
In analogy with the 'success breeds failure syndrome' that was described by
Starbuck, Greve and Hedberg (1978) we argue that large K-type organizations
would have severe difficulties in dealing with a paradigmatic technology shift
(hypothesis seven). The elaborated structure of K-strategists and their capital
intensive production system enables them to withstand competition for a long time,
but also prevents them from moving swiftly into new resource spaces. Therefore, if
new technological opportunities arise and the opportunities in the 'old' paradigm
decrease, r-strategists will be able to take advantage of the new opportunities much
more quickly than their established competitors. This so-called K- to r transition
was found in all markets except for the computer market where a paradigmatic
technology shift has not (yet) occurred. A typical example of a K- to r transition
took place in the telecommuni-cations industry where Bell managed to establish a
dominant position in the telephone market because its much large K-type
competitor (Western Union) failed to recognize the opportunities in this market. In
the semiconductor industry a paradigmatic shift in the early 1970s deteriorated the
positions of large well established K-type organizations in favour of small new
innovative companies. From the established companies only Motorola managed to
gain a dominant position in the new paradigm.
To summarize, our integrated framework as presented in the second chapter
was able to predict fairly accurately the technological and market developments in
all industries that were studied. Despite the important differences in industrial
conditions that characterize the three markets there is a remarkable resemblance in
their evolution over time. This gives strong support for a further development of
an integrated evolutionary framework'". All aspects considered we might
conclude that both biological inspired theories, although in their infancy, seem to
be very promising in handling dynamic phenomena. However, much effort is
needed for the construction of a mature framework. According to Kuhn (1970)"....
the success of a paradigm ( ) is at the start largely a promise of success
discoverable in selected and still incomplete examples. Normal science consists in
the actualization of that promise, an actualization achieved by extending the
knowledge of those facts that the paradigm displays as particularly revealing, by
increasing the extent of the match between those facts and the paradigm's
Given the observed importance of the policy framework in, in particular, the telecommunications
sector an extension of the framework to treat the policy environment might be needed to grasp the full
dynamics of these sectors.
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predictions, and by further articulation of the paradigm itself" (Kuhn, 1970: 23-24).
Thus, if 'normal science' is able to enhance the ecological and evolutionary
paradigm sufficiently, it may eventually replace the prevailing economic
paradigms. Cross fertilization between the evolutionary and ecological theories
seems to be an extremely important tool in achieving matureness of both the
ecological and evolutionary economic theories (see also Andersen, 1994).
Opportunities for cross fertilization are however not restricted to biological
inspired theories. In the literature the integration of biological inspired theories
with theories of industrial organization (Boone and van Witteloostuijn, 1995), new
institutionalism (Tucker et al., 1990) and even with strategic management theories
(Carroll, 1990) have been proposed. Therefore we will argue that 'local search' on a
specific scientific trajectory should be replaced by broader search patterns into new
trajectories and scientific paradigms. This might eventually lead to the convergence
of previously distinct scientific paradigms.
The second part of this thesis concerns an in-depth empirical analysis of
three major forces that have jointly determined a considerable part of the
development of the IT sector during the past decade: technological convergence,
strategic technology partnering and globalization tendencies. Table 37 shows the
findings of our evaluation of 10 hypotheses as put forward in the second part of
our thesis.
TABLE 37 Con/irmfltion or re/ection o/fhe (en /typo/tees in f/ie second part o/ffti's thesis.
hypof/ieses 8
V
9
-
20
V
11
V
12
V
13
V
14
-
15
-
16
-
17
-
hypothesis con/irmed
hypothesis wot cori/irmed
Chapter six was primarily concerned with an empirical analysis of the
technological convergence process. Technological convergence can be described as
the growing similarity among the technological foundations of the different IT
segments. The pervasive effect of semiconductors and software has blurred the
traditional boundaries between the various IT markets. An empirical analysis is
used to examine whether the convergence of information technologies has led to a
growing similarity of companies that are active in different IT markets. More in
particular we tried to find out whether ongoing patterns of technological and
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product market convergence have affected the technological cores of leading
companies in the computer, telecommunications and semiconductor industry.
Following evolutionary and ecological theorists we argue that a firm's reliance on
basic routines severely reduces its speed of adaptation. In spite of the technological
convergence that is found in technologies and products we therefore expected to
find companies that are still basically focused on their traditional core technologies.
The second major research issue that is addressed in chapter six is concerned with
the use of strategic alliances as a means to monitor several technological
developments. We therefore argued that firms would tend to converge through
means of strategic technology alliances. Our empirical analysis was based on two
types of data: patent data and data on strategic technology alliances. A simple
linear regression is used to measure the relationship between time and the relative
importance of patents and alliances in a particular industry sector. The results of
the regression analysis showed a confirmation of hypothesis eight which asserted
that firms are still doing more of the same instead of being involved in a process of
redefining their 'core' business. Hypothesis nine which argued that firms converge
through means of strategic alliances could however not be confirmed by our
empirical analysis. In spite of an overall growth in the number of strategic
technology alliances over time, cooperative agreements have not been used
extensively to deal with the forces of technological convergence. A possible
explanation for this finding is that the use of cooperative agreements for
technology acquisition is only effective if those agreements are combined with a
comparable degree of internal development. Overall our findings indicate that in
spite of the observed growth in technological convergence the technological
structures of firms have not been significantly affected, at least not in terms of their
patents and strategic technology alliancing behaviour. '" - i -
Chapter seven has been concerned with the rapid increase in the number of
strategic technology alliances in the IT sector. Traditionally cooperative agreements
used to be undertaken between enterprises in order to gain access to foreign
markets or to bypass government regulations. Today cooperative agreements are
undertaken for a much wider range of strategic reasons. The scope of these
alliances is usually global and cooperative companies are often more or less
comparable in size. Because firms are now often engaged in multiple alliances with
different partners at the same time it has become necessary to abandon the
traditional focus on the alliances of one specific organization. Instead a 'network'
perspective is proposed. From a network perspective the number of alliances is
only one of several important variables. It is argued that the assessment of the
power of organizations in a network requires a more extensive analysis of the
position of that particular organization in the network, its connection to other
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players as well as its ability to control flows of information. Our main goal of
chapter seven is to evaluate eight basic hypothesis about the use of strategic
technology alliances. The first part of chapter seven is concerned with the
identification of the basic trends in strategic technology partnering. We expected
that the number of alliances has increased considerably over time (hypothesis 10).
An empirical analysis of the growth of the number of strategic technology alliances
in the field of information technology shows that the number of such alliances has
gone up dramatically. Before the 1970s strategic technology alliances were virtually
unknown. A steady growth in the number of newly established alliances in the
1970s was replaced by escalating growth during the 1980s. In the early 1990s the
growth in the number of newly established strategic technology alliances remains
very high but seems to level off. This pattern of growth clearly confirms hypothesis
10. A detailed analysis of sectoral data on the establishment of strategic technology
alliances showed that there were major differences in both the number and
evolution of newly established alliances among the various industry sectors. We
assumed that the rapid increase in the number of alliances over time was for a
large part due to the need for more flexibility in the market. The increasing
importance of flexibility in today's market was said to drive firms to choose for
more flexible forms of organization. Therefore we expected that the equity/non-
equity ratio of strategic technology alliances has decreased significantly over time
(hypothesis 11). A critical assesment of the number of equity versus non-equity
agreements confirmed this hypothesis by showing that this ratio has indeed
increased considerably during time. A related analysis was concerned with the
evolution of the basic rationales for strategic partnering in information
technologies. A critical evaluation of the relative distri-bution of various rationales
over time showed that new rationales such as a reduction in lead times and
technological complementarity have taken over the role of market access as the
predominant reason to establish strategic technology alliances. This confirms
hypothesis 12 which argues that traditional (access) reasons have been replaced by
other reasons that are related to recent changes in the international environment.
After we evaluated the trends in the number of newly established strategic
technology alliances we focused on the evolution of cooperative networks. An
analysis of the overall network structure of the various sectors showed that sparse
networks in the early 1970s have evolved into extremely dense network in the late
1980s and early 1990s. Especially the semiconductor network stands out in this
respect, whereas the computer industry shows only a relatively modest rise in
network density in the last period under study. This confirms our expectation
(hypothesis 13) that the trend in the number of alliances is not only due to the
entrance of new firms into the network but also for a considerable part to the
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increasing number of alliances that are established by individual firms. The same
pattern of increased alliance activity was found in the centrality measures that were
related to the number of direct links (degree centrality) and in the power to control
flows of information between other companies in the network (betweenness
centrality). After having focused on the overall network structures we directed our
attention to the positions of the individual players in the network. Our main
expectation was that there would be a strong relationship between technological
and market structural developments and the evolution of networks of strategic
technology alliances (hypotheses 14-17). The results of our analysis on the
evolution of networks in the various industry sectors however show that although
there are a large number of indirect relationships between industry development
and networks of strategic alliances there appears to be no linear relationship
between them.
Chapter eight addresses one of the most important and critical features of
today's economy: internationalization. This process of internationalization has
received widespread interest in the literature. Most authors have argued that
patterns of internationalization would lead to a single global world market in
which companies have no particular relationship to any specific country. In the first
part of the chapter we analyze patterns of internationalization of corporate
technological activity in the by now familiar three industry sectors: computers,
telecommunications and semiconductors. The main question that is addressed in
this part is whether companies are gradually becoming more international in terms
of their internal and external technology flows and the location of their R&D
facilities. Data from the European Patent Office (EPO) enabled us to analyze
patterns of international patenting behaviour. The results of the analysis indicate
that only a small degree of corporate technological activity takes place abroad.
Additional research on strategic alliances shows that in spite of becoming more
international in focus alliances have become increasingly concentrated within
major economic regions. Therefore our analysis suggests that if internationalization
takes place at all it is only found in a number of exceptional cases. After we
assessed trends in the degree of internationa-lization of corporate technological
activity we focused on the nature of globally operating companies. The question
was raised whether large multinational firms are gradually losing their national
characteristics and become truly globalized companies. In the literature it is often
argued that firms that face the same homogenous environment will take on similar
structures and strategies. The results of an empirical analysis on the structures and
strategies of companies from various different home countries revealed that despite
their international orientation companies in all three sectors can still be recognized
in terms of their region of origin. Our results therefore suggest that either
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internationalization tendencies have not been strong enough to generate clear
patterns of isomorphism or that imprintment forces have restricted companies from
taking on 'global' strategies and structures. Firms are found to be still basically
influenced by the social, cultural, technological and competitive conditions under
which they were established. The main conclusion is therefore that
internationalization of innovation appears to be still less important than expected
both in terms of actual internationalization trends as well as in terms of the
globalization of companies themselves.
The empirical analyses in the second part of this thesis seem to confirm our
basic assumption that companies seem to be characterized by strong inertia.
Whereas firms seem to make increasing use of strategic alliances as a means to deal
with changing environmental conditions they do not seem to be able (or willing) to
change their 'core' structures according to the demands of the environment.
Although pressures for internationalization and convergence seem to be very high,
companies seem to have retained their traditional structures and strategies. This
gives strong support for the further development of theories that do not assume
rapid adaptive change within organizations. Inertia seems to be an essential
characteristic of organizations and should therefore be a core concern of every
theory of organization.
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77ie Cooperafiw i4greeme«fs awi Tedmo/ogy Indicators (G4TJ,) /n/brmaf ion System
The CATI data bank is a relational database which contains separate data files that
can be linked to each other and provide (des)aggregate and combined information
from several files. The CATI database contains three major entities. The first entity
includes information on over 10,000 cooperative agreements involving some 4000
different parent companies. The data bank contains information on each agreement
and some information on companies participating in these agreements. We define
cooperative agreements as common interests between independent (industrial)
partners which are not connected through (majority) ownership. In the CATI
database only those inter-firm agreements are being collected, that contain some
arrangements for transferring technology or joint research. Joint research pacts,
second-sourcing and licensing agreements are clear-cut examples. We also collect
information on joint ventures in which new technology is received from at least one
of the partners, or joint ventures having some R&D program. Mere production or
marketing joint ventures are excluded. In other words, our analysis is primarily
related to technology cooperation. We are discussing those forms of cooperation
and agreements for which a combined innovative activity or an exchange of
technology is at least part of the agreement. Consequently, partnerships are
omitted that regulate no more than the sharing of production facilities, the setting
of standards, collusive behaviour in price-setting and raising entry barriers -
although all of these may be side effects of inter-firm cooperation as we define it.
We regard as a relevant input of information for each alliance: the number of
companies involved; names of companies (or important subsidiaries); year of
establishment, time-horizon, duration and year of dissolution; capital investments
and involvement of banks and research institutes or universities; field (s) of
technology'*'; modes of cooperation'"; and some comment or available information
'*' The most important fields in terms of frequency are information technology (computers, industrial
automation, telecommunications, software, microelectronics), biotechnology (with fields such as
Pharmaceuticals and agro-biotechnology), new materials technology, chemicals, automotive, defense, consumer
electronics, heavy electrical equipment, food & beverages, etc. All fields have important subfields.
As principal modes of cooperation we regard equity joint ventures, joint R&D projects, technology exchange
agreements, minority and cross-holdings, particular customer-supplier relations, one-directional technology
flows. Each mode of cooperation has a number of particular categories.
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about progress. Depending on the very form of cooperation we collect information
on the operational context; the name of the agreement or project; equity sharing;
the direction of capital or technology flows; the degree of participation in case of
minority holdings; some information about motives underlying the alliance; the
character of cooperation, such as basic research, applied research, or product
development possibly associated with production and/or marketing arrangements.
In some cases we also indicate who has benefitted most.
The second major entity is the individual subsidiary or parent company
involved in one (registered) alliance at least. In the first place we assess the
company's cooperative strategy by adding its alliances and computing its network
centrality. Second, we ascertain its nationality, its possible (majority) owner in case
this is an industrial firm, too. Changes in (majority) ownership in the eighties were
also registered. Next, we determine the main branch in which it is operating and
classify its number of employees. In addition, for three separate subsets of firms
time-series for employment, turnover, net income, R&D expenditures and numbers
of assigned US patents have been stored. The first subset is based on the Business
Week R&D Scoreboard, the second on Fortune's International 500, and the third
group was retrieved from the US Department of Commerce's patent tapes. From
the Business Week R&D Scoreboard we took R&D expenditure, net income, sales
and number of employees. In 1980 some 750 companies were filed; during the next
years this number gradually increased upto 900 companies in 1988, which were
spread among 40 industry groups. The Fortune's International 500 of the largest
corporations outside the US provides amongst others information about sales
(upon which the rankings are based), net income and number of employees.
A third entity was recently added in order to perform more in-depth
research in the information technology field. For this purpose detailed information
on leading companies in the three major segments of the information technology
industry were included in the database. These major segments comprise the
dataprocessing, telecommunications, and micro-electronics industry. For all three
industries information on the direction of technology flows and on technology to
market ratio's of major players in these industries were processed from the CAT!
alliance database and stored in a separate entity. Information on technology flows
is used to measure the degree to which the strategic partnerships of companies
generate technology to their partners or absorb technology from them. Technology
to market ratio's are created in order to measure whether a company's alliances are
primarily focused on research or used for market-entry purposes. This information
was subsequently complemented by information technology diversification
patterns of the same firms which we were able to obtain from Elsevier's World
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Electronics Company File. In order to measure the research activities of these firms
detailed patenting behaviour information was processed from the US department
of Commerce patent tapes. In addition we included complementary data from
various sources. The Gartner Group provided us with a comprehensive data set
which comprised information on corporate sales, data processing sales, R&D
expenditures and operating income of the 100 largest worldwide data processing
companies. Whereas data on the telecommunications industry was gathered from
various sources. Publications of telecommunications sales of major
telecommunications firms were found in specialized journals and newspapers,
books and annual reports. Sources include IDATE, DATAQUEST and BIPE. R&D
expenditures were already available from the CATI database, or taken from annual
reports or Elsevier's World Electronics Company File. Micro-electronics sales data
were also obtained from various specialized journals and from newspapers. All
journals and newspapers we used for our sample made use of Dataquest data.
Once again R&D expenditure data as well as total sales data were obtained from
the CATI database as well as from annual reports and Elsevier's World Electronics
Company File.
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Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Dit boek beschrijft de ontwikkeling van markten en technologieen vanuit een
evolutionair perspectief. Met name de relatie en interactie tussen technologische en
markt-structurele ontwikkelingen wordt nader bestudeerd. Het theoretisch
raamwerk dat voor de beschrijving van deze ontwikkelingen wordt gebruikt is
gebaseerd op concepten uit de biologie. De biologie kent in tegenstelling tot de
economie een lange traditie in het beschrijven van tijdgebonden ontwikkelingen. In
dit proefschrift proberen we aan te tonen dat de dynamische inzichten die
oorspronkelijk werden ontwikkeld voor het beschrijven van de evolutie van de
mens en (andere) diersoorten zeer goed bruikbaar zijn bij het beschrijven van de
evolutie van complexe industriele systemen. We denken hierbij met name aan de
uit de biologie bekende Darwiniaanse en Lamarckiaanse evolutionaire theorieen.
Het centrale element in deze theorieen wordt gevormd door het concept
'natuurlijke selectie'. Het begrip 'natuurlijke selectie' wordt veelal gebruikt om aan
te geven dat er een vorm van selectie plaatsvindt waarin dieren, planten of mensen
die het best aangepast zijn aan de op dat moment heersende omgeving zullen
overleven, terwijl anderen ten onder zullen gaan. In een economische context
kunnen we beargumenteren dat bedrijven die voldoen aan de eisen van hun
omgeving snel kunnen groeien, terwijl bedrijven die minder goed aangepast zijn
aan de op dat moment geldende omstandigheden getroffen zullen worden door
lagere verkopen en winsten.
Na een korte inleiding introduceren we een gei'ntegreerd evolutionair
raamwerk dat uiteindelijk zal dienen om de evolutie van complexe industriele
systemen te beschrijven en eventueel te voorspellen. Het raamwerk bestaat uit twee
fundamentele peilers: evolutionaire economie en ecologische organisatie theorie.
Het inzicht dat verkregen wordt door het integreren van deze twee door de
biologische wetenschappen geinspireerde theorieen wordt gebruikt om een aantal
hypothesen te formuleren omtrent de evolutie van industriele systemen. Deze
hypothesen worden vervolgens getoetst aan de ontwikkeling van drie belangrijke
markten in de informatie technologie sector. We beschrijven achtereenvolgens; de
computer industrie, de telecommunicate Industrie, en tenslotte de micro-
elektronica industrie. Zoals zal blijken uit de onderstaande beschrijvingen zijn er
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zeer grote verschillen tussen de drie sectoren in zowel technologisch, institutioneel
alsmede in markt-structureel opzicht. Juist deze verschillen maken het interessant
om ons raamwerk te toetsen aan zulk een mengeling van sectoren. We starten de
industrie analyse met een beschrijving van de computer industrie. Deze sector is
niet alleen interessant vanwege haar strategische belang voor de toekomstige
informatie-maatschappij maar ook vanwege haar turbulente historie. De sector
wordt al geruime tijd gekenmerkt door bijzonder sterke concurrentie tussen grote
intemationaal opererende bedrijven. Op dit moment vindt in deze sector een golf
van herstructurering en consolidatie plaats. Een dergelijke turbulente sector lijkt bij
uitstek geschikt om onze hypothesen met betrekking tot de evolutie van complexe
industriele systemen te evalueren.
Hoofdstuk vier beschrijft de ontwikkeling van een traditioneel sterk
gereguleerde industrie, namelijk de telecommunicatie industrie. Deze sector werd
van oudsher gekenmerkt door de dominante positie van enkele door de overheid
aangewezen ondememingen. Op dit moment vindt er echter een wereldwijde golf
van deregulating en liberalisatie plaats. Dit geeft andere ondememingen een betere
kans om te concurreren op de traditioneel beschermde nationale markten. Ook in
dit hoofdstuk worden de geformuleerde hypothesen geevalueerd aan de hand van
de geobserveerde ontwikkeling van de industrie.
Het vijfde hoofdstuk beschrijft de historische ontwikkeling van de micro-
elektronica sector. Deze sector is niet alleen van belang vanwege haar grote invloed
op de evolutie van de andere IT sectoren maar ook vanwege haar enorm snelle
technologische en markt-strucrurele ontwikkelingen. Als we kijken naar de
resultaten van de toetsing van de verschillende sectoren zien we dat het
evolutionaire raamwerk zowel de markt-strucrurele als de technologische
ontwikkelingen in de diverse industrieen vrij nauwkeurig voorspelt. Ondanks de
hierboven beschreven verschillen tussen de IT sectoren blijkt de evolutie van de
sectoren een groot aantal sterke overeenkomsten te vertonen.
Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift behandelt een aantal relevante
gemeenschappelijke aspecten van de diverse IT sectoren vanuit een meer
kwantitatief empirisch perspectief. Hoofdstuk vijf bestudeert het effect van een van
de belangrijkste technologische ontwikkelingen in de informatie technologie sector,
namelijk technologische convergence. Technologische convergentie duidt op het in
toenemende mate vervagen van de grenzen tussen de diverse IT sectoren. Het
groeiende belang van software en micro-elektronica in alle sectoren van de
informatie technologie sector heeft ertoe geleid dat de produkten van de
verschillende industrieen steeds vaker gebaseerd zijn op dezelfde (digitale)
technologieen. Was er vroeger nog een duidelijk onderscheid tussen een
(handbediende) telefooncentrale en een computer, tegenwoordig zijn de nieuwste
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(digitale) telefooncentrales in feite geavanceerde computers. Het ontstaan van
uitgebreide netwerken waarin computers en telecommunicatie apparatuur continu
met elkaar verbonden zijn heeft de traditionele scheiding tussen computer en
telecommunicatie apparatuur nog verder vervaagd. In hoofdstuk zes wordt door
middel van een statistische analyse getoetst of een dergelijke technologische
convergentie heeft geleid tot een toenemende similariteit tussen de bedrijven uit de
verschillende sectoren. De resultaten van de analyse tonen aan dat ondanks de
sterke technologische convergentie bedrijven zich nog steeds voomamelijk richten
op hun traditionele 'core' technologieen. Ook de veronderstelling dat bedrijven
convergeren door middel van technologische allianties die gericht zijn op het
verkrijgen van kennis die zich bevindt buiten hun 'core' sector werd niet bevestigd
door onze studie. Sinds het einde van de jaren zeventig zien we echter wel een
steeds toenemend aantal bedrijven dat samenwerkings-overeenkomsten met elkaar
aangaat. Dit fenomeen dat 'strategische samenwerking' wordt genoemd wordt
bestudeerd in hoofdstuk zeven. In de jaren zestig en zeventig werden strategische
allianties vooral ondemomen door kleine ondememingen. In de jaren tachtig
vinden we vervolgens een sterke groei in het aantal allianties van multinationale
ondememingen. Terwijl in de jaren zestig en zeventig strategische allianties vooral
gebruikt werden om toegang te verkrijgen tot buitenlandse markten worden
strategische technologie allianties in toenemende mate gebruikt voor andere
redenen, zoals het verlagen van kosten, het zoeken naar technologische
competenties bij andere ondememingen en het verkorten van de 'time to market'.
Extreem snelle technologische ontwikkelingen die gepaard gaan met dramatisch
toenemende kosten van het onderzoekswerk hebben een groot aantal bedrijven
aangespoord om te zoeken naar nieuwe wegen om deze ontwikkelingskosten te
verlagen. Een van de opties om tot lagere onderzoek- en ontwikkelingskosten te
komen is het aangaan van een strategische technologie alliantie. Het delen van
onderzoekskosten met technologisch competente ondememingen door middel van
strategische technologie allianties leidt niet alleen tot lagere onderzoekskosten per
onderneming maar geeft tevens toegang tot een ongekend groot kennispotentieel
bij andere ondememingen. De bestudering van de groei van het aantal strategische
technologie allianties toont aan dat tot de jaren zeventig nauwelijks strategische
allianties werden ondemomen. Gedurende de jaren zeventig maar vooral in de
jaren tachtig zien we echter een explosieve groei in het aantal nieuwe allianties.
Deze explosieve groei eindigde in het begin van de jaren negentig waarin we zien
dat het aantal nieuwe allianties langzaam stabiliseert. Na het analyseren van de
belangrijkste trends in het aantal samenwerkingsverbanden, de voornaamste
motieven en de vormen van samenwerking gaan we over tot het analyseren van de
structuren van de netwerken van samenwerkingsverbanden. De resultaten van de
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'netwerk analyse' tonen aan dat er geen directe relatie gevonden kan worden
tussen de ontwikkeling van markt-structuren en de evolutie van de specifieke
netwerken van strategische allianties.
In hoofdstuk acht behandelen we tenslotte een fenomeen dat evenals
samenwerking plaatsvindt in bijna alle industriele sectoren, namelijk
internationalisering. In het eerste gedeelte van het hoofdstuk maken we gebruik
van recente data om het belang van internationalisering van technologische
activiteiten te onderzoeken. De resultaten van een analyse gebaseerd op patent- en
samenwerkings gegevens tonen aan dat er ondanks de sterke internationalisering
van de produktie er nauwelijks sprake is van internationalisering van
technologische ontwikkeling. In het tweede gedeelte proberen we het effect van
internationalisering op de structuren en strategieen van grote internationaal
opererende bedrijven te onderzoeken. We stellen daarbij de vraag of door de
toenemende internationalisering grote internationaal opererende bedrijven
eenzelfde strategic of structuur gaan hanteren. De empirische resultaten laten
echter zien dat ondanks hun international activiteiten de meeste ondernemingen
nog steeds gekenmerkt worden door nationale of regionale kenmerken. We
beeindigen dit boek met een evaluatie van de resultaten van de empirische studies
en met het geven van enkele suggesties voor een toekomstige onderzoeks agenda.
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